Originally published on Global Voices

Protester with ‘Reclaim the vote’ sticker outside parliament on November 17, 2024. Image by Mariam Nikuradze/OC Media used with permission.

This article was first published on OC Media. An edited version is republished here under a content partnership agreement. 

Georgia Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced on November 28 that Georgia was halting its EU membership bid “until 2028.” The news sparked widespread demonstrations as thousands took to the streets and demanded the government continue its EU trajectory. Riot police in the capital, Tbilisi, have violently cracked down on the protestors and arrested dozens.

In his announcement, the prime minister added that the government would also be refusing any budgetary support from the EU. The latter was in response to the EU's previous announcement that it was halting funding to the Georgian government over the controversial foreign agent law and other anti-democratic moves by the ruling Georgian Dream party.

Exactly one year ago, the European Commission recommended that the EU grant Georgia candidate status, but anti-democratic developments within the country have derailed its plan to become an EU member.

In October, Georgian Dream was reelected in what independent observers described as an unfree and unfair election and called for the vote to be redone. This included the country's President Salome Zourabichvili and four key opposition groups. However, there was no budging from the ruling party, which has further distanced the country from its EU aspirations.

The results have also been challenged in the Constitutional Court, which has yet to make a final ruling. Since the October election, the country has been rocked by protests and drawn harsh criticism from the EU, including a resolution adopted by the European Parliament on November 28 rejecting the legitimacy of Georgia’s parliamentary election and calling for a new vote within a year. Despite the calls, the ruling government approved the mandates of all 150 MPs on November 25, ignoring the explicit dissent of 61 opposition members who were absent during the opening of the parliament in Tbilisi, some of them protesting outside the parliament alongside other demonstrators.

A number of the country’s top legal and constitutional experts have stated that approving mandates while the results of the election were being challenged in the Constitutional Court represented an outright violation of the constitution.

Changing tides

Georgia formally applied for European Union (EU) membership in March 2022. The move represented a U-turn for the ruling party, which had insisted it would not accelerate its initial timeline of applying for membership in 2024.

The shift was largely driven by increasing pressure from the domestic opposition, as well as thousands of protesters who participated in a “March for Europe,” organized by Georgia's liberal activist group, the Shame movement, and other pro-democracy groups in a bid to “demonstrate the commitment of Georgian people to its European choice and Western values.”

In June 2022, Georgia's candidate status was denied, and the state was given a list of 12 conditions the country had to fulfill before their application could be reexamined. Among these conditions were reducing political polarization, reforming the judiciary, ensuring functioning state institutions, strengthening anti-corruption measures, including de-oligarchisation, and others.

Then, in December 2023, Georgia was finally granted this status following an EU Council meeting. That decision, however, came amid a growing rift between Georgia's ruling government and Western allies as well as the local civil society groups insisting that the government has failed to fulfill the 12 priority conditions.

The government continued to crack down on freedoms and human rights with violent dispersals of protests, attacks on the independent media, and a widening rift between society and state leadership.

The ruling party has faced criticism for its deepening anti-LGBTQ+ stance, all the while cozying up with Russia ever since the latter invaded Ukraine. Last year, the ruling party attempted to impeach the country's president but failed to do so.

The country's track record on freedoms and democracy has also been deteriorating. In May 2024, the government adopted a controversial foreign agent bill despite ongoing protests against the law. The bill severely restricts all media outlets and non-governmental organizations in Georgia, and according to local civil society, it “would entail monitoring from the government, which could compromise organizations’ internal communications and confidential sources.”

Pushback against the new government

The official results of the October elections gave the ruling Georgian Dream party a large majority in parliament, with 54 percent of the vote, an increase from the previous 48 percent support the party received in the 2020 election.

The final results were released by the Central Election Commission on November 18, confirming Georgian Dream's victory and prompting more protests by opposition groups and the public at large, accusing the CEC of dismissing documented widespread electoral fraud and irregularities.

On Thursday, November 28, the ruling Georgian Dream party approved a slightly reshuffled government cabinet led by incumbent Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze. The new government was endorsed without a single opposition member present, as the new parliament has been boycotted by all four opposition groups.

The same day, Kobakhidze announced that Georgia was halting its EU membership bid.

All four major opposition groups instantly condemned the announcement. The outgoing president, Zourabichvili, called the move a “constitutional coup.”

Kobakhidze's announcement sparked more protests. Thousands of demonstrators stayed overnight on Rustaveli Avenue, one of the key streets in Tbilisi, periodically clashing with riot police who were using pepper spray, water cannons, tear gas, and physical violence against demonstrators, opposition figures, and journalists.

While several demonstrators were detained throughout the night, the Interior Ministry has yet to confirm the number of detainees.

In Tbilisi, protesters gathered around the ruling Georgian Dream party’s headquarters before proceeding to march to Rustaveli Avenue, where parliament is also located.

Written by Arzu Geybullayeva, OC Media

Originally published on Global Voices

Benny Tai. File photo: Jennifer Creery/HKFP. Used with permission.

This report was written by Kelly Ho and published in Hong Kong Free Press on November 19 and 21, 2024. The following edited version is published as part of a content partnership agreement.

Pro-democracy activist Benny Tai has been jailed for 10 years over organising an unofficial primary election in 2020, as Hong Kong’s High Court delivered sentences in the city’s largest national security case to date.

Tai was among 45 pro-democracy figures sentenced on November 19 after being convicted of conspiring to commit subversion, an offence under the Beijing-imposed national security law.

Handing down a 10-year sentence to Tai, judges Andrew Chan, Alex Lee and Johnny Chan described Tai as the “mastermind” behind the conspiracy in their judgement.

Tai was initially given a 15-year sentence, which was cut to 10 years after the judges, each of whom has been handpicked to preside over national security cases, considered his guilty plea. “The only mitigation in [Tai’s] case was his early plea of guilty. To that, the customarily one-third discount would be given,” the judgement read.

Ex-district councillor Andrew Chiu was sentenced to seven years after his initial sentence was reduced by half, with the judges taking into account his guilty plea and assistance to the prosecution.

Chiu was one of four democrats who testified for the prosecution, along with Au Nok-hin, Ben Chung and Mike Lam. Lam, the only defendant to have remained on bail throughout proceedings, was sentenced to five years and two months in jail.

The second-longest sentence was meted out to activist Owen Chow, who was given seven years and nine months in jail to be served separately from a five-year sentence for rioting.

The court ruled that Chow’s role as an initiator of an online petition to rally “radical” candidates constituted an aggravating factor. Former district councillor Wong Ji-yuet’s four years and five months will also be served consecutively with a three-year sentence for rioting.

Joshua Wong, who became known around the world for his student activism, was given a one-third discount because he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to four years and eight months in prison. Taking into account Wong’s previous convictions dating back to 2016, the judges said they “did not consider [Wong] to be a person of good character.” The judges said:

The sentence we passed on [Wong] also would not have a crushing effect on him.

Former Stand News journalist Gwyneth Ho, who did not submit a mitigation plea, was sentenced to seven years in prison.

Veteran activist and former lawmaker “Long Hair” Leung Kwok-hung was sentenced to six years and nine months in prison. His 24 prior convictions, some of which involved unauthorised assemblies, meant that the judges “were [not] in a position to describe [Leung] as having a positive good character.”

Kwok Ka-ki, Jeremy Tam, Claudia Mo, Andy Chui, and Gary Fan received the lowest sentences of four years and two months.

Under Hong Kong’s Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, which was enacted in March to plug “loopholes” left by Beijing’s security legislation, inmates serving time in prison for national security offences are subject to a higher threshold for early release, making remission unlikely.

Many of the democrats have been detained since being taken into police custody and charged on February 28, 2021, meaning they have served over three years and eight months already.

‘Constitutional chaos’

At the centre of the case was the July 2020 election primary, through which the opposition camp hoped to identify candidates to help it win majority control of the legislature in an upcoming election.

The judges ruled that the democrats had intended to abuse their powers to indiscriminately veto the government budget and force the chief executive to resign if they had indeed won a majority.

In a 319-page judgement in May, the judges wrote that Tai’s goal was to “undermine, destroy or overthrow the existing political system and structure of [Hong Kong] established under the Basic Law and the policy of One Country, Two Systems,” China's policy that gives it governance over Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. This would have plunged the city into a “constitutional crisis,” they ruled.

Beijing inserted national security legislation directly into Hong Kong’s mini-constitution in June 2020 following a year of pro-democracy protests and unrest. It criminalised subversion, secession, collusion with foreign forces and terrorist acts — broadly defined to include disruption to transport and other infrastructure. The move gave police sweeping new powers and led to hundreds of arrests amid new legal precedents, while dozens of civil society groups disappeared. The authorities say it restored stability and peace to the city, rejecting criticism from trade partners, the United Nations and NGOs.

In response to the ruling, the US Department of State spokesperson Matthew Miller issued a statement saying that it would take steps to impose new visa restrictions on Hong Kong officials. Miller said:

The 45 defendants sentenced today were aggressively prosecuted, and many now face life-altering imprisonment simply for their peaceful participation in political activities which are protected under the Basic Law of Hong Kong… In response, the Department of State is taking steps to impose new visa restrictions on multiple Hong Kong officials responsible for implementation of the [national security law].

Also, in a statement, the Hong Kong government slammed the US's sanction plan as a “despicable political manipulation.” It said:

Any reasonable and fair person, upon reviewing the court’s judgment, would be convinced of the severity of the crime and the guilt of the convicted individuals, supported by irrefutable evidence. Despite these ironclad facts, Western countries, anti-China organisations and politicians, and foreign media continue to distort the truth and maliciously attack.

Written by Hong Kong Free Press

Originally published on Global Voices

Nigeria's 2015 Presidential election voting in Abuja. Image by U.S. Embassy / Idika Onyukwu, from Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0 DEED).

In Pakistan’s 2024 elections, while behind bars, former Prime Minister Imran Khan managed to reach over 250,000 viewers on YouTube through an Artificial Intelligence (AI)-generated video. His message, delivered via the internet, reached a massive audience despite his physical absence from the campaign trail. This striking use of AI highlighted the growing influence of digital tools in modern politics, demonstrating how, even under challenging circumstances, technology is reshaping the way politicians engage with voters.

As the “Year of Democracy” nears its end, several key elections have already been held, while others are still on the horizon. This supercharged election year has seen 72 countries — representing over half of the world’s population — head to the polls. Africa, in particular, has been a focal point, with 16 national elections, double the number from 2023. The widespread availability of AI tools like ChatGPT and AI-driven video and image generators has given political parties new ways to connect with voters, engage them, and shape public opinion. 

However, these technologies do more than provide new opportunities; they introduce complex challenges, particularly in combating misinformation and ensuring the ethical use of data. The question remains: Are these technologies truly benefiting democratic processes, or are they creating new obstacles that need to be addressed?

In an interview with the Global Investigative Journalist Network, Victoria Turk of The Rest of The World, an organization that tracks AI use in elections globally, highlighted this dual nature of AI. She noted:

…when people think about elections and generative AI, they think automatically about disinformation, misinformation, deep fakes, and intentionally misleading voters. We are seeing some of that, but there are also other creative uses of this technology. In some cases, we’re seeing political parties and campaigns using this tech to better reach voters, spread their campaign materials, and provide information.

Voter engagement in a digital world

The shift towards digital campaigning is undeniable. AI tools allow political parties to connect with their constituents more efficiently and effectively than ever before. In countries like India, with a registered electorate of 968 million, many candidates have used AI-powered avatars to engage with voters on an individual level. This hyper-personalized approach is believed to enhance candidates’ political appeal by showing voters that they are attuned to specific concerns.

