Originally published on Global Voices

The Rogun Dan being constructed. Image by Sosh19632 via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.

The Rogun Dam, located on the Vakhsh River in Tajikistan, is one of the most ambitious hydropower projects in the world, let alone in Central Asia. Designed to be the world's tallest dam, with a projected height of 335 meters (1,099 feet), it is poised to transform Tajikistan’s energy landscape by providing an estimated output of 13.1bn kWh, with a total capacity of 3,600 MW. 

About 90 percent of energy in Tajikistan is created through hydropower, with the Nurek hydroelectric power station (opened in 1980) producing 11.4 bln kHw — almost half of all electric power produced in Tajikistan.

Tajikistan’s energy sector has been in a state of crisis for years now. This crisis is due mainly to aging power generation assets, many of which have not been modernized since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ,as well as added pressures due to climate change. Given that so much of Tajikistan's energy generation is driven by hydroelectric power, decreasing water levels due to shrinking glaciers and other climate pressures are causes for concern.

The Vakhsh River, which has been experiencing a decrease in water levels due to mismanagement and climate change. Screenshot of video “20201201 Rogun Dam – Video Drone” by Marco Piscoya. Fair use.

In 2020, Tajik officials released a statement notifying residents that there would be electricity use limits and outages throughout the country, largely because “the volume of water in the country’s largest river Vakhsh had fallen by 50 percent. As a result … the water level of the Nurek reservoir, had fallen by 17 metres compared to 2019.” This decrease in water meant the Nurek Dam was unable to meet the country's electricity needs. 

These limitations on energy consumption have become an annual event in Tajikistan, especially during winter. Despite the decreased water levels, Emomali Rahmon, the Tajik president, maintains that “with the construction of Rogun Dam, we are not only resolving the problems with electric energy for the population, but we are also creating a solid basis for the development of various spheres of economy.”

Construction of the Rogun Dam started in 1976, but it was stopped due to political and funding challenges. As of November 2018, 75 of the total 335 meters had been built, and one turbine of six is in operation. Officials estimate that, with proper funding, the dam could be fully completed by 2028.

China's expanding role in Central Asia

China's growing influence in Central Asia is part of its larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strategy, wherein it is seeking to expand infrastructure and trade links between China and various regions of the world. Tajikistan, as a strategically important landlocked country bordering China, is a key partner in the BRI framework. This relationship is underpinned by Chinese investments in infrastructure, mining, and hydropower.

China’s involvement in the Rogun Dam project is driven by its geopolitical interests, desire to secure stable energy supplies, and strategic influence over Central Asian infrastructure.

Building the Rogun Dam requires vast financial resources. When the project first resumed in 2008, officials estimated the overall cost would be about USD 3 billion, but this amount has ballooned over the years to over USD 9.7 billion total. For a country like Tajikistan, whose economy is relatively small and reliant on remittances, this is a monumental expense. So far, Tajikistan has already spent USD 3.3 billion on the project but still lacks at least USD 6.4 billion to finish building the dam, according to estimates made in August 2024. During the last decade, the projected costs of completing the Rogun Dam have increased by 15 percent annually.

Chinese banks and investment institutions have become key financiers of infrastructure projects across Central Asia, including Tajikistan. Chinese funding has supplemented Tajikistan's efforts to finance the dam, either through direct investments or loans to Tajikistan’s government. 

Chinese investment in the Rogun Dam Project

Tajikistan and the Rogun Dam. Image by C1MM via Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 3.0.

China’s influence on the Rogun Dam project is part of its broader strategy to increase its presence in Central Asia. While Tajikistan is the main driver of the project, Chinese financial resources, technical expertise, and geopolitical interests have had a significant impact on its development.

It's noteworthy that, even as China seeks to strengthen its ties in Central Asia, the scale of Chinese financing is very limited compared to other investors in the dam. According to an analyst who spoke to Global Voices on condition of anonymity, “Chinese actors tend to avoid investment in controversial projects.” While Chinese companies have previously explored hydroelectric projects in Tajikistan, most of these efforts were abandoned to appease downstream Uzbekistan, which could see its water supply suffer if the upstream rivers are dammed, thereby hindering its cotton industry. Criticism from environmental groups is also spooking further Chinese investment.

