Maia Sandu and her opponent Alexandr Stoianoglo. Screenshot of video “Moldova's pro-Western incumbent Maia Sandu claims election win | AC1G” from the Talk Shows Central YouTube channel. Fair use.

Maia Sandu won the Moldovan presidential election on November 4, 2024, becoming the country's first leader to secure a second term through direct elections. Sandu’s final lead was around 11 percent, or approximately 182,000 votes — a respectable result. However, there's a caveat. Unlike in 2020, she achieved this victory largely thanks to the votes of the Moldovan diaspora. Domestically, Sandu lost to her opponent, Alexandr Stoianoglo, by a margin of 2.4 percent, or 32,000 votes. This conflicting result highlights a longstanding divide in Moldovan society across multiple dimensions.  Evgenii Cheban wrote about the election results for Moldovan media outlet NewsMaker, and Global Voices translated the article, edited it for clarity and republished it with the permission from NewsMaker. 

How did Sandu secure victory?

The results of the first round of the presidential election and a pro-European constitutional referendum were an unpleasant surprise for the Moldovan government and Sandu personally. The incumbent president's first-round victory was far from the convincing win that could ensure an easy second-round victory. The pro-European constitutional referendum, seen as a rehearsal for the second round, nearly failed.

Taking this bitter pill from Moldovan voters, Sandu's team set out to improve their standing.

The president worked hard to charm voters who supported other candidates, delivering conciliatory and unifying messages, especially targeting the supporters of Renato Usatii, who came in third in the first round. She even reached out to Ilan Shor‘s network of activists. The former air of superiority and condescending attitude towards opponents and their supporters seemed to have vanished.

A notable symbol of this shift was a Friday photo with Ion Ceban, the mayor of Chișinău, whom Sandu and her team had long labeled as “Moscow’s man.” Now, the two stood together — though with not-so-happy expressions — promoting a “European future” on Sandu's Facebook page, just two days before the deciding vote.

A divided Moldova: Why the diaspora had to rescue Sandu's victory, and what's next?

In response to the protest vote of the first round, Sandu acknowledged the government's mistakes and even promised reforms, starting with government reshuffles.

To minimize the impact of Shor's activists, reportedly financed by Russia, law enforcement ramped up efforts, with daily reports of searches, detentions, and fines for vote-buying. 

The media leaked the database of Ilan Shor’s supporters in Moldova, spreading it widely on social networks. Government supporters abandoned the presumption of innocence and publicly denounced those listed.

Read more: Moldova's presidential elections face the second round

Alexandr Stoianoglo's campaign: A contrast in approach

Between the two election rounds, Stoianoglo and his team were far less active. He performed poorly in debates with Sandu, gave a few advantageous interviews, did a social media stream, but posted little about his campaign meetings.

Sandu's team’s active engagement across multiple areas stood out against Stoianoglo's passive campaign, yielding results. The combined strategy of tackling Shor’s network, mobilizing supporters, and appealing to voters from eliminated candidates paid off.

Sandu improved her first-round result by 275,000 voters, of which only 115,000 came from higher turnout. Stoianoglo gained an additional 347,000 votes — 141,000 short of the total votes for eliminated candidates in the first round. This shortfall in protest votes partially resulted from Renato Usatii’s refusal to support the opposition candidate in the second round. But the main reason for Stoianoglo’s loss likely lies elsewhere — most Moldovan voters aren’t prepared to see a candidate from a pro-Kremlin party as president. Sandu’s campaign focused heavily on this fear during the final stretch.

Division one: Geopolitics

When Moldovans discuss societal divides, they often reference a geopolitical split — those favoring European integration versus those leaning toward Russia. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has significantly reduced support for the latter stance.

The main pro-Kremlin political force, which openly backs and justifies Russia's invasion of Ukraine, is Ilan Shor’s semi-underground organization. In the second round, Shor urged his supporters to vote for Stoianoglo and arranged transportation to polling stations abroad in Minsk, Baku, and Istanbul. Igor Dodon, the Socialist leader backing Stoianoglo, also tried to justify Putin’s actions, though with less enthusiasm and more caution.

Connections between Stoianoglo and pro-Kremlin forces were a major point of attack and a key vulnerability. Although Stoianoglo condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an act of aggression, supported Ukraine's territorial integrity, and distanced himself from Dodon, his efforts didn’t seem convincing enough.

Fear of a “Kremlin Trojan horse,” as Sandu called Stoianoglo, became the main rallying cry for her supporters in the second round.

The final election results clearly showed that most Moldovan voters (especially those in the diaspora) are wary of any Kremlin-associated forces. This narrative will likely feature heavily in Sandu’s and PAS’s strategies in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Division two: inequality

If the Socialist Party and Shor are toxic due to corruption and Kremlin ties, why did Stoianoglo win domestically? Moldova isn’t driven solely by geopolitics or fears of war. Particularly in the regions outside Chișinău, another societal division exists — one unrelated to high politics or global concerns.

Moldovan society is split into two Moldovas, with little relation to geopolitics or Vladimir Putin.

The first Moldova consists of citizens with incomes above average, mostly residing in Chișinău or abroad. They vote predominantly for pro-European politicians and favor EU integration. These citizens travel to Europe frequently, making visa-free access, low-cost airlines, and parking fees at Chișinău airport vital. Most have Romanian passports and influence public opinion on social media and TV.

The second Moldova lives mainly in Moldova's emptying villages and small towns, often lacking basic utilities like centralized water and sewage systems. Many in this second Moldova are elderly, surviving on minimal pensions, while younger residents, with low salaries, consider emigration, taking microloans for essentials. They feel the brunt of any economic shock, be it inflation or rising utility costs.

These citizens aren’t necessarily against Moldova's European path; they simply don’t see or feel its benefits. Yet, they constantly hear about EU integration from government officials and see EU flags displayed everywhere.

The stark difference between these two Moldovas becomes evident by comparing photos from Shor's party protests and last year’s pro-European rally in Chișinău. Even better, take a look at footage from the 2022 Chișinău Marathon. There, men and women in branded sportswear with expensive gadgets run past elderly poor dressed women, who have been brought to the Shor protest and are watching them with curiosity.

The second Moldova is poorly represented in public spaces and Moldovan politics. They often fall for populist slogans and cheap promises and feel alienated by the arrogance shown by the first Moldova, including the ruling party and president.

For this second country, socioeconomic conditions matter more than foreign policy. The Communist Party once addressed their need for justice, as did Sandu and PAS with their anti-oligarchic stance in 2020–2021. Recently, Stoianoglo has appealed to this sentiment with his slogan, “Justice for All,” explaining his domestic win.

Two Moldovas, two presidents

The first Moldova, mainly the diaspora and Chișinău, chose Sandu, while the second Moldova voted for Stoianoglo — two different countries, with different priorities, wanting different presidents.

In her post-election address, Sandu once again promised to be “the president for all citizens,” aiming to bridge the divide intensified by this campaign. But can she — and will she?