In addition to personalized engagement, AI has also been instrumental in overcoming linguistic barriers in India’s diverse electorate. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for instance, used the government’s AI-powered tool Bhashini to deliver speeches in Hindi that were translated in real-time into Tamil, Kannada, Bengali, Telugu, Odia, and Malayalam. While AI bots may struggle with dialects and are susceptible to inaccurate translations, they help candidates reach more voters by bridging language divides.

Ethical considerations and the digital divide

Despite its potential, the rise of AI in elections comes with ethical challenges, particularly concerning data privacy, misinformation, and equity. To combat AI-driven misinformation, the Indian government has taken proactive steps by issuing a deepfake and AI advisory. This advisory obligates platforms to clearly inform users that posting deepfakes can lead to criminal prosecution under the law, signaling a strong stance against AI misuse. This is a crucial measure in maintaining election integrity and ensuring that AI is used responsibly in the political arena.

Similarly, in Nigeria, concerns over the use of voter data in targeted campaigns have prompted calls for stricter regulations on how data is collected and used. The Nigeria Data Protection Act (NDPA) 2023 is designed to address these concerns, mandating high data protection standards for data controllers and processors. Political parties must ensure that AI is deployed in a manner that respects data privacy and complies with protection regulations, such as the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), to maintain voter trust.

Furthermore, the digital divide remains a significant obstacle in many regions. While AI has enhanced voter engagement in urban centers, rural voters often remain disconnected. Although mobile technology has made strides in bridging this gap, more must be done to ensure that every citizen has access to the information needed to participate fully in the democratic process.

Combating mis and disinformation with AI fact-checking

As misinformation and disinformation become an increasingly significant threat to democracy, AI is also playing a vital role in countering its spread. AI-powered fact-checking tools have been deployed by civil society groups and independent fact-checkers to combat this issue. 

One recent example is the 2023 Turkish elections, where deepfakes were used to discredit opposition leaders. AI-generated videos falsely linking political figures to criminal activities went viral, demonstrating both the risks and the potential of AI in combating disinformation. To mitigate such dangers, AI is being deployed to fact-check rapidly and ensure that voters are not misled by fabricated content. Platforms like Full Fact in the UK and Africa Check in South Africa use AI to scan political speeches, news stories, and social media posts for misinformation.

AI’s ability to scan and identify false information in real time could be a game changer in mitigating the negative impact of deepfakes and other forms of digital manipulation. However, it also requires constant vigilance and improvements.

AI and political polarization

AI algorithms on social media platforms, such as Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and YouTube, have been shown to significantly influence political polarization. These algorithms are designed to maximize user engagement by curating content that aligns with users’ existing views, often reinforcing their beliefs and leading to echo chambers. This can increase partisan animosity, especially in highly polarized countries like the US and Brazil.

Research highlights that while social media platforms may not be the root cause of polarization, their design can exacerbate it. Studies have found that users exposed to content on these platforms are more likely to become entrenched in their views, leading to deeper political divides. For instance, these platforms use algorithms that promote content that elicits emotional responses, which often amplifies divisive and polarizing political messages.​

​Efforts to combat this issue, such as adjusting algorithms to promote diverse perspectives, are crucial. However, such initiatives are often short-lived due to fears of losing user engagement and profitability.

Blockchain and transparent voting systems

Beyond voter engagement and fact-checking, blockchain technology has emerged as a tool to ensure transparency in elections. While blockchain has often been associated with finance and cryptocurrency, its potential for securing the integrity of elections is now being tested. While Estonia has been a pioneer in adopting blockchain-based voting systems nationwide, Sierra Leone conducted a notable trial during its 2018 elections. A Swiss-based company, Agora, used blockchain technology to record votes in the Western Area Urban district as part of a proof-of-concept. This trial aimed to demonstrate how blockchain could securely and transparently log votes.

Although the Sierra Leone National Electoral Commission officially handled the results using traditional methods, the blockchain experiment showcased the potential for future elections to incorporate this technology for greater transparency. 

As these experiments demonstrate, blockchain could pave the way for more secure and transparent elections, though its adoption still faces hurdles in terms of scalability and widespread implementation.

A new era for democracy?

The “Year of Democracy” in 2024 highlights the transformative potential of AI and digital tools in fostering robust, transparent, and inclusive elections. Nations like Sierra Leone, India, and Estonia demonstrate that AI can significantly enhance democratic processes, but only if ethical and inclusive considerations are prioritized.

As these global elections unfold, the true test will lie in whether AI will enhance democratic values or, conversely, exacerbate existing challenges. The integrity of these elections and the responses to inevitable disputes will not only reveal the current state of democracy but also determine whether regions like Africa will emerge as beacons of effective elections and democratic resurgence or continue to face electoral setbacks.

Written by Cecilia Maundu

Originally published on Global Voices

Photo by Olga Loginova. Used with permission.

This article was written by Dmitriy Mazorenko, Nazerke Kurmangazinova, Olga Loginova, Beiimbet Moldagali, Almas Kaisar, and Victoria Natachiyeva for Vlast.kz and published on October 10, 2024. An edited version is published on Global Voices under a media partnership agreement. 

Based on the October 6th referendum in Kazakhstan, an overwhelming number of voters seem to be in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant; however, amid widespread violations at the polls and waning political participation, experts and observers are seriously questioning the authenticity of this result.

The lack of political participation isn't exactly surprising. A string of unfulfilled promises since Qandy Qantar (Kazakh for “Bloody January,” the violent crackdown on protestors in 2022) disappointed Kazakhstanis, who showed little interest in the referendum, which President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had already pushed for in 2023.

Ever since taking power in 2019, Tokayev has also announced a number of reforms, but the changes only further stifled opposition and political participation. The trend continued during the referendum, as police arrested and filed criminal cases against dozens of activists.

While the authorities said the referendum would be a prime example of direct democracy, political scientist Dosym Satpayev and sociologist Serik Beissembayev told Vlast that this was an instrument to rubber stamp a decision that had already been made. Both experts argued that the increasingly intense repression against the opposition was inevitable, given society's growing dissatisfaction with the ruling government.

Preparations for a ‘yes’ vote

For about a year, the central and regional governments have scrambled to put together public hearings and expert discussions, to which they only invited specialists loyal to the government. Government agencies repeatedly said they had nothing to do with the hearings, attributing them to the goodwill of civic activists. In fact, these events were organized by groups such as the pro-government Civil Alliance.

The main refrain at each of these events was the issue of energy security: The country’s increasing electricity consumption would put it at risk unless a nuclear power plant was built. Neither the authorities nor the government-friendly groups offered any alternative options to make up for the increased electricity demand. The “yes” side of the referendum also routinely ignored and marginalized the experts who came out against the nuclear project.

A public discussion ahead of the referendum in Almaty. Photo by Almas Kaisar. Used with permission.

A few days before the referendum, police detained about 40 activists across the country. They had voiced their criticism towards the planned nuclear power plant. Some of them now face criminal charges, while a handful were given a two-month detention sentence for allegedly “organizing mass unrest.”

The questionable results

More than 5.5 million people (71.12 percent of the total) voted in support of the construction of the nuclear power plant at the referendum, according to official data. Independent observers, however, said the numbers for both the turnout and the voting results are unreliable.

Vlast collected voting protocols from independent observers and open sources, showing that the “no” vote stood at 57 percent at 31 polling stations in Almaty, Uralsk, Astana, Pavlodar, Semey, Shymkent, and the Turkestan region.

In Almaty, while the official statistics give a 54:46 “yes” victory, the evidence suggests that 55 percent of voters were against the project.

A protocol of the vote tally, which shows significantly more “no” votes, from one of the voting centers in Almaty.

Observers also recorded a number of gross procedural violations. Berik Abenov, from the Uly Kosh Foundation, filmed a woman in the village of Temirlan in the Turkestan region throwing a stack of ballots into a ballot box and then running away.

Kural Seytkhanuly, also from Uly Kosh, noticed a person in Turkestan trying to stuff a handful of ballots into a ballot box. He reported this to the commission chairwoman, who refused to take action. The prosecutor's office also left this case unchecked.

Some observers, including Seytkhanuly, were removed from the polling stations.

Another case involved journalists Lukpan Akhmedyarov and Raul Uporov, who were listed as observers in Astana for the Erkindik Kanaty Foundation. Other observers, however, asked the commission to remove them. A spokesperson for Erkindik Kanaty told Vlast:

There were no grounds for Lukpan and Raul to be removed. These decisions were made arbitrarily and illegally. Observers do not even have the right to petition for the removal of their colleagues.

Inactive activists

This past referendum, if anything, was a sign of a weakening public participation across the country.

Vadim Ni, an environmental law specialist and a co-founder of the platform AES Kerek Emes (Kazakh for “No Need for NPP” [nuclear power plant]), said that only few people were involved in their public discussions during their campaign to vote “no” for the referendum.

A ballot showing a “no” vote in Astana. Photo by Tamara Vaal. Used with permission.

Roman Reimer, co-founder of Erkindik Kanaty, agreed: “Ahead of the referendum, there were only isolated attempts to register groups and create a coalition among those who oppose the construction of the nuclear power plant.”

According to Ni, there was simply too little time to organize a campaign. On September 2, during his speech to the nation, Tokayev set the date to October 6, just five weeks later. This was not enough for a detailed discussion on such a complex topic, Ni quipped.

Trust me, I’m listening

Political scientist Dosym Satpayev told Vlast that the recent referendum has nothing to do with direct democracy. He argued that referendums are a tool often used in authoritarian regimes to create the illusion of democracy. In Kazakhstan, this strategy already had various names since Tokayev came to power: from “New Kazakhstan” to a “Listening State.”

This referendum was the fourth in the history of Kazakhstan and the second after Qandy Qantar. All of them were a tool for manipulating public opinion in order to legitimize a decision that had already been made. Ahead of the vote, there was always strict control and pressure on opponents.

Sociologist Serik Beissembayev said that a 63.6 percent turnout was unrealistic. Turnout had shown a constant decline in previous electoral rounds.

It wasn’t a nail biter. Government officials at all levels echoed the president's mandate, calling for a ‘yes’ vote. The people understood that the country's leadership had already made a decision. Citizens who expressed the opposite point of view were stigmatized.

Tokayev’s unfulfilled promises after Qandy Qantar were the reason for society’s apathy and disappointment, which should have translated into a lower turnout.

Former President Nursultan Nazarbayev cast his vote at the referendum. Photo by Tamara Vaal. Used with permission.

Beissembayev and the Demoscope, a research organization, planned to conduct a telephone survey that could provide alternative data on turnout and the level of support for the construction of the nuclear power plant. However, the Central Election Commission refused to accredit them. Beissembayev told Vlast:

This amounts to censorship. This is the government ordering to hinder the work of an independent research organization. I think that the entire system is set up to control the media space and suppress independent sources of information.

Satpayev argued that the government fears society:

The elites are currently discussing whether Tokayev will extend his term of office by changing the Constitution or find a successor. The construction of the nuclear power plant will overlap with the next transition period, and those who will build it need a stable regime.

Against the backdrop of the transition, Satpayev expects more repression. Beissembayev also expects a strengthening of the current authoritarianism.

There is a growing distrust towards the entire political system of Kazakhstan. We have returned to the same system that was under Nazarbayev. And this could be the fuel of future protests. When people do not trust the political system, they are more prone to radicalization.

Written by Vlast.kz

Originally published on Global Voices

The scene at the Supreme Court building after the explosions. Image: Art by Global Voices over picture by Bruno Peres/Agência Brasil. Used with permission.

Congresswoman Erika Hilton was giving a press conference on the latest developments regarding a proposal that could reduce working hours for Brazilians, at the Planalto Palace hall, the presidential working building, when two explosions were heard on November 13, around 7:30 pm. Only 500 meters away, one person lay dead in front of the Supreme Court building in Brasília, Brazil's federal capital.