But money isn't the only way China is supporting the project. China’s contribution to the Rogun Dam project is also evident in its technical assistance and engineering expertise. Chinese companies have established a dominant presence in Central Asian infrastructure development, including hydropower projects. Chinese engineers, contractors, and firms bring expertise that is critical for the construction of such a massive and complex project as the Rogun Dam.

But China has its own motivations for supporting the effort, despite the controversy.

While Tajik officials hope the dam will be able to solve its electricity crisis, they also are looking to their energy-starved neighbors as potential customers for the surpluses energy that is produced. Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are especially attractive options that would benefit from a reliable, sustainable energy source. In securing water and electricity resources through Central Asia, China is indirectly supporting its broader regional water and energy interests, as well as ensuring the stability of energy supplies that feed into its Belt and Road Initiative.

Environmental and social implications

Even as the Rogun Dam promises considerable economic and energy benefits, its environmental and social impacts are significant, and China’s involvement further complicates the equation. 

Environmental activists report that over 7,000 people have already been displaced from the reservoir zone, and it is estimated that some 38,000 more are going to be further resettled to other regions of Tajikistan. However, this displacement was not without controversy. There were complaints that governmental compensation was not enough to buy a new house in the area of relocation.

Moreover, activists also raise concerns about mismanagement and lack of financial transparency in the construction of the dam. It was reported that, five years ago, one of the dam's power generators stopped working. In an interview with the analytical site Cabar.asia, a Tajik energy expert says that poor-quality cement, reinforcements, and other low-quality building materials have been used during the construction. Moreover, environmental activists say there has been a lack of transparency surrounding the construction and point out the high levels of corruption in Tajikistan, and the lack of public discussions of the project amid longstanding suppression of human rights in the country.  

Environmental activists have also expressed fears that the dam will disrupt the natural flow of the Vakhsh River, affecting biodiversity and agriculture in downstream areas.

China’s track record on environmental considerations in infrastructure projects has been mixed. While Chinese investment brings much-needed funding, it also raises concerns about environmental oversight and long-term sustainability. Some critics argue that Chinese-backed infrastructure projects often prioritize economic gains over environmental protections, exacerbating the negative consequences of large-scale dams.

As the Rogun Dam nears completion, the balance of these factors will shape the future of Tajikistan’s energy landscape and its relationship with China. The dam represents not only a milestone in Tajikistan’s development but also a microcosm of the broader dynamics shaping Central Asia’s integration into China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

To learn more about the intersection of Chinese development projects and climate justice in the Global Majority, see our Climate Justice Fellowship Project:

Global Climate Justice Fellowship

The Global Climate Justice Fellowship partners independent Sinophone journalists and journalists from Central Asia, Francophone Africa, and Latin America to assess the role of China in mitigating the global climate crisis.

Written by Shahida Yakub, Global Climate Justice Fellowship

Originally published on Global Voices

A field of cotton in Tajikistan. Image from Flickr, World Bank Photos. License CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

Even though Tajikistan is considered an agricultural country, only six percent of its territory is arable land, the rest is mountainous. Despite this, agriculture provides 20 percent of the country's GDP and over 45 percent of the country's employment. 

Tajikistan is one of the world's top exporters of raw cotton. In 2022, Tajikistan exported USD 212 million worth of raw cotton, making it the 12th largest exporter in the world. 

However, Tajikistan’s cotton sector suffers from outdated machinery, low-quality seeds, insufficient government support for local farmers, and a lack of foreign investors willing to develop Tajikistan’s cotton and textile industries. Moreover, Tajikistan’s legal framework, corruption, and top-down power structures make this country unattractive to Western investors. 

China offered Tajikistan a helping hand and invested over USD 3.8 billion over the last ten years, mainly in mining and agribusiness. China’s investments in Tajikistan's cotton industry reflect a broader strategy to enhance agricultural production and secure raw materials for its textile industry.

China’s cotton diplomacy

While international donors and foreign investors were wary of investing in Tajikistan, Chinese companies have been willing to navigate Tajikistan's complicated political web.

An exiled Tajik opposition member who spoke to Global Voices on conditions of anonymity said that in order to do business in Tajikistan, anyone, be it a foreign or local company or businessman, needs to have some sort of “roof,” i.e. patronage from local or state officials in order to secure business. And this kind of protection is often remunerated by payments or bribes.

