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This article was written by Ekaterina Dubasova and originally published by Newsmaker on August 21, 2024. A translated and edited version is republished on Global Voices under a media partnership agreement.

Relations between Chișinău, Tiraspol (Transnistria), and Comrat  (Gagauzia) remain far from peaceful. While many point to Russia's destabilizing actions, Moscow is not solely to blame for these tensions. In its report published on August 21, the International Crisis Group (ICG) concluded: “The Moldovan government's hardline approach to Transnistria and Gagauzia has led to increased internal tensions and appears counterproductive.” This article highlights the key findings from the ICG report and explores the challenges Moldova faces in fostering unity amid external and internal pressures.

The Kremlin’s strategy and its transformation

Experts from the International Crisis Group emphasize that Russia has historically viewed the territory of the former Soviet Union as its sphere of influence. However, Moldova's economic ties with Western countries have strengthened: energy crises, along with Russia's war in Ukraine, have prompted Chișinău’s decisive turn toward the West.

The situation did not sit well with Russia, resulting in a shift in its tactics regarding Chișinău. Early in the war, “Moscow seemed to believe that gaining control over southwestern Ukraine up to Transnistria would allow it to use military pressure to impose its demands on Moldova.” The authors point out: “Now that the front lines are far from Moldova’s border, this strategy has been sidelined, and Moscow has chosen a different path.”

The Kremlin’s new tactic is intimidation. This primarily involves stoking fear among the Russian-speaking population of potential discrimination by Moldovan authorities. The report draws attention to the shelling of the local Ministry of State Security building in Tiraspol and other similar incidents in April 2022, stating: “It seemed intended as a reminder that Russian power can still reach Moldova.”

A stick without a carrot is a poor tool

However, the authors of the report argue that the growing split between Chișinău and Gagauzia, as well as Transnistria, has been fueled not only by Russia's interference in Moldovan politics but also by Chișinău’s own policies: “After strengthening ties with the West and Ukraine, inspired Moldovan officials have moved toward tightening political and economic control over breakaway Transnistria and autonomous Gagauzia. This has sparked concern and discontent among the residents of these regions.”

The International Crisis Group also noted that, since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia's influence in Tiraspol has weakened. To support this, the authors cite three factors: First, Tiraspol allowed the transit of Ukrainian goods through its territory. Second, in 2022, the number of applications for Moldovan passports from residents of the region sharply increased (residents sometimes travel with Romanian, Russian, or Ukrainian passports), and by January this year, 97.55 percent of Transnistria’s population held such passports. Finally, in March, the lowest voter turnout in 18 years for Russian presidential elections was recorded in Transnistria.

Thus, the authors conclude that Moldovan officials, feeling increasingly confident in the new geopolitical landscape, sought to tighten political and economic control over the region. Examples include the Moldovan law about separatism and the removal of customs and tax privileges for Transnistria. These actions prompted the PMR leader — the unrecognized president of Transnistria — Vadim Krasnoselsky, to convene a “congress of deputies at all levels” for the first time in 18 years, during which they appealed to Moscow for diplomatic support. According to the report’s authors, “By choosing the stick without offering a carrot or dialogue, Moldovan authorities risk provoking backlash and increasing problems between Tiraspol and Chișinău.”

A similar situation is unfolding in Gagauzia, where Evghenia Gutsul, who is aligned with fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, was elected as the region’s head (bashkan). Moldova’s president Maia Sandu considers Gutsul part of a criminal group. “After Gutsul’s latest trip to Russia in early April, Moldovan authorities charged her with illegally financing a political party. If convicted, she could face prison time and be forbidden from pursuing a political career. The United States, supporting Sandu’s government efforts to remove Gutsul from power, imposed sanctions on her on June 12,” the report notes.

Nevertheless, Gutsul and Shor's political allies have formed a bloc campaigning against European integration in the upcoming referendum (October 20, 2024). The International Crisis Group observes, “Many voters in Gagauzia, who make up about 5 percent of Moldova’s electorate, are likely to abstain or vote against EU membership. This could influence the outcome, but only in the case of a very tight vote count.”

Challenges

Chișinău faces a difficult task: on one hand, protecting the upcoming elections from Russian interference, and on the other, improving relations with Tiraspol and Comrat.

Regarding the dialogue with Tiraspol, the report’s authors highlighted: first, a very small percentage of Moldovan voters consider the Transnistria’s issue a top priority. Second, the reintegration of Transnistria would increase the number of pro-Russian voters in Moldova. Nevertheless, the International Crisis Group's experts believe that “the geopolitical shifts triggered by Russia's attack on Ukraine have created a rare opportunity for Moldova to strengthen ties with its opposition regions,” and Chișinău must take action to initiate dialogue with Tiraspol.

As for Gagauzia, the authors of the report believe that Chișinău's attitude toward the current authorities of this region is unlikely to change. However, these territories need a dialogue. “The government prefers to maintain relations with Gagauz mayors, businessmen, and students […] Chișinău should strengthen these connections and seek new ones,” the report states.

The primary recommendation from the International Crisis Group on protecting the elections from interference is to combat disinformation and Russian propaganda. The report’s authors called on Western partners to support Moldova’s struggling independent media and encourage the creation of trustworthy Russian-language media outlets.