The first explosion came from a car parked next to the Lower Chamber that had been loaded with fireworks, bricks, and explosives. Around 20 seconds afterward, a second explosion was set off in front of the Supreme Court, leaving one man dead. The justices were finishing a session and were led to exit the building as a security measure.

The deceased was identified as Francisco Wanderley Luiz, 59. Civil police have named him as the car's registered owner. He was dressed in clothes with images of playing card suits — likely a reference to the comic book character Batman's archenemy, the Joker.

For many in Brasília, the incident was reminiscent of when crowds invaded and vandalized the Supreme Court building less than two years ago, on January 8, 2023, attempting to force a coup d'état only one week after Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was inaugurated for a third term as Brazil's president.

The 2023 attacks, alongside a second bombing attempt, were a culmination of months of protests after Lula defeated incumbent Jair Bolsonaro in the 2022 elections, with the former president refusing to acknowledge the result.

After the attacks, over 2,000 bolsonaristas, as Bolsonaro's supporters are known in Brazil, were arrested. Some were sentenced to 17 years in prison for invading and damaging the Three Powers public buildings — the presidential building, the Supreme Court, and the National Congress. Bolsonaro himself, who headed to the United States to avoid attending Lula's inauguration, is currently under investigation for promoting anti-democratic acts.

The Federal Police launched an official inquiry to investigate this latest attack. The findings have yet to be released.

Who is Francisco Wanderley Luiz?

Authorities are still investigating Francisco Wanderley Luiz and his potential motivation in the bombings. A locksmith by trade, in 2020, he ran for the city council of Rio do Sul, a city of roughly 72,500 people in the southern state of Santa Catarina. Luiz, who identified as “Tiü França,” was affiliated with PL, the Liberal Party, which Bolsonaro joined a year later, in 2021.

Brazilian news outlets, such as ICL, have been reporting that Luiz had been posting threats on his social media in the months leading up to the attack. On August 24, Luiz posted a selfie from the Supreme Court plenary with the caption, “They let the fox enter the chicken coop” and “You've been warned.”

The same day, he visited parliamentarian Jorge Goetten's office, a politician affiliated with the Republican party and part of Bolsonaro's base. The congressman, who said he wasn't in office when Luiz tried to visit, told Folha de S. Paulo newspaper that he had known Luiz for over 30 years, and each time they met last year Luiz seemed “emotionally shaken.”

ICL also mentions screenshots of WhatsApp messages that the man sent himself. In one of them, he writes: “Let's play??? Federal Police, you have 72 hours to disarm the bomb in the house of shitty communists.”

The day after the attack, the Federal Police said in a press conference that he had been living in Brasília for three or four months and that the explosives were handcrafted, but with a high potential to cause damage. A video shows the man throwing what looks like small explosives at the Justice statue in front of the Supreme Court and laying his head over another one, which led to his death.

The Federal Police said Luiz was in Brasília in January 2023, but they have yet to confirm if he participated in the January 8th attacks. The rented house he had been living in, just outside of Brasília, contained more explosives and was covered in graffiti referencing the event.

Long wolf or a systemic issue?

While some see the attacks as an act of a “lone wolf,” the story is part of a larger context that has been brewing in Brazil for the last few years. The Federal Police General Director, Andrei Passos Rodrigues, confirmed that extremist groups are still active in Brazil:

Não descartamos nenhuma hipótese. Eu tenho algumas ressalvas com essa expressão do lobo solitário. Ainda que a ação visível seja individual, por trás dessa ação, nunca há só uma pessoa, há sempre um grupo ou ideias de um grupo ou extremismos e radicalismos que levam ao cometimento desses delitos.

We aren't discarding any hypothesis. I have a few reservations with this term ‘lone wolf.’ Even if only one individual is visible, behind this action, there is never only one person, but a group or ideas from a group or extremism and radicalism that lead them to commit the offenses.

Almost two years after the January 8th attacks and with former president Bolsonaro on the verge of being denounced for his participation, politicians that support him have been trying to grant amnesty for all those involved in the attacks. They had tried to bargain for this in the recent election for the presidency of the Lower Chamber.

Bolsonaro himself cannot run for any public position until 2030 after being charged for a meeting where he attacked the electoral system and accused it of fraud without presenting any evidence in front of a group of ambassadors just before the 2022 elections. His passport is also retained by the Federal Police due to other investigations linked to him.

Throughout his presidency, the former president regularly gave speeches portraying the Supreme Court and its justices as enemies. The day after the latest attack, on November 14th, he issued a statement calling it “a sad episode” and “an isolated fact,” saying that is “about time for Brazil to cultivate a proper environment so different ideas can be confronted peacefully.”

Justice Alexandre de Moraes, in charge of the investigations on digital militias, the January 8 attacks, and now the explosions, said the context that led to this latest attack began back then when the infamous hate cabinet incited hate speech against Brazilian institutions, its servants, and their families. Last year, the judge himself was harassed by bolsonaristas at an airport in Rome while traveling with his family.

Isso foi se avolumando sob o falso manto de uma criminosa utilização da liberdade de expressão. Ofender, ameaçar, coagir, em nenhum lugar do mundo isso é liberdade de expressão, isso é crime. Isso foi se agigantando e resultou, a partir da tentativa de descrédito das instituições, no 8 de janeiro.

It swelled under the fake guise of a criminal use of free speech. Offending, threatening, coercing, nowhere in the world is this considered freedom of expression; it is a crime. It was growing, and resulted in an attempt to discredit the institutions on January 8th.

Moraes was also adamantly opposed to the possibility of an amnesty deal. He claimed an amnesty for criminals wouldn't allow a peace process and that “an amnestied criminal is an unpunished criminal.”

At the time of writing this story, President Lula hadn't spoken publicly about the attack. He was at Alvorada Palace, the presidential residence, when the explosions started.

On November 18th, Brazil will welcome world leaders to Rio de Janeiro for the G-20 summit, an annual gathering of international leaders and stakeholders. Given the attacks, officials are already considering how to further reinforce the city's security scheme.

Written by Global Voices Brazil

Originally published on Global Voices

Ghana Elections 2020 in pictures. Image by Owula kpakpo from Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0 Deed).

While technology offers many advantages, it also presents significant challenges. Social media, for instance, has successfully connected people worldwide and created spaces for sharing ideas and information. However, it has also become a powerful tool for spreading misinformation and disinformation, especially during elections.

This is the most pivotal election year in history, with 72 countries heading to the polls. According to the 2024 Global Risk Report, misinformation poses a serious threat to democratic processes globally, especially during elections. The report warns that unchecked misinformation can undermine the legitimacy of newly elected governments, fuel political unrest, and potentially destabilize democratic institutions over time.

Ghana is no exception to this, as democracy watchdogs have noted a dangerous rise in disinformation ahead of the December 7, 2024 election. According to the International Freedom of Expression Exchange, the primary drivers of this problem include political party propaganda, legacy media’s prioritization of speed over accuracy, and regulatory challenges faced by the Ghanaian government.

A recent YouTube video highlights how some Ghanaian politicians are leveraging social media to misinform and influence public opinion, even paying influencers to promote their agendas. For example, in 2022, as Ghana experienced an economic crisis where the Ghanaian cedi greatly depreciated against the dollar, several Twitter influencers were reportedly paid to post misleading praise about the ruling government’s efforts to strengthen the cedi.

In another video by VOA, broadcast journalist Bernard Avle explains how AI technology was used to clone his voice and show introduction, which was then used to promote sex enhancement products on Facebook without his consent.

During the 2020 election, fake news and misinformation contributed to unrest, with at least eight deaths linked to political violence. This year, technology and political experts are concerned that AI cloning technologies could worsen the situation. As noted in this video, Citi FM has already observed a rise in disinformation, with perpetrators leveraging the media outlet's brand and credibility to spread false information. TV3 Ghana, one of the country's prominent media houses, recently fell victim to this, as highlighted in the tweet below:

Kindly disregard this creative circulated on various social media platforms.

For the latest news, head to our official website: https://t.co/9cC9uTaGco#TV3GH pic.twitter.com/X1wETX6M3l

— #TV3GH (@tv3_ghana) June 7, 2024

Recognizing the severity of this issue, a group of young Ghanaians organized a Youth Against Disinformation conference. In an interview with Global Voices, Malise Omoloye, 20, a journalist, content creator, and one of the co-hosts of the event, shared insights on the motivation behind the conference and the key outcomes.

(ZZ): You recently co-hosted the Youth against Disinformation conference in Ghana. Can you share what this conference is about and what motivated you to host it?

(MO): The Youth Against Disinformation conference is a platform focused on addressing the spread of misinformation and disinformation, particularly as it affects young people. This conference brings together youth across all industries, digital creators, and advocates for media literacy to empower them with skills to identify, counter, and prevent the spread of false information. The event provided a platform for open discussions and collaborative efforts among participants to build a more informed and media-literate generation.

What motivated me to co-host the event was my passion for Media Information Literacy and my commitment to empowering young people with the skills and tools necessary to navigate today’s complex media landscape. As a journalist and content creator, I recognize the immense influence that misinformation can have on public opinion and social dynamics. By educating and equipping the youth, we can foster a more discerning, critical approach to media consumption. Partnering with organizations like Penplusbytes, UNESCO Ghana, DW Akademie, and Youth Komnunity made this conference a powerful opportunity to make a meaningful impact.

View this post on Instagram

A post shared by Malise Cullen (@malisecullen)

(ZZ): What were the outcomes of this conference?

(MO): One of the significant outcomes of the conference was the interactive breakout sessions that provided participants with hands-on training in fact-checking tools and essential cybersecurity practices. During this session, attendees were introduced to Dubawa, a prominent fact-checking platform in West Africa, which enables users to verify the authenticity of news, images, and information. Participants gained valuable skills to detect and counter misinformation in real time using the Dubawa bot.

In addition to fact-checking, the other session covered crucial aspects of cybersecurity and intelligence, emphasizing the importance of safe online practices and personal data protection. Participants learned strategies for safeguarding their digital presence, recognizing phishing attempts, and understanding the basics of cyber threats. This is particularly vital in an era where disinformation often spreads through digital platforms and where cyber threats can compromise both individual privacy and the reliability of shared information.

(ZZ): You moderated a panel discussion on disinformation and its influence on the polls. Can you share what this panel discussion was about and the key takeaways from the discussion?

(MO): Moderating the panel discussion on ‘Disinformation and its Influence on Decision-Making and Actions at the Polls’ provided an insightful look into how misinformation affects democratic processes, particularly during elections. This discussion explored the ways in which false information, spread through social media and other digital channels, can shape public perception, sway voter behavior, and ultimately influence election outcomes. Given the critical role that elections play in shaping policy and governance, the discussion highlighted the importance of countering disinformation to ensure informed and fair decision-making among voters.

This research on social media and elections in Ghana highlights how political parties increasingly use social media as a strategic channel to reach and engage voters, particularly people between 18–35.

With a population exceeding 34.65 million, more than half of Ghanaians are online. WhatsApp is the most widely used platform, reaching 10.1 million users, and is heavily utilized by both the ruling party and the opposition to disseminate messages during election periods. Facebook, with 7.4 million users, follows in popularity, where the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party regularly share content — occasionally including disinformation and attacks on rivals. Although X (formerly Twitter) has a smaller user base of 1.17 million in Ghana, it remains a significant platform for discussions on national issues.

According to the news website MyJoyOnline, on November 9, a coalition of civil society organizations known as the Ghana Fact-Checking Coalition launched a major initiative to combat misinformation and disinformation that threaten the country’s democratic integrity. This initiative brings together over 100 media outlets and nearly 50 journalists across Ghana, who will help verify and distribute fact-checked reports to communities nationwide. To reach diverse audiences, the reports will be available in approximately 45 local languages.

As Ghanaians prepare to head to the polls on December 7, only time will tell whether these initiatives have effectively curbed the spread of misinformation and disinformation.