One of the lawyers of the international law firms working in Tajikistan who was interviewed for a study on Chinese Cotton Diplomacy in Tajikistan says: “Chinese.. their work rules are different from other [investors]. In the first stage they work closely with us but … after 15 days they contact …officials and they are open to bribes, yes they do not need our services except [for] officials.”

Land lease

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon. Screenshot from YouTube.

Tajikistan has approximately 724,000 hectares of arable land, all of which are heavily reliant on irrigation due to the country’s mountainous terrain. Beginning in 2012, Tajikistan leased around 18,000 hectares of its land to China for cotton, rice, grain, and corn cultivation for a 49-year contract. The agreement was part of a broader initiative to strengthen economic ties between the two countries. 

The main problem with this agreement is that its terms and conditions have not been disclosed. It is not clear what — if any — systems have been implemented regarding inspecting and regulating the lands leased by Chinese farmers. 

In an interview with Radio Ozodi, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Agriculture, Narzullo Dodoboyev, said the land leased to Chinese farmers are “abandoned lands affected by erosion.” He also said that Chinese companies are going to invest in order to restore this land and start cultivating crops. 

A regional expert who spoke to Global Voices on the condition of anonymity said that “China has a lot of expertise in turning land affected by erosion into a working land, through the ‘terracing method,’ which slows down soil erosion.” 

And indeed, the results yielded by Chinese farmers are quite remarkable. In 2015, Tajikistan's deputy minister of agriculture, Sidjovuddin Isroilov, praised the Chinese company Xinxian Inhai which leased 6,300 hectares of land in the Khatlon region of Tajikistan. In one of its districts, the group cultivated the highest grain and cotton yield in the country.

However, a regional expert who spoke to Global Voices on the condition of anonymity pointed out that “the nature of agriculture in Tajikistan is based on irrigation and water brings weeds which have to be dealt with by using pesticides. Pesticides enter the soil and ultimately end up in water basins, most likely in the Amudarya River,” which flows through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan.

The Belt and Road Initiative

China is keen to help Chinese companies develop their work abroad within the framework of “The Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), it's massive international development plan. 

Over the past eight years, China has invested in more than 820 agricultural projects in partner countries, with an investment stock exceeding USD 17 billion. In 2020, the total agricultural trade volume with partner countries reached USD 95.79 billion.

In Tajikistan, these efforts have been a boon for Chinese companies, as they are released from paying VAT when they import equipment and seed materials from China. The Tajik government doesn’t disclose the terms and conditions of these lease agreements.

The Head of a Water Users’ Association (WUA) in southern Tajikistan meets cotton farmers to discuss irrigation requirements. Image from Flickr. License CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

On the other hand, independent Tajik farmers have been left at a big disadvantage compared to well-financed Chinese agricultural companies. They have little to no support from the Tajik state. It is also difficult for them to get bank loans to buy modern equipment since they are exclusively offered short-term loans at high interest rates, which makes it nearly impossible for farmers to pay it back.

Fertilizers and pesticides

While China may be benefitting from its agricultural investments, they could be leaving a dangerous legacy in the host countries, namely: long-lasting pollution.

In 2018, the Chinese state agency Xinhua published a story about Chinese farmer Duan Li, whose company, Hunfank, from China's Henan province, invested over USD 31 million in agriculture in Tajikistan. Over 6,000 hectares of land that had been developed by this company became polluted and unsuitable for agriculture. Henan province is the major agricultural and a major food province in China, and some studies show that the vast amounts of chemical fertilizers used there are causing soil and water pollution. 

China, the largest agricultural country in the world, typically uses 1.5 to 4 times as much pesticides per hectare as the world average. Pesticides play an important role in increasing productivity, reducing crop loss by controlling destructive pests and reducing diseases. However, pesticides are frequently linked to risks to soil health, water contamination, human poisoning, and damaging ecosystems. 

Farmers in China also heavily rely on agricultural mulch film, a synthetic polymer compound material that will stay in the soil if it is not cleaned or picked up during agricultural production. 