Written by Zita Zage

Originally published on Global Voices

US President Donald J. Trump welcomes Prime Minister Imran Khan of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Monday, July 22, 2019, to the West Wing Lobby entrance of the White House. (Official White House photo by Joyce N. Boghosian). Image via Flickr by Trump White House Archived. Public Domain.

The complex relationship between the United States and Pakistan has long been marked by a mix of cooperation and deep hostility due to conflicting diplomatic ties, nuclear policy, and regional issues such as the War in Afghanistan. For many Pakistanis, the United States is viewed as an outside force intervening in their internal affairs — a narrative crafted by decades of political unrest, economic volatility, and military operations, particularly during the US's “War on Terror.”

This narrative was cemented when former Prime Minister Imran Khan was deposed two years ago. He quickly blamed the United States for his downfall. Khan was dismissed from office in 2022 following a no-confidence vote in Pakistan's parliament. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison for corruption in January 2024, just weeks before Pakistan's general election in February. However, the former cricketer-turned-politician asserted that his country's top military generals and Washington conspired to remove him from office. The assertion was unverified, yet his supporters largely believed the claim.

Now, after Donald Trump achieved a decisive victory over Kamala Harris in the 2024 US presidential election, supporters of Imran Khan, the incarcerated former Pakistani prime minister, claim that Trump will find time to tweet something highlighting Khan's situation. The two leaders seemingly share a strong bond, stemming from when then-Prime Minister Khan paid a visit to the White House in July 2019. The meeting was viewed as a diplomatic victory for Khan, raising his international stature and hinting at warming US-Pakistan relations.

Keeping those times in mind, Khan supporters, including many of the 625,000-strong Pakistani American community, believe Trump might be willing to advocate for the former prime minister in his second term. When Trump was president, he saw Khan (then prime minister) multiple times, including at the White House. When the two leaders met again in January 2020, on the margins of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, President Trump described Khan as a “very good friend of mine.”

The Pakistani-American community in the United States has formed firm relations with the Trump campaign and pledged to support Trump rather than the Democratic nominee, Kamala Harris. Trump has a non-interventionist and anti-war attitude and has stated he opposes “regime change operations” on foreign soil.

The intrigue surrounding Trump's return is compounded by his campaign's pledges, including potentially advocating for Khan's release from prison. One clip circulating on social media shows him promising to lobby for Mr. Khan's release; however, this is an old video modified by Imran Khan's followers and never actually happened.

As Trump prepares to take office in January 2025, one question remains: Will Trump intervene in Pakistani politics? While Khan's followers are clearly optimistic, it is critical to consider the broader ramifications of US foreign policy in South Asia, particularly under a leader like Trump, who has proven a transactional approach to international relations. Trump's foreign policy has often prioritized personal relationships and short-term rewards over long-term strategic objectives.

Historically, US administrations have used their authority to influence results in Pakistan, frequently favoring geopolitical interests over democratic norms. The military's influence in Pakistani politics cannot be overstated; the military establishment wields significant power and frequently dictates foreign policy choices. Analysts believe that regardless of who occupies the White House, the United States will most likely deal with Pakistan's military rather than individual politicians. This fact presents substantial hurdles for Khan, who has established himself as an outsider to traditional power systems in both Pakistan and the United States.

The Biden administration resumed military support and investment in Pakistan, with a focus on technology and green energy — areas that Trump may not prioritize given his track record. The idea that Trump will take a more forgiving stance toward Khan does not guarantee that he will ignore the United States’ strategic interests in the area, particularly regarding relations with India and combating Chinese dominance.

Nonetheless, Trump's intervention, even if it was nominally in support of Khan, would be risky. Trump's track record indicates that his foreign policy decisions are frequently influenced by personal ties and financial interests rather than a consistent ideological stance, creating concerns about his long-term commitment to any particular outcome in Pakistan. Furthermore, Trump's prospective engagement with Pakistan may exacerbate divisiveness, particularly if his backing is interpreted as siding against the military establishment. Such a posture might bolster pro-Khan individuals while exacerbating the country's long-running civilian-military power struggle.

It should be noted that Washington considers Islamabad an ally against Tehran in the unlikely circumstance of a conflict with Iran. There was some consensus on this during the US-Pakistan strategic discussions. Now that the Republicans have taken control of the White House, Senate, and likely US House, the new government will reach out to Pakistan without regard for Khan or other lawmakers. Any influence from the Trump administration would be motivated by US strategic goals, particularly in South Asia, such as regional security and combating China's influence, rather than merely humanitarian considerations.

Written by Ramna Saeed

Originally published on Global Voices

Trump 2024 signage. Onondaga, New York, USA. Image by Adam Jones via Flickr (CC BY 2.0).

This story was written by Shristi Karki and originally published in the Nepali Times on November 6, 2024. An edited version is republished on Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement.

A shock wave is rolling across the United States over the return of Donald Trump to the White House, as well as the Republican control of the Senate and possibly the House. However, the consequences of this vote will impact not just America, but also people across the world.

In South Asia, it will mainly change the way Washington views and deals with China and India, along with more unpredictable consequences. The impact on Nepal will be governed by how US relations with the country’s two giant neighbours develop in the next four years.

“Compared to Harris, who has been focused more on multilateralism and maintaining allies, Trump is more confrontational and unilateral,” says National Assembly member and former Foreign Minister Bimala Rai Paudyel. “There is fear that Trump’s policies will push the world to become even more polarised than it is now.”

India and China will both be able to fill the gap left by Trump America’s retreat from global and regional leadership. They will be able to take advantage of Trump diluting relations with or abandoning traditional allies in Europe and Asia.

Although India has strong ties with the West, New Delhi has long wanted to call its own shots. It is using its growing economic clout to turn away from the EU and the US. For example, India has got away with importing oil from Russia despite Western sanctions. This is likely to increase under a Trump presidency.

Akhilesh Upadhyay, senior fellow at the Strategic Affairs Center, Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS), says: “From a traditional security perspective, Nepal is bang in the middle of China and India. China and America have a great power rivalry, and it is unclear which way [the] Indian axis will go.”

India could also benefit if Trump follows through on threats of more tariffs on Chinese imports. Even though the Biden-Harris administration has been punishing China with tariffs and other barriers, Trump has in the past been more belligerent toward Beijing.

“On the one hand, India is close to [the] US in Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad); on the other hand, it takes part in BRICS where it works with Russia and China, and the Shanghai Cooperation. It remains to be seen how the US relationship plays out with our two big neighbours,” adds Upadhyay.

Since the enemy of an enemy is a friend, Washington has regarded India as its bulwark against increased Chinese economic and military clout. But New Delhi has not always gone along with US strategic interests and rankles about the US being too involved with India’s smaller neighbours, like Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.

Image via Nepali Times, used with permission.

On the downside, a Trump administration could curb the influx of Indian IT workers in the US and also scale back US job opportunities for Nepali students, which were ample under the Biden administration.

Some experts say which party is in the White House will not affect South Asian policy and Nepal even less, but a Trump win could mean less development assistance to Nepal, particularly in reproductive health, human rights and social safety.

Nischal Pandey at the Centre for South Asian Studies in Kathmandu says that the few state-level visits between the US and Nepal — from King Mahendra’s address to the joint session of US Congress during President Eisenhower's tenure in 1960 to Ganesh Man Singh being received at the White House by President Bush Sr after 1990, to US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s visit in 2002 during George HW Bush’s term — have all been during Republican administrations.

He adds, “Historically, Republican presidents and administrations have been more interested in Nepal than Democratic ones.”

More directly, Nepalis aspiring to migrate to the United States could find it more difficult. There are currently about 300 Nepalis waiting in Mexico for human traffickers to smuggle them into the United States, and that border is going to be tightened even more.

Earlier this year, São Paulo airport in Brazil had over 150 Nepalis stranded after arriving to take the Darien Gap backdoor to the US. Another 200 headed out to Brazil were stuck at Addis Ababa airport, forcing Ethiopia to ban visas to Nepalis.

Trump has threatened a high tariff on Mexican imports if it does not stop migrants. He plans to deport 11 million undocumented people.

Trump’s strong rhetoric on China could be bargaining brinkmanship, and it will be interesting to see how he balances this with Sino-Russian alignment. Biden did not roll back bans on Huawei and restrictions on TikTok, and US security concerns about China’s rise is a bipartisan issue, just as Gaza is. Harris would likely not have done things differently in those sectors.

MP Bimala Rai Paudyal says: “Trump’s win could cause economic tensions with China, which will affect trade here as well; this is something we will need to prepare for.”

America’s moral authority to lecture countries like Nepal on transitional justice, human rights, democracy, and press freedom will be diminished during the second Trump term.

Reproductive rights and support for family planning projects in Nepal through the UN system may also fall as it did during his earlier presidency. Foreign aid through USAID could also be cut.

Perhaps the more indirect impact of Trump's presidency on Nepal, however, will be his rollback on America’s commitment to curb climate change, which will accelerate the melting of the Himalayan icecaps with a major impact on the water supply downstream in Asia.

“America’s climate commitments and goals will be impacted by Trump, who doesn’t believe in climate change,” says Paudyal. “The current work on loss and damage, and carbon trading depends significantly on US funding, and the world looks to the US to be proactive.”

If Trump can bring the Ukraine war to a close by cosying up to Putin, a peace deal may improve the fuel and food situation globally. There are thousands of Nepalis in the Russian Army; at least 40 have died, and they could finally come home.

Upadhyay concludes: “As for Nepal, the Trump administration should see Nepal as a sovereign nation on its own right rather than through the prism of great power rivalry either between the US and China.”

Written by Nepali Times

Originally published on Global Voices

Feature image via Canva Pro.

In a turn of events that surprised many, beleaguered former president and Republican candidate Donald Trump has been elected the 47th president of the United States in a convincing win over current vice president Kamala Harris.

In the Caribbean, as in America itself and around the globe, the outcome of the 2024 American presidential race had people speculating about what Trump's upcoming second term in office might mean for the region — especially in areas like immigration, trade, tourism and climate cooperation:

Bridgette Simpson,44, is originally from Jamaica but has been living in Atlanta for decades. She said immigration is her top concern and is terrified about a second Trump term. “I think this new version of what folks want America to be doesn’t include me or my mom.” @285SouthAtl pic.twitter.com/6L2fl1cgMp

— Gabriela Henriquez Stoikow (@gchenriquez1) November 6, 2024

Regional leaders were quick to offer their congratulations to the new president-elect, but some — like Jamaica's Prime Minister Andrew Holness in the tweet below — experienced some pushback with online comments:

Congratulations President Donald J. Trump, @realDonaldTrump, on your election as the 47th President of the United States of America.

Jamaica remains committed to strengthening our close and enduring partnership with the United States and looks forward to advancing the goals of… pic.twitter.com/mBCcdep4Ag

— Andrew Holness (@AndrewHolnessJM) November 6, 2024

Several social media users also responded to Prime Minister Mia Mottley‘s warm Instagram message on behalf of Barbados, with one noting, “I love you Queen but diplomacy is a no. He has called us [a] ‘sh**hole country.'”

Trump's controversial 2018 comment specifically referred to Haiti and some African nations, but with Haiti being a Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member, many in the region took the slight personally — especially when coupled with his most recent disparaging remark about Puerto Rico:

Trump ran a campaign targeting the people of two different Caribbean Islands (Haiti and Puerto Rico) and yall voted him in a near landslide. So here is my message to you from the Land of Wood and Water, GO FUCK YOURSELF

— Marxist-Hobart Brownist Madason (@Asgore_D_Yosuke) November 6, 2024

Meanwhile, another commenter on Mottley's post reasoned, “The job of any politician— especially a prime minister — is to be a flexible diplomat. Congratulating a legitimately elected president is, above all, a show of political respect. Mia is offering her congratulations as the prime minister, not as a private individual.”

When it comes to Trump, however, many in the region simply could not overlook the “private individual” aspect — and this Jamaican social media user was not prepared to let leaders off the hook, diplomatic protocol be damned:

world leaders react to President Elect Convicted Criminal as the self proclaimed leader of free world and a country that pretends to be the bastion of freedom and democracy! Will they gravel! Yes they will because they are not governed by any morals, values or principles.

— InMyOwnWords (@InMyOwnWordsJam) November 6, 2024

One X (formerly Twitter) user, originally from the Dominican Republic but now living in the United States, lamented:

Unfortunately, looks like I’ll be continuing the family tradition of surviving under dictatorships. As a Dominican immigrant, I am haunted by the past, by the choices my ancestors couldn’t make, by the trauma they endured to survive violence & their hopes and dreams of better.

— Dr. Saudi says Free Palestine! (@tingo_taught_me) November 6, 2024

While some regional netizens wrestled with the possible contributing factors to Harris’ loss, others — like diaspora member Sonya Sanchez-Arias — were confounded by those who voted for Trump. She later remarked, “Imagine trading your wife and daughter's freedom and wellbeing for cheaper milk and eggs!”

One X/Twitter user from The Bahamas chimed in:

I hate that as a planet, we have to hold our breaths every four years while the most destructive country in human history decides who gets to do the destroying.

— Xi BigTing (@JuMyKn) November 5, 2024

Another added:

Tbh only thing more frightening than Trump being president is JD Vance as vp and Elon Musk having access to everything. It’s like the devil and his 2 henchmen.

— 𝒮 (@mcintosh_sian) November 6, 2024

Some Caribbean people, however, were firmly on the other side of the political divide. In Trinidad and Tobago, at least three weeks before the US presidential election, a WhatsApp invitation began circulating, inviting people to “Celebrate MAGA style as the race for President Trump soars to 270 and becomes POTUS 47.” The event also offered “complimentary MAGA hats on entry.”

The Trinidad and Tobago Newsday attended the celebration and posted footage of it on Instagram, reporting that the event attracted about 45 people. Many of the comments on the post, however, were critical and decidedly anti-Trump. Others took issue with the fact that the event organisers had the audacity to play the music of Jamaican reggae icon Bob Marley, who routinely spoke out for the marginalised and voiceless.

Trinidad and Tobago Facebook user Richard Hill, meanwhile, suggested that the future of the world was hanging on the outcome of the US election. He posited that a win by the Democrats would greenlight “the NWO Agenda 2030.” The alleged New World Order agenda he refers to has been debunked.

In Jamaica, some netizens called out their compatriots’ indignation over Trump being re-elected, accusing them of a double standard:

I firmly believe if Jamaica could vote, we'd be a red state. I don't think the average Jamaican is as disgusted by Trump as we'd like to believe https://t.co/odX7NdEhug

— tariq (@simply_tariq) November 6, 2024

The argument reminded many of what Jamaican lawyer and newspaper columnist Gordon Robinson had predicted with regard to Harris’ chances back in September when he made the following points:

3. She's unlikely2bcumPresident. The avg American voter cares less abt liberal issues like how many convictions Trump owns or how bad he is. They r petrified@ the browning of USA&high cost of living&will vote4any1who promises2stem the tide of blackification by any means necessary

— Gordon Robinson (@TheTerribleTout) September 6, 2024

Finally, one former regional journalist who made the switch to public relations approached the whole situation as a learning experience:

Lessons in this election and the Trump campaign especially if you’re in Marketing and Comms. Social media make you feel like you have to talk to everybody appeal to everyone. Nope. Figure out your primary target audience & what you want them to do. Focus on them. Execute.

— The Notorious YGL (@jahmekyagyal) November 6, 2024

As Trump prepares to take office again, Caribbean nations will be closely following his policy directions and what he may or may not execute.

Written by Janine Mendes-Franco

Originally published on Global Voices

Maia Sandu and her opponent Alexandr Stoianoglo. Screenshot of video “Moldova's pro-Western incumbent Maia Sandu claims election win | AC1G” from the Talk Shows Central YouTube channel. Fair use.

Maia Sandu won the Moldovan presidential election on November 4, 2024, becoming the country's first leader to secure a second term through direct elections. Sandu’s final lead was around 11 percent, or approximately 182,000 votes — a respectable result. However, there's a caveat. Unlike in 2020, she achieved this victory largely thanks to the votes of the Moldovan diaspora. Domestically, Sandu lost to her opponent, Alexandr Stoianoglo, by a margin of 2.4 percent, or 32,000 votes. This conflicting result highlights a longstanding divide in Moldovan society across multiple dimensions.  Evgenii Cheban wrote about the election results for Moldovan media outlet NewsMaker, and Global Voices translated the article, edited it for clarity and republished it with the permission from NewsMaker. 

How did Sandu secure victory?

The results of the first round of the presidential election and a pro-European constitutional referendum were an unpleasant surprise for the Moldovan government and Sandu personally. The incumbent president's first-round victory was far from the convincing win that could ensure an easy second-round victory. The pro-European constitutional referendum, seen as a rehearsal for the second round, nearly failed.

Taking this bitter pill from Moldovan voters, Sandu's team set out to improve their standing.

The president worked hard to charm voters who supported other candidates, delivering conciliatory and unifying messages, especially targeting the supporters of Renato Usatii, who came in third in the first round. She even reached out to Ilan Shor‘s network of activists. The former air of superiority and condescending attitude towards opponents and their supporters seemed to have vanished.

A notable symbol of this shift was a Friday photo with Ion Ceban, the mayor of Chișinău, whom Sandu and her team had long labeled as “Moscow’s man.” Now, the two stood together — though with not-so-happy expressions — promoting a “European future” on Sandu's Facebook page, just two days before the deciding vote.

A divided Moldova: Why the diaspora had to rescue Sandu's victory, and what's next?

In response to the protest vote of the first round, Sandu acknowledged the government's mistakes and even promised reforms, starting with government reshuffles.

To minimize the impact of Shor's activists, reportedly financed by Russia, law enforcement ramped up efforts, with daily reports of searches, detentions, and fines for vote-buying. 

The media leaked the database of Ilan Shor’s supporters in Moldova, spreading it widely on social networks. Government supporters abandoned the presumption of innocence and publicly denounced those listed.

Read more: Moldova's presidential elections face the second round

Alexandr Stoianoglo's campaign: A contrast in approach

Between the two election rounds, Stoianoglo and his team were far less active. He performed poorly in debates with Sandu, gave a few advantageous interviews, did a social media stream, but posted little about his campaign meetings.

Sandu's team’s active engagement across multiple areas stood out against Stoianoglo's passive campaign, yielding results. The combined strategy of tackling Shor’s network, mobilizing supporters, and appealing to voters from eliminated candidates paid off.

Sandu improved her first-round result by 275,000 voters, of which only 115,000 came from higher turnout. Stoianoglo gained an additional 347,000 votes — 141,000 short of the total votes for eliminated candidates in the first round. This shortfall in protest votes partially resulted from Renato Usatii’s refusal to support the opposition candidate in the second round. But the main reason for Stoianoglo’s loss likely lies elsewhere — most Moldovan voters aren’t prepared to see a candidate from a pro-Kremlin party as president. Sandu’s campaign focused heavily on this fear during the final stretch.

Division one: Geopolitics

When Moldovans discuss societal divides, they often reference a geopolitical split — those favoring European integration versus those leaning toward Russia. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has significantly reduced support for the latter stance.

The main pro-Kremlin political force, which openly backs and justifies Russia's invasion of Ukraine, is Ilan Shor’s semi-underground organization. In the second round, Shor urged his supporters to vote for Stoianoglo and arranged transportation to polling stations abroad in Minsk, Baku, and Istanbul. Igor Dodon, the Socialist leader backing Stoianoglo, also tried to justify Putin’s actions, though with less enthusiasm and more caution.

Connections between Stoianoglo and pro-Kremlin forces were a major point of attack and a key vulnerability. Although Stoianoglo condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an act of aggression, supported Ukraine's territorial integrity, and distanced himself from Dodon, his efforts didn’t seem convincing enough.

Fear of a “Kremlin Trojan horse,” as Sandu called Stoianoglo, became the main rallying cry for her supporters in the second round.

The final election results clearly showed that most Moldovan voters (especially those in the diaspora) are wary of any Kremlin-associated forces. This narrative will likely feature heavily in Sandu’s and PAS’s strategies in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Division two: inequality

If the Socialist Party and Shor are toxic due to corruption and Kremlin ties, why did Stoianoglo win domestically? Moldova isn’t driven solely by geopolitics or fears of war. Particularly in the regions outside Chișinău, another societal division exists — one unrelated to high politics or global concerns.

Moldovan society is split into two Moldovas, with little relation to geopolitics or Vladimir Putin.

The first Moldova consists of citizens with incomes above average, mostly residing in Chișinău or abroad. They vote predominantly for pro-European politicians and favor EU integration. These citizens travel to Europe frequently, making visa-free access, low-cost airlines, and parking fees at Chișinău airport vital. Most have Romanian passports and influence public opinion on social media and TV.

The second Moldova lives mainly in Moldova's emptying villages and small towns, often lacking basic utilities like centralized water and sewage systems. Many in this second Moldova are elderly, surviving on minimal pensions, while younger residents, with low salaries, consider emigration, taking microloans for essentials. They feel the brunt of any economic shock, be it inflation or rising utility costs.

These citizens aren’t necessarily against Moldova's European path; they simply don’t see or feel its benefits. Yet, they constantly hear about EU integration from government officials and see EU flags displayed everywhere.

The stark difference between these two Moldovas becomes evident by comparing photos from Shor's party protests and last year’s pro-European rally in Chișinău. Even better, take a look at footage from the 2022 Chișinău Marathon. There, men and women in branded sportswear with expensive gadgets run past elderly poor dressed women, who have been brought to the Shor protest and are watching them with curiosity.

The second Moldova is poorly represented in public spaces and Moldovan politics. They often fall for populist slogans and cheap promises and feel alienated by the arrogance shown by the first Moldova, including the ruling party and president.

For this second country, socioeconomic conditions matter more than foreign policy. The Communist Party once addressed their need for justice, as did Sandu and PAS with their anti-oligarchic stance in 2020–2021. Recently, Stoianoglo has appealed to this sentiment with his slogan, “Justice for All,” explaining his domestic win.

Two Moldovas, two presidents

The first Moldova, mainly the diaspora and Chișinău, chose Sandu, while the second Moldova voted for Stoianoglo — two different countries, with different priorities, wanting different presidents.

In her post-election address, Sandu once again promised to be “the president for all citizens,” aiming to bridge the divide intensified by this campaign. But can she — and will she?

Written by Guest Contributor

Originally published on Global Voices

Marielle Franco, September 2017. Photo courtesy of the Marielle Franco Institute.

This article, written by Bibbi Abruzzini and Clarisse Sih, is part of the #MarchWithUs campaign, which features stories from gender justice activists from across the globe. Listen to the podcast episode on the Marielle Franco Institute here.

On the night of March 14, 2018, Brazil was shocked by the breaking news about the execution of a Rio de Janeiro city councilor. The politician was 38-year-old Marielle Franco, and she was killed in her car alongside her driver, Anderson Gomes. Franco’s name would turn into a symbol against political violence and become known worldwide since then.

Franco was first elected to Rio's City Council in 2016 with PSOL (Socialism and Liberty), a leftist party. She was a woman of African descent who grew up in the Maré favela complex, one of the largest in the city; she was a single mother and a woman in a same-sex relationship. A sociologist, she also had a master's degree, obtained studying the installment of police units in favelas, and advocated for human rights, especially for LGBTQ+ and impoverished communities.