This problem is not isolated to Tajikistan. A regional expert who is monitoring China's farming practices in Russia, who spoke to Global Voices on the condition of anonymity, says that “Chinese farmers were achieving remarkable crops in Russia, but they used pesticides and other chemicals, which ultimately made the land unusable.” A number of reports in Russian media about the harmful consequences of Chinese farming practices in Russia have corroborated this claim.

Concerned experts

Global Voices approached several agricultural experts in Tajikistan and spoke to journalists who write about agriculture. However, none of them were able to comment on what kind of fertilizers and pesticides are used by Chinese farmers or the scale of their application on the crops. There is no publicly available information on this, and because civil society is deeply repressed in Tajikistan, it is unlikely that any independent research is possible on this matter.

One regional expert who spoke to Global Voices on the condition of anonymity, says that the agreement between Tajikistan and China on land lease “should have included a document about the system of controls of farming methods. But it is very likely that such a document doesn’t exist and that Tajikistan just leased the farming land to China and [is turning] a blind eye on what is going on.”

Because Tajikistan’s agriculture is heavily based on irrigation, ultimately, chemicals and pesticides used to promote crops are washed into the Amudarya river. However, local agriculture specialists point out that “neither Chinese nor Tajik farmers are too concerned about following environmental regulations and it leads to soil alkalization.”

It's undeniable that China's lease of agricultural fields in Tajikistan has led to several positive outcomes. The lease brought investment into the struggling Tajik agricultural sector, providing much-needed capital for local farmers. Chinese companies bring modern agricultural technology that has helped enhance productivity in Tajikistan's cotton sector. Improved methods and resources have also led to higher yields, benefiting the local economy and contributing to Tajikistan's export potential. However, the lack of transparency regarding fertilizers and pesticides poses a major environmental and social threat — one that has yet to be fully explored or understood because of Tajikistan's repressive environment toward media and civil society. 

Written by Shahida Yakub

Originally published on Global Voices

New Morococha. Screenshot from a promotional video by Minería Chinalco.

In 2013, Chinese mining company Chinalco (中国铝业集团有限公司) sparked an international conversation about extractive impacts with the news it had successfully relocated an entire Peruvian town of 5,000 residents to clear space for a copper mine. At the time, the relocation project in Morococha, central Peru, was touted as a solution to protect villagers from pollution and environmental degradation as a result of mining practices, and as a potential template for Chinese overseas investment in Latin America. 

Ten years later, experts describe the move as a “tragedy.” 

Joselyn Jaua, a Peruvian journalist who covers the environment and communities in the region, explained to Global Voices that Chinalco’s policies have deeply impacted both Old Morococha and New Morococha: “The rise of poverty is notorious for relocated and non-relocated people alike.” 

The relocation project was perceived as a pioneering approach by Chinese mining companies in managing relationships with communities abroad. Chinalco, the state-owned company that acquired Peru’s biggest copper mine in 2007, which has invested USD 4.476 billion in the megaproject, promised on paper to provide local job opportunities, consult representatives from the communities, and prioritize environmental and social problems raised by the inhabitants of Morococha. 

Raúl Las Madrid, Legal Affairs Manager for Chinalco Peru Mining, said in a video of ProInversion, a Peruvian government agency, earlier this year.

En la actualidad, esta población ha sido reasentada a una nueva ciudad que nosotros construimos desde cero. Fue parte de nuestro compromiso y responsabilidad social. Lógicamente, tienen agua, desagüe, luz permanente, tienen diversas iglesias para todos los credos, centros educativos y hospital.

Today the population has been resettled to a new city that we built from scratch. It was part of our commitment and social responsibility. Logically, they have water, drainage, permanent light. There are educational centers, a hospital, and various churches for all faiths.

However, many residents and environmental activists argue that the company has failed to honor its promises. A 2019 study by the National University of Central Peru revealed that most of the population of New Morococha believes their economy, job stability, and access to social benefits promised by Chinalco have not been fulfilled.

Jaime Borda, a Peruvian activist with Red Muqui, a local network advocating for the rights of communities impacted by mining projects, told Global Voices.

Actualmente el distrito de Morococha se encuentra en situación de pobreza y extrema pobreza. Muchas familias han tenido que migrar a otras ciudades en busca de mejores oportunidades dado que la nueva ciudad de Morococha no garantiza una vida digna o un movimiento económico.