In her first run, she received 46.502 votes. After her death, her family created the Marielle Franco Institute, a civil society organization, to keep seeking justice and responses on her killing and who ordered it, but also to carry her legacy with projects linked to her subjects of interest.

With Brazil voting again in city elections and over 60 countries going to the ballots this 2024, there are also concerns about the vulnerability of activists, candidates and even citizens amidst polarized local contexts. Research shows that political violence is worse for some.

Women and other minorities around the world are facing unprecedented levels of targeted political violence. This takes a wide range of forms, including physical attacks and backlash against groups that have historically been marginalized as a reaction to their advancement within patriarchal and colonial power structures.

‘The police shot 111 times’

After Anielle Franco, Marielle’s younger sister, was named minister of racial equality in the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2023, Lígia Batista, a human rights lawyer became the executive director of the Marielle Franco Institute. Batista was one of the people who built a campaign for Amnesty International following the developments of the investigations on Franco’s murder, demanding faster response and impartiality by the police authorities and taking the case to national and international human rights forums.

“I started organizing my anger in university, joining as a human rights activist addressing mostly racism and police violence,” says Batista in an interview with Bibbi Abruzzini from the civil society network Forus. ”The first case that touched my heart took place in November 2015, when five Black boys were shot to death by police officers in Rio de Janeiro inside a car. The police shot 111 times.”

“After that day, I started to understand what moves me, why I was so angry, and what kind of contributions I wanted to offer to bring about change when it comes to these inequalities and how violence works against people like us, my family and my neighbors,” Batista says.

In her years working at Amnesty International, Batista navigated through issues such as housing rights, the right to protest, conflict resolution, and denouncing police brutality and violence in politics. Because of that activism, she had the chance to meet Marielle Franco.

Ligia Batista, executive director of the Marielle Franco Institute.

Over the past few years, the Instituto Marielle Franco has been consolidating its work around three main areas, Batista explains. The first focuses on addressing gender and race-based violence in politics. The second is to fight and overcome barriers to the political participation of Black women, LGBTQ+ people and people from favelas and peripheries in politics. The third is to explore creative ways to protect Marielle Franco's memory.

For instance, for the 2024 municipal elections in Brazil, they developed the Marielle Franco Agenda, a set of anti-racist, feminist, LGBTQI+, peripheral, and popular political practices and commitments inspired by Franco's legacy. In developing this year's edition, they consulted over 200 collectives, social movements, and organizations, doubling the number of participants they had in 2022.

The agenda is designed to be implemented in city councils and municipal governments by 2024 candidates.

Tackling gender and race-based violence in politics

Batista says, “To be able to move the needle when it comes to the fight for transformation in Brazil's political system, we need to shift a political culture, a culture that is really crosscut by fear and by violence. To address political violence, political parties and governments need to be held accountable. They need to be the ones offering effective tools to be able to prevent and tackle gender and race-based violence in politics”.

For instance, the research “Mapping Political Violence Against Black Women” conducted by the Instituto Marielle Franco in partnership with Justiça Global and Terra de Direitos, looked at gender-based political violence. According to the report, eight out of 10 Black women in the 2020 elections in Brazil experienced virtual violence; six out of 10 experienced moral and psychological violence, and five out of 10 suffered from institutional violence.

They have mapped eight types of political violence suffered by over 140 Black women candidates in the country, and their work has consistently shown that whether Black women are elected or not, they remain unprotected against these forms of violence. Through the “Não Seremos Interrompidas” (“We will not be Interrupted”) campaign — a reference to Marielle's last speech at Rio's City Council — they’ve been advocating for local authorities to act against political violence that has kept Black women and LGBTQ+ people from accessing and safely occupying political power.

“This year, we are working on creating a network of political strategists, people who are going to come together to support Black women candidates and LGBTQ+ people during elections. So far, we have been exploring this work mostly through arts and culture,” Batista adds.

Two years ago, a law was passed in Brazil to combat political violence. “‘Justice for Marielle’ goes beyond finding answers and holding the perpetrators of the crime accountable. We need to ensure that no one else gets killed.”

Therefore, the Institute has launched a survey that takes “an X-ray” of the two years of the law and the mechanisms for protecting and preventing political violence. They are calling for expanded legislation, enhanced protection mechanisms — including a specific protocol for victims of political violence — a guarantee of adequate financial support for representatives dealing with attacks and involving political parties, electoral bodies and more in prevention and awareness programs.

The PANE platform, another project by the institute, consolidates actions and tools aimed at reshaping Brazil’s political system. With a nod to the 524 years since the Portuguese colonizers’ arrival, the platform walks one through the deep-rooted inequalities and violence faced by historically marginalized communities over centuries. The cracks in the current structures are visible, and PANE promotes the inclusion of Black women in decision-making spaces, pressuring parties to support these candidacies and advocating for a commitment to anti-racist policies among candidates in elections.

In collaboration with organizations like Educafro, the Movimento Mulheres Negras Decidem (Black Women Decide), and the Coalizão Negra por Direitos (Black Coalition for Rights), the Instituto Marielle Franco has already achieved significant milestones.

They successfully pressured the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) for proportional funding and airtime for Black candidates in the 2022 elections. However, they aim for more permanent changes and are urging parties to implement these recommendations immediately.

Global trends

Annual Festival Justiça por Marielle e Anderson, Rio de Janeiro 2024. Photo courtesy of the Marielle Franco Institute.

Globally, women, minorities, and LGBTQ+ communities continue to face significant underrepresentation in political decision-making and political parties. This issue is rooted in complex societal dynamics and intersecting forms of violence. At the current rate, gender diversity in the highest positions of “political power” will not be reached for another 130 years.

The role of international solidarity in achieving change in political systems cannot be neglected, Batista says: “I think that international solidarity is key to us. We are stronger where and when we are together beyond any borders. This message of collectiveness is always really important to put an extra layer of pressure to make decisions, to change the situation and to create a different political environment.”

This past March 14 marked six years, 71 months since Marielle Franco was murdered. The family writes that these were “the hardest six years of our lives.” But every year, the Instituto Marielle Franco organized a “justice festival” with over 20,000 people to continue fighting for justice, defending Marielle Franco's memory, multiplying her legacy and “watering her seeds” of democracy against political violence.

After six years, Marielle Franco's killers were finally convicted this November. Addressing the press after the sentencing, Anielle Franco, Franco’s sister, said that this is the beginning of a path to justice: “We need to end the normalization of violence against Black people, children who are victims of stray bullets and murdered public figures. We will hold our heads high for Marielle, Anderson, and the right to a dignified life.”

Written by Forus

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Arzu Geybullayeva

Georgians voted in a parliamentary election on October 26th, described as a crucial and pivotal vote in the country's history. Initial reports show the ruling Georgian Dream Party winning with 54 percent, thus securing a parliamentary majority and reaffirming its hold on power. Rights groups have called the election “rigged” and warned that Georgia is on an increasingly authoritarian path. While the opposition and Georgia's President have refused to accept the election results due to electoral discrepancies and accusations of fraud, officials from Georgia's neighboring Azerbaijan rushed to congratulate the ruling government.

Azerbaijan's support is not surprising. While Georgia's government has been under heavy criticism since the last parliamentary vote in 2020, which was also contested, in the months leading up to the election, Azerbaijani media, officials, and even TV personalities have rallied behind the Georgian Dream party.

Meddling in the vote

Ahead of the vote, Azerbaijan pro-government news platforms were inundated with articles accusing the West of meddling in Georgia's elections as well as interviews with pro-ruling party candidates from ethnic Azerbaijani communities living in Georgia. There were no stories about opposition candidates from the same community or violations these candidates faced on election day.

It was not just traditional news outlets that were favoring the Georgian Dream Party. Even talk shows were encouraging ethnic Azerbaijanis, living in Georgia to vote for the Georgian Dream. “Support stability, peace, war free Georgia when you go to vote. Because war-free and peaceful Georgia is important for Azerbaijan. We have our compatriots living there. If the situation there gets complicated there, it will be bad for you, and for us. Bear in mind the example of Ukraine. What is Georgia like right now? Stable and peaceful, unlike Ukraine,” said the show's host, Hoshgadam Hidayatgizi, during the show.

Hidayatgizi's references to Ukraine are not surprising. Prior to the election day, Georgian Dream launched a political ad campaign featuring images of war-torn Ukraine juxtaposed with peaceful images of Georgia. According to OC Media, banners and campaign videos were released in September 2024 and showed “burnt remains of the Mariupol Drama Theatre, marked with the numbers 4, 5, 9, and 25 — the electoral numbers of the opposition Coalition for Change, Unity — National Movement, Strong Georgia, and For Georgia respectively. The contrasting image of a theatre in the western Georgian town of Senaki had Georgian Dream’s electoral number, 41, and was captioned with ‘Choose peace!’”

Following the election, Azerbaijani members of the parliament who were in Georgia to observe the election blatantly encouraged ethnic Azerbaijanis to vote for the Georgian Dream party.

Azerbaijani political commentators aren't ashamed to say that they have interfered with Georgian elections: pic.twitter.com/vV3NIS11BL

— Cavid #MakeRussiaSmallAgain (@cavidaga) October 27, 2024

Azerbaijani MP Arzu Naghiyev: pic.twitter.com/yHoF07Gzwx

— Cavid #MakeRussiaSmallAgain (@cavidaga) October 27, 2024

Similarly, one member of the Azerbaijan Parliament, Hikmet Bababoglu, speaking live on a pro-government television channel praised the election process based on his visit. “There were attempts to dramatize this election, but we did not witness any violations,” Babaoglu said in an interview. Babaoglu also criticized President Salome Zourabichvili and responses from the West, which has so far been critical of the election outcome based on reports of violations and fraud.

Georgia's ethnic Azerbaijani community

Ethnic Azerbaijanis make up the largest minority in the country. They reside in Georgia's southern province of Kvemo Kartli. Local activists say it is not the first time the Azerbaijani government has urged its diaspora to support the Georgian Dream Party.

In an interview with Meydan TV, Samira Ismayilova recalled how during the 2016 election, when then-26-year-old Ismayilova ran in the local election, vote rigging in favor of the ruling government ended with her losing the parliamentary election, despite evidence tilting the victory in her favor. Ismayilova told Meydan TV, how the government of Azerbaijan tried influencing votes by identifying influential people from the community with ties in Azerbaijan and using them as a means of reiterating a message of support in favor of the ruling government's candidate.

Samira Bayramova, another ethnic Azerbaijani living in Georgia, confirmed the influence of the Azerbaijani government in an interview with Meydan TV. Bayramova explained how, since 2016, the state oil company SOCAR has been involved in interfering in the Georgian election. The civic activist said the government sent a group of Azerbaijani officials to Georgia, specifically to the region of Kvemo Kartli, who openly supported the Georgian Dream Party's candidate and told the community members to follow suit.

Azerbaijan's encouragement often comes in various forms. Bayramova explained in the interview how SOCAR on one hand, invests in education of local communities and on the other, is involved in buying votes among members of the community.

In 2019, Azerbaijan's presence did not go unnoticed either, as the local residents were encouraged to vote for the Georgian Dream mayoral candidate in this year's election as well.

Ahead of October 26 election, scores of Azerbaijani officials, including SOCAR's vice president, vice speaker of Azerbaijani parliament, SOCAR's Georgia country director and others were visiting Georgia, for the opening of a kindergarden. SOCAR sponsored kindergardens are common in Georgia.

Ethnic Azerbaijanis interviewed by JamNews also said they were forced to vote for candidates representing the Georgian Dream. Some were told they would lose their jobs if they did not comply.

Explaining Azerbaijan's involvement

Azer Gasimli, an Azerbaijani politician and director of the Political Management Institute, finds Azerbaijan's involvement in the domestic politics of Georgia as mutually beneficial. Gasimli told Meydan TV that “it is in the interest of the government of Azerbaijan that Georgia does not integrate into European institutions and becomes more authoritarian. That there are no democratic processes taking shape.” Adding, the interests of both current ruling governments overlap and align in this regard. Azerbaijan is described in a number of international human rights reports as an authoritarian state
and for years, has had one of the lowest international track records on citizens’ rights and freedoms.

Azerbaijan held its own snap parliamentary election in September 2024. Ballot stuffing and other evidence of fraud and violations were widely documented. Attempts by independent observers to have the Central Election Commission annul results at polling stations where these violations were documented proved futile.

Perhaps relying on a similar lack of oversight, one ethnic Azerbaijani representing the Georgian Dream Party, attempted to do the same on October 26. Footage of Rovshan Isgandarov aggressively stuffing a ballot box with a stack of ballots was caught on camera and made it to the news. His actions prompted the closing of the polling station and promises of an investigation into the fraud.

Whether this and reports of election violations from other polling stations in Georgia, will have an impact on the final result of the elections remains to be seen. In an interview with BBC, on October 28, Georgia's Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze dismissed the reports as irregularities which happen everywhere while Georgian Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili denied allegations of fraud all together the same day during a press briefing.

Written by Arzu Geybullayeva

Originally published on Global Voices

Photo by Sasha Pleshco on Unsplash. Used under an Unsplash license.

On October 20, presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on joining the EU were held in Moldova.  The results of the presidential elections and the referendum on European integration came as a surprise to many in Moldova. Only slightly more than 50 percent of voters supported the inclusion of the European course in the constitution. On November 3, 2024, Moldova will hold the second round of the presidential election, with incumbent President Maia Sandu and former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo advancing. NewsMaker examined why the forecasts and polls did not materialize, and what can be expected next. Global Voices translated the article and republished with permission from NewsMaker. 

With a narrow margin and a second round

The second round of the Moldovan presidential election will take place in two weeks, on November 3. The candidates will be Maia Sandu from the ruling PAS party and Alexandr Stoianoglo from the Socialists. Pre-election polls showed that Sandu would likely take first place and Stoianoglo second, but the difference in numbers was significant.

Polls showed that around 30–35 percent of respondents were ready to support Sandu, while around 10 percent favored Stoianoglo. This was out of the total electorate, with a large portion of voters still undecided. As a result, Sandu received 42.45 percent, and Stoianoglo 25.98 percent.

Elections on the edge

The referendum, on the other hand, was expected to see an overwhelming victory for the “Yes” vote.

In reality, the referendum was split almost in half: 50.49 percent voted in favor of including European integration in the Constitution, while 49.57 percent voted against.

Regions against the EU?

Interestingly, according to preliminary results (after half of the ballots were counted), those voting against the referendum were significantly higher (around 56 percent) than those voting in favor. The situation began to change once the ballots from overseas voting stations were processed. Inside the country, most regions had more voters against the constitutional amendments. In fact, there were regions where Sandu (the initiator and main promoter of the referendum) came in first place, but the majority voted against the referendum, such as in the Ungheni and Leova districts. In some districts, Sandu received fewer votes than the “Yes” vote on the referendum, such as in the Telenesti and Nisporeni districts.

The capital, Chișinău voted “Yes” to amending the constitution: 55.98 percent of voters in the capital supported it, while 44.02 percent were against.  All districts of Chișinău and its suburbs supported the amendments, except one, where the majority opposed the EU course being added to the Constitution.

Southern and northern regions of the country mostly voted against the amendments.

WatchDog expert Andrei Curararu argues that the fact that in more than half of Moldova’s districts, over 50 percent opposed the constitutional amendments is not representative.

In federal states, federal subjects play a bigger role. But we are a unitary state. Our demographic situation is such that the population gravitates toward living in Chișinău. I believe that half of our population now lives in Chișinău. We see that Gagauzia voted against the amendments, but let’s not forget that only 200,000 people live there, and typically only about 55,000 vote.

He also pointed to the economic influence of Chișinău and the diaspora on the country’s development, suggesting that this factor should be compared with the regions that voted against.

Why did this happen?

After the preliminary election and referendum results were announced, Maia Sandu stated that around 300,000 voters were targeted for bribery. There were expectations of provocations and vote-buying during the elections and the referendum. The fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, sentenced to 15 years in Moldova, and his “Victory” bloc created a network of supporters, offering them money to join and recruit others. The police repeatedly conducted searches and arrested leaders and members of the bloc’s territorial organizations for illegal financing and influence on the electoral process. Curararu noted that Moldova has a “televised format” for defending democracy: “We conduct searches and arrest two or three leaders, but we do not work with the population. And the population turned out to be much more influenced by Shor than we thought earlier.”

Former Moldovan representative to the UN and Council of Europe Alexei Tulbure noted that Russian interference became a very serious factor influencing the results. However, if judicial and law enforcement reforms had been implemented in Moldova, “the destructive power of Russian interference could have been minimized.”

Political scientist Angela Colatski compared the government’s response to Shor’s actions to “a mosquito bite.”

When you sit down to play with a cheater, it doesn’t matter what game you’re playing—you always have to stay alert. We can’t fight them using their methods, because those are illegal methods. We need to use the entire state arsenal, and ahead of time.

Bad timing

Alexei Tulbure believes that only reforms improving people's lives can make the process of European integration irreversible.

If people's lives improve, we can confidently say there will be no going back. But adding amendments to the Constitution won’t make European integration irreversible. We lack a legal culture. 

 Moreover, organizing a referendum simultaneously with the presidential election raised many questions. Some pro-European supporters also voted against it, as “it was a vote against the government, not against Europe.” Tulbure emphasized that “This was a message directed at the president and PAS, who organized the referendum when it wasn’t the right time or method.” 

Insufficient work with voters

Another reason cited by experts is insufficient engagement with voters. “There needs to be political work to achieve broad consensus on European integration and to unite society,” Tulbure said. He believes the process should involve other ethnic and political groups in the population, which “would change their attitude towards it.” He added, “If they are excluded, they become easy prey for propagandists and populists.” 

According to him, the PAS team didn’t do enough to reach out to voters.

They [PAS representatives] visited central districts of Moldova, where their stable electorate mostly lives. The president didn’t visit the north or the south, where her rating is significantly lower. In the next two weeks leading up to the second round, she needs to visit these areas and convince people.

Angela Colatski also noted that the idea of the referendum was poorly communicated to voters. “Not all voters understood that there would be no second round for the referendum. The slogan ‘There will be no second round in the referendum’ came too late,” she said. 

What’s next?

Moldova is heading to the second round of elections. Making predictions is difficult. The gap between candidates in the first round is 16 percent. Sandu has already appealed to the supporters of Octavian Ticu, Andrei Nastase, Tudor Ulianovschi, Ion Chicu, and Renato Usatii, asking for their support in the second round. However, it is worth noting that all these candidates criticized the incumbent president.

Among the named candidates, Renato Usatii received the most electoral support, finishing third in the first round. In the previous presidential election in 2020, Usatii also placed third and called for votes for Sandu in the second round. Before the first round of the current election, Usatii said he would not endorse anyone this time. Stoianoglo, on the other hand, may unite all opposition-minded voters. But whether that will be enough to close the gap and pull ahead remains unclear.

On the other hand, it seems that Sandu has already mobilized her stable electorate, and there are no more votes to draw from. Experts disagree. Tulbure believes Sandu still has two resources: voters from the northern and southern parts of the country, whom she failed to convince in the first round, and the diaspora, which, although it already demonstrated massive voting, could provide additional support.

Angela Colatski believes that Maia Sandu must build cooperation with other pro-European forces, especially ahead of next summer’s parliamentary elections. The referendum results revealed not only a deep societal divide but also dissatisfaction with the current government. Experts have long doubted whether PAS will replicate its 2021 results. “It’s necessary to start negotiating a pro-European coalition now,” Colatski noted.

Curararu believes the shock from the referendum and election results could serve as motivation for pro-European voters.

There are two weeks left until the second round of the election, and the campaign will intensify. Both candidates have already challenged each other to debates.

Written by Guest Contributor

Originally published on Global Voices

Illustration of Vice President Kamala Harris made by Connectas and used with permission.

This article is from our media partner CONNECTAS and was written by the Argentine journalist Leonardo Oliva.

“Latino voters, we see you and we are willing to win this together.” This post from September 27 is by Julie Chavez Rodriguez, the first Latina to lead a presidential campaign in the United States. This 46-year-old Californian, granddaughter of a famous labor leader, is in charge of getting Kamala Harris to win the elections on November 5 against Donald Trump.

Both the Democrat and the Republican candidates have been trying to attract the Latino vote, a community that has become the first ethnic minority in the country. But Harris has more at stake in this contest: Hispanics, historically voters for her party, see in the vice president — who is mixed race, woman and daughter of immigrants — a representative of minorities. They consider her someone more empathetic to their needs than Trump, who in the last debate shamelessly spread fake news: that Haitian immigrants are eating family pets in the town of Springfield, Ohio.

Julie Chavez's post should be understood in this context. Since Harris became the Democratic nominee at the end of August, the party's hopes of retaining the presidency have been renewed, after Joe Biden decided not to seek re-election. And this momentum is also evident among Hispanic voters.

Latino voters we see you and are ready to win this together https://t.co/yoV89aOMfO

— Julie Chavez Rodriguez (@JulieR2022) September 27, 2024

Latino voters, we hear you and we are ready to win this together

The organization Voto Latino reported that voter registration has increased by 200 percent since Harris's nomination. This translates to about 112,000 new voters, of whom more than half (56 percent) are between 18 and 29 years old. In addition to young people, women have also been motivated to vote as a result of the “Kamala effect.”

As CONNECTAS published in March, the number of Latino voters in 2024 grew by 6.5 percent compared to the 2020 presidential election that Biden won; and it exceeds by 20.5 percent the number of those eligible to vote in 2016, when Trump won. This year, more than one in 10 voters (14.7 percent) will be of Latino origin, a record number. However, of the 36.2 million potential Hispanic voters, only 26 million are registered to vote. Harris's team has its sights set on those 10 million undecided voters who have never set foot in a polling station.

With one month left before the election, the official candidate has focused part of her campaign on the issues that most concern Latinos: the economy, housing and, to a lesser extent, the right to abortion. On the other side, Trump does not hesitate to attract voters with a hardline approach against immigration, much of which comes from Latin American countries.

Ernesto Castañeda, director of the Immigration Laboratory at American University and head of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at that university in Washington, D.C., says:

No creo que la migración en sí misma vaya a definir la elección. El tema más importante en las encuestas ahora es la economía, seguido de la inflación.

I don't think immigration in itself will define the election. The most important issue in the polls now is the economy, followed by inflation.

Castañeda argues that Harris's nomination has changed voting trends not only among Latinos but also among African Americans, and insists that economic issues will be a priority for people casting their votes. He explains:

Son los mismos temas que le incumben a la clase media trabajadora de cualquier otro tipo de comunidad. Los migrantes indocumentados son solo un 3 por ciento de la población estadounidense y los latinos son casi el 20 por ciento de la población y un 18 por ciento de la fuerza laboral, entonces sus temas son el salario mínimo o los derechos laborales, no la situación migratoria.

These are the same issues that concern the working middle class in any other type of community. Undocumented immigrants make up only 3 percent of the US population, and Latinos are almost 20 percent of the population and 18 percent of the workforce, so their issues are minimum wage or labor rights, not immigration status.

Political scientist Franklin Camargo agrees with Castañeda on what drives the Hispanic vote:

La prioridad de los latinos es la economía; es el costo de vida y la inflación. En esta área desaprueba enormemente a la administración Biden–Harris.

For the Latinos the priority is the economy; it is the cost of living and inflation. In this area, they strongly disapprove of the Biden–Harris administration.