Currently, the district of Morococha is in a situation of poverty and extreme poverty. Many families have had to migrate to other towns in search of better opportunities since the new town of Morococha does not guarantee a decent life or economic movement.

Instead, Chinalco has relied on subcontracting and outsourcing labor, leading to low wages, according to Borda.  

Since 2013, 96 percent of the residents in Old Morococha have been compelled to relocate to a flood-prone wetland area, which is also isolated from the central highway. The situation is even worse for some 20 families who have refused to resettle. 

“The remaining families in Old Morococha are facing daily harassment from the Chinese mining company Chinalco,”  Borda said. “Every day, they are destroying the few houses of the settlers, until the last brick disappears.”

According to him, these families are cut off from electricity and clean water, living in conditions “like in the times of the cavemen.” They have also been blocked from key access routes, restricting their ability to meet basic needs like work, food, and healthcare. 

A 2018 report released by the United Nations concluded that four Chinese-owned mining companies, including Chinalco, violated the human rights of Peruvians. The report said the Toromocho copper mining project of Chinalco has generated conflicts with the population in Morococha, and the resettlement process of the community members has been incomplete and dangerous.

Anatomy of a relocation

Chinaclo didn't initially plan to relocate the town. The town of Morococha, now known as Old Morococha, is situated in the province of Yauli, about 140 kilometers east of the capital Lima. It is known as the birthplace of the Peruvian mining boom of the 1930s. After decades of poorly regulated mining around Old Morococha, the town was left with a dangerous and unpredictable legacy: A toxic, uncovered mine tailings deposit in the middle of the city. The town also lacked a proper sewage system and residents used communal latrines before the relocation.

A Map and figures of the Morococha relocation project. Source: BBCMundo

In 2006, Peru Copper Inc., a Canadian mining company that had acquired concession rights to the Toromocho project, sought approval from the Peruvian government to convert the underground mine into an open-pit mine. The company hired Social Capital Group, a Peruvian mining consultancy, to conduct environmental and feasibility analysis for the project. The report highlighted that relocating the town was the only feasible and sustainable solution, given the deteriorating conditions in Morococha and its proximity to the Toromocho mining site.

Although the majority of the local population was in favor of the resettlement at the time, the unprecedented scale of relocating such a large town posed a significant challenge. When Peru Copper invited bids for the concession, only one company expressed interest: Chinalco. “No other company was willing to invest USD 50 million in a social project without any guarantee of return,” Cynthia Sanborn, a political scientist focusing on China and Latin America at the University of Pacific in Peru, explained to Dialogue Earth in 2013. 

Chinalco, the world's third-largest aluminum producer, has played a significant role in expanding China’s influence in Latin America's mining sector. As a state-owned company, Chinalco is integral to China’s national strategy of securing mineral resources both domestically and abroad. The Toromocho project, which Chinalco acquired from the Canadian company with a total investment of USD 860 million in 2007, was the first greenfield copper mine developed by a Chinese corporation abroad. 

In 2018, the company invested another USD 1.3 billion dollars in the expansion. Despite delays in development during the pandemic, Toromocho remains the fifth-largest copper producer in the country. Peru is the second-largest copper producer in the world. 

New Morococha. Google Maps Photos. Image by José Salcedo, 2019. Fair Use.

The Chinese company stated that it has “brought earth-shaking changes to the lives of the local residents” (“这些举措给矿区居民的生活带来了翻天覆地的变化”) in the Yauli province. The efforts that the company championed include building a sewage treatment plant, facilitating the relocation of 1,050 households from the mining area, and investing in local healthcare infrastructure. Chinalco also promised to hold a “round table” (“La Mesa de Diálogo”) with communities and committed to hiring local staff to make major decisions for the future of the community. By 2023, the company claimed that it had hired 1,500 employees for the Toromocho project, with only 20 Chinese staff. 

Borda argued that while the new town has basic services, economic activities in Morococha remain stagnant because the company outsources low-wage jobs. The company also failed to establish a promised camp for mining workers, a settlement designed to house laborers involved in mining operations. It typically features basic accommodations, communal facilities, and necessary amenities to support the workforce. The camp is also expected to boost the local economy. Spaces for dialogue promised by the company have also shrunk in the past few years, Borda said, and the non-settled families were excluded from it. 