Camargo, who is also a political commentator for Univisión Noticias (Univisión News), further disagrees that Harris is a favorite among Latinos.

Estamos viendo encuestas que dicen que Donald Trump no solamente aumentaría el voto latino con respecto a las dos contiendas anteriores, sino que sería uno de los candidatos republicanos de la historia reciente en conseguir la mayor cantidad de votos latinos.

We are seeing polls that show that Donald Trump would not only increase the Latino vote compared to the two previous races, but that he would be one of the Republican candidates in recent history to get the largest number of Latino votes.

Recent polls by The New York Times show how close the election will be, which is partly due to the changing trend in the Latino vote. If in 2020, 65 percent were in favor of Biden over Trump; this time only 55 percent say they would vote for Harris. And the rest of the predictions show that both candidates are in a technical tie after the September 11, 2024 debate.

Young, undocumented and apathetic

A report by the Pew Research Center reflects a contrasting reality of the universe of Latino voters in the United States. Although they are currently the largest minority (surpassing African Americans), they are still less likely to vote than Americans in general (53 percent versus 72 percent). This is partly due to the fact that the Latino population includes a large number of very young people; and also because many others are not citizens (19 percent of Latinos).

And there is another factor that diminishes the electoral weight they may have: almost half of Latino voters live in only two states, California and Texas. But according to all analysts, the campaign will probably be defined in three states of the so-called Rust Belt (Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin), where the voters to be wooed are not Latinos, but white working-class men.

Map created by Connectas using Flourish. Source: Pew Research Center, using data from the American Community Survey (IPUMS) 2022. Used with permission.

Furthermore, it must be taken into account that Hispanics are the most apathetic group when it comes to voting. In the last election, only 51 percent of those who were eligible voted, compared to 63 percent of African Americans and 74 percent of whites. For Camargo,

Hay una falta de interés en el grueso de nuestra comunidad en tener algún tipo de acción política y esto obedece a varias razones. Puede ser falta de asimilación o poca expectativa de cambio, creer que lo que hagas no va a cambiar absolutamente nada.

The majority of our community lacks the interest in having any kind of political action and this is due to several reasons. It may be a lack of assimilation or a low expectation of change, believing that what you do will not change anything at all.

Another reason, says the Venezuelan-born political scientist, is that:

Estados Unidos en términos de seguridad, de economía, etcétera, es mucho más próspero que los países de los que venimos, y eso hace que no tengas tanto interés en la política dado que te sientes cómodo.

The United States, in terms of security, economy, etc., is much more prosperous than the countries we come from, and that makes you not have as much interest in politics because you feel comfortable.

So, if the key states to decide the election are not those with the largest Latino presence and, in addition, Hispanic voters are not the most participative at the polls, will the enthusiasm that her candidacy generated among part of the Latino population be enough for Kamala Harris to achieve victory?

NALEO Educational Fund, an NGO dedicated to promoting the participation of Latinos in the American political process, recognizes that Harris's nomination has increased enthusiasm in that community. But according to Dorian Caal, director of Civic Engagement Research for that organization, the Latino vote is no longer so predictable:

Los candidatos o las campañas tienen una oportunidad de hablar con la comunidad latina de los asuntos que son importantes para ella. A los latinos les importan asuntos como la migración, pero también otros como el costo de la vida, que ha sido bien importante no solo en esta elección, sino también en el 2022 y en el 2020.

Candidates or campaigns have an opportunity to speak to the Latino community about issues that are important to them. Latinos care about issues like immigration, but also others like the cost of living, which has been very important not only in this election, but also in 2022 and 2020.

Caal, however, praised the role that women from the Latino community, who are more active, will play in this presidential race. In addition, Caal maintains that:

La comunidad latina es especialmente una comunidad joven [68 por ciento tiene menos de 50 años, contra el 52 por ciento del resto de los estadounidenses]. Por eso serán un segmento importante en estas próximas elecciones.

The Latino community is especially a young community [68 percent are under 50 years old, compared to 52 percent of the rest of the Americans]. That is why they will be an important segment in these upcoming elections.

Written by Connectas Translated by Teodora C. Hasegan · View original post [es]

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Arzu Geybullayeva

Turkey faces a problem which its citizens are afraid to admit: how to remove a sitting president who has no intention of leaving office.

Under the rule of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey has become visibly poorer. Citizens are angry, bitter and some are beginning to raise their voices. It’s hard to put a percentage on the number of people who want Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) gone, but suffice it to say that if elections were held tomorrow, they would likely lose by a landslide.

Fully aware of this, Erdoğan is in no rush to call snap elections. After all, he was re-elected president only last year until 2028. He has now signaled that he would like to be re-elected for a fourth term, which is not permitted by the country's constitution. What can be done to prevent him from illegally holding onto power? Unfortunately, removing him by democratic elections is not a function of reality. Turkey's population has to actively pressure him out of office.

Who wants Erdoğan gone?

For some time now, I have been watching street interviews on YouTube, conducted by a cadre of citizen journalists who randomly interview ordinary people on Turkey’s streets capturing citizen sentiments.

Public disdain against Erdoğan is palpable. After 22 years of his rule, people want change. Economic malpractice, rampant corruption, crushing consumer inflation are overwhelmingly heaped on Erdoğan’s bad governance. The elderly are finding it hard to access healthcare and medicines, pay their rent, and even secure daily basics like bread. Many are seen in public markets buying rotten fruit and vegetables at discounted prices, some searching for garbage in trash cans that appears to be edible. Turkey has never experienced this level of poverty.

Citizens are confused, however, as to how or whether Erdoğan will leave office. Their anger needs to be channeled into action. They need to feel empowered and believe that their voices of frustration can be directed to remove him from power. Right now, most of them believe that if they speak up, there would likely be unwelcome consequences like losing their job, or being arrested and jailed.

In the last decade, Erdoğan has erased the view that Turkey is a country governed by the rule of law. It is not. It is a country governed by law and impunity. The basic constitutional order has been upended.

Democratic transition of power unlikely under Erdoğan

At present, I am of the view that political and governmental change in Turkey is not possible by relying on the conventional institutions of democracy like elections. In other words, I don’t believe that Erdoğan would leave office just because he may one day lose an election. Criticisms of and challenges to Erdoğan’s rule by law are not well-received. Turkey, in my estimation, is beyond the point of peaceful transition of power from one incumbent to the next. Erdoğan is giving clear signals of his intent to remain in office, come what way.

Erdoğan's strong grip on power is not sustained simply because he rules with an iron fist. Rank-and-file citizens also share the blame. In fact, the actions of some of his harshest critics help sustain his rule.

The single largest problem preventing the president’s removal from office inside Turkey is public pressure. The vast majority of Turkish people are unwilling and unable to raise their voices and criticize Erdoğan. They remain silent, mainly because they are afraid of going to jail.

Waiting for a savior

In addition to this fear, there is an unfortunate fixation in the minds of regime critics that somehow, if an election were to be held in the near future, it would finally rid the country of 22 years of the president and his autocratic rule.

It is a view focused on finding a savior who can finally convince more than 50 per cent of voters to back them. In the past two election cycles (2023 presidential and 2024 local elections), Ekrem Imamoglu, the charismatic mayor of Istanbul, was a frequent name employed by hopeful Erdoğan dissenters, that he may actually be the person. There is, however, little consideration given to the possibility that politically, Turkey may have reached a point where the transition of power from Erdoğan to his successor may not be achievable in a peaceful manner. In late 2024, there is a decent chance that Imamoglu will be banned from politics and will not be able to run against Erdogan.

The combination mirage of waiting for Turkey’s political savior and naive belief that elections will unseat Erdoğan has resulted in a society-wide level of passivity. A mistaken belief that if Turks are patient and vote for the right person, Turkey will wake up to a bright future. Such passivity is a significant source of power sustaining Erdoğan’s autocratic rule. Therefore, taking a vocally anti-Erdoğan position and openly resisting his authoritarian rule is viewed as unnecessary, even anti-Turkish.

Anti-Erdoğan = Anti-Turkish?

Since joining the Foundation the Defense of Democracies (FDD) as a Turkey watcher, a Washington-based think tank that is openly critical of Erdoğan, I have identified a clear trend: openly calling out Erdogan’s undemocratic acts is met with hostility by many Turks, and not by those who are his supporters, but by those who desire to see him gone.

My assumption was that critics would be supportive of analysis and policy recommendations detailing Erdoğan’s transgressions from democracy, the rule of law and corrupt practices. Instead, factually grounded and disclosure-based analysis is frequently dismissed by his critics as “anti-Turkish propaganda.”

Moreover, we frequently see arguments made that FDD research, in addition to being disparaging of Erdoğan and the AKP, is too “Western,” as in, it is too focused on or solely interested in keeping Ankara as a puppet of Western powers. In private conversations with individuals, I have come to learn that direct exposure of Erdoğan’s policies, which cast Turkey in a negative light, should only be discussed among other Turks. This is based on the view that, as Turks, we can be as critical of Turkish politicians among ourselves, but doing so openly in public is damaging to Turkey’s overall image, and we should refrain from airing the country’s dirty laundry when in the company of non-Turks.

My compilation of these individuals’ backgrounds, affiliations, demography, etc., is not methodologically derived in any scientific manner. They are observations I have made since joining FDD.

Where is the public outrage?

FDD analysis of Erdoğan policies has certainly been harsh, to say the least, both in rhetoric and in tone. This is intentional. In my estimation, only analyzing Erdoğan's actions without exposing the malice, corruption and abuse of power involved is a dereliction of my duty. Unfortunately, this is what the majority of my think tank and journalist colleagues in Washington do: simply analyze what Erdoğan says or does as if he were just another world leader. By underreporting his actions, they help perpetuate authoritarianism.

Without a doubt, Turkey's image was damaged when FDD helped uncover a brazen violation of international sanctions against Iran by Ankara. FDD research into the Halkbank case shed light on how Erdoğan helped orchestrate a USD 20 billion heist, where Turkey purchased illegal Iranian natural gas and paid for it in gold. Calling for accountability in all these measures is not denigrating Turkey’s reputation. It is an attempt to salvage it. Erdoğan is a criminal, pure and simple. Any person who opposes such illegal behavior should join us in demanding that he be held accountable before the law.

Erdoğan has fundamentally stripped Turkey of its soul. He has done more harm to the country's democratic development than any junta regime. It is worth remembering that he refers to the Gezi Park protests of 2013 as acts of ‘”terrorism.” These were popular and largely peaceful public protests denouncing Erdoğan and the AKP’s corrupt rule of impunity. During the protests, Berkin Elvan, a child sent out by his family to buy bread, was shot and killed by the police. Erdoğan denounced him as a terrorist on the day he was being buried by his family. Elvan's murder has gone unpunished.

This is the same government that removed protections to deter violence against women under the Istanbul convention (which they originally legislated); the same government that emptied the country’s central bank reserves, totaling over USD 128 billion of stolen funds. It is the same government that openly embraces and provides material support to Hamas, a major terrorist organization that carried out the deadly October 7 attacks in Israel, murdering over 1,200 Israeli civilians. While Turkey's allies, especially in NATO, are heavily critical of Israel's military operations to eliminate Hamas, Turkey is the only country in NATO that openly praises Hamas’ actions.

For the first time in its 100-year history, Turkey is in danger of unraveling as a cohesive polity. It is time for fellow Erdoğan critics and policy analysts who document Turkey to see past one another’s differences and acknowledge that if we want to see the survival of a democratic Turkey, we need to support and work together. Elections, saviors and underreporting Erdoğan will not save the country. Those who clap for Erdoğan’s authoritarian project are united. The question remains: why do we choose to undermine and weaken one another by not coalescing around those who strive to rid Turkey of the scourge of Erdoğan rule?

Written by Sinan Ciddi