In 2022, miners protested against Chinalco with a strike and blockade after the company laid off almost 1,000 workers, among other environmental and social conflicts.

Project Toromocho in Old Morococha, 2017. Screenshot of Documentary Morococha: Invisible Voices.

Chinalco did not respond to a request for comment from Global Voices. 

Chinalco’s failed promises and residents’ dissatisfaction

To understand Chinalco’s responsibility to the population of Morococha, two basic agreements must be understood: The Marco Deal, a contract between the company and the population of Morococha that addresses poverty, basic health services, and housing and drafts a strategy to boost the local economy; and the environmental impact study, which defines the impact of the Toromocho project on the community and the environment. To date, the Marco Deal has not been signed, and the Environmental Impact Study has not been implemented. 

According to the Geological, Mining, and Metallurgical Institute of Perú (INGEMMET) 2017 report, the city of Old Morococha faces an “imminent, non-mitigable danger” due to severe risks, including visible structural damage, proximity to mining waste and tailings, and ongoing seismic hazards exacerbated by active mining operations. The combination of these factors renders any mitigation efforts ineffective, underscoring the extreme vulnerability of the area.

Map of Old Morococha showing the inhabited homes and demolished homes in 2013 and 2016, three years after the relocation began. Source: 2017 Report by the Geological, mining and metallurgical Institute of Perú. Fair use.

Those who have moved to New Morococha are also exposed to some environmental risks. 

The new town, which is also called Carhuacoto, was built in the middle of two lagoons and on what was previously a swamp, so the humidity not only affects the buildings but also the health of the residents. In a 2015 investigation, a woman and her family were given a small 50-square-meter unit in New Morococha, but humidity from the swamp caused her serious health issues, forcing them to return to Old Morococha. Now, they live in an overcrowded former school, sharing the space and one bathroom with several families.

The INGEMMET report concluded that frequent floods and liquefaction of soils caused by earthquakes may affect the safety of residents living in buildings of New Morococha, where most urban facilities, including schools, religious temples, and health centers, were built within 26 months between 2010 and 2012. The report said the company has not yet informed residents of what they would do to mitigate those risks. 

Furthermore, the residents who have not yet moved are reluctant to accept Chinalco’s offers. They claimed that the company only offered USD 9 for each square meter of their homes, hardly enough for them to buy a new house in New Morococha. 

While Chinalco claims that “all risks have been resolved,” their report also acknowledges that Peruvians, who have endured a history of colonization and resource exploitation, harbor deep concerns about mining development. This apprehension is especially pronounced among Indigenous communities living in the Andes, who are particularly sensitive to these issues.

Borda emphasized that the Peruvian authorities share responsibility for the failure of the resettlement project. They neglected their role as protectors of the population’s rights, amending laws to favor mining companies over local communities. They also approved the company’s Environmental Impact Study, despite ongoing concerns about environmental and water issues that can affect the local population. Similar cases happen not only in Morococha but also in other mining towns in Peru.

Written by Gabriela Mesones Rojo, Alicia Chen

Originally published on Global Voices

Powdered rare earth minerals. Image from Wikimedia Commons, license: public domain.

For the past decades, China has undoubtedly dominated the rare earth marketplace. The country sits atop the world's biggest reserve of these minerals, considered essential components in many technological industries that are at the forefront of the green energy transition. China dominated the exploration and the supply chain, becoming a key supplier for global markets. But that could soon be changing as other countries, including Brazil, toss their hats into the ring, hoping to gain independence from Chinese exports. 

China currently supplies between 85–90 percent of the world's rare earth material, according to a report by China Water Risk. This near-monopoly gives the country huge leverage in controlling the flows of rare earth elements throughout the world. Rare earths are a group of chemical elements found in nature together with minerals. The name “rare” comes from the difficulty in extracting these elements, which have particular characteristics like intense magnetism and light absorption, making them prime materials for the technological industry. 

Chinese President Xi Jinping touring a rare earth processing plant in Jiangxi province, China. Screenshot from YouTube.

The country has not been shy about exercising this power. In November 2023, Beijing announced stricter export controls, under which it would require rare-earth exporters to report the type of metal they were exporting and the final destinations. In December of that same year, China banned the export of rare earth processing technologies, a move that effectively hindered other countries’ chances of developing their own industries and becoming less reliant on Chinese supplies. 

An excerpt from the comic strip referenced in the text. Image from Wechat.

China has also demonstrated some concern over foreign interests in its own reserves of rare earths. This past January, the Chinese Ministry of State Security published a comic strip on its WeChat channel in which it depicts a fictional mine where undercover security guards bust foreign spies who were pretending to be real estate developers, insinuating that the foreigners were trying to steal their minerals and technology. 

The strip does not name countries or companies, but in a piece that followed it, the Global Times, a state-backed publication linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), quoted an expert saying that countries such as the United States, Japan and in the European Union “coveted” China's rare earth resources and have “resorted to infiltration, bribery, and espionage to achieve their goals.” No evidence was provided to back up these claims. 

Fearful that China might decide to restrict its rare earth exports, which has the potential of disrupting a number of key industries globally, countries in the West are looking to diversify their supply by developing rare earth extraction in other countries. One of them is Brazil, which has the world's third-largest reserves of rare earth. The Brazilian government estimates that the country could become one of the top five global producers in the coming years. The first mining project, Serra Verde, in Goiás state, began production this past January and aims to extract 5,000 tonnes annually by the time it reaches full capacity. 

More than a business play, Brazil's entry into this arena is a need, as it comes at a crucial moment. In order to reach net zero emissions by 2050, delivering on the 2016 Paris Agreement, the market for critical minerals, including rare earth metals, is expected to grow almost sevenfold in the next half-decade, according to the International Energy Agency. 

A rare earth processing plant in Serra Verde, Brazil. Screenshot from YouTube

A more sustainable industrial development requires this group of 15 elements present in the periodic table, as they are key components in many technological industries that are at the forefront of the energetic transition, including electric vehicles and wind power. These materials are enablers for industries who are seeking to lower emissions and reduce energy consumption. 

But while rare earths are a crucial component to ensure industries become more sustainable, their extraction can be quite harmful for the environment, resulting in what experts have called the “rare earth paradox.” 

Xianbin Yao, professorial lecturer of International Studies in De LaSalle University, in Manila, and former special senior advisor of the Pacific Department at the Asian Development Bank (ADB), said in an interview with Global Voices:

On the one hand, many rare earth elements are used in products that are essential components of our clean, smart, low-carbon and climate-resilient future. On the other hand, rare earth elements come with a pollution tag.

Consequences of rare earth extraction and production

One example of the footprint of rare earth mining can be seen in the Bayan Obo mine, in the west of Inner Mongolia, a Chinese autonomous region, which accounted, alone, for 45 percent of rare earth production in 2019. A 2023 report by Science News deemed it “one of the most polluted places on earth.” Mine waste containing heavy metals has been dumped into nearby rivers, the air is heavy with fumes and toxic dust, the vegetation in the site has been removed to allow for mining and the local population have reported symptoms of intoxication by heavy metals. 

Smog in Inner Mongolia, which has been named “one of the most polluted places on earth” because of the excessive industry, including rare earth extraction and processing. Screenshot from YouTube.

But after mining, transforming the raw ore into something viable for the industry — the step known as processing — also has a footprint of its own. It consumes large amounts of water and produces ample waste.

In 2022, Sky News visited a tailings pond in Baotou, where Bayan Obo is located, which accumulates the toxic byproducts of mining activities in the region. They interviewed two villagers who had just finished watering their fields with water that did not “meet the standards for human or animal drinking,” according to them. The men told the reporter of a nearby village where at least 35 percent of the villagers had been diagnosed with cancer. The government moved them out and banned farming on those lands. The following video depicts toxic waste from rare earth processing being dumped in Baotou:

Brazil's path forward

Bayan Obo is only one example, but many others exist. So far, with production limited to China, the environmental toll has fallen on Chinese communities alone. But as Brazil and other countries enter the rare earths market, they are being afforded the opportunity to follow a different path from China by avoiding the same mistakes and minimizing the environmental cost of exploring these minerals. 

This is a relevant concern for a country like Brazil, which has a history of two recent large-scale tragedies in mining. In 2015, a tailings dam for iron ore collapsed in Mariana, in Minas Gerais, killing 19 people. In January 2019, another tailings dam from an iron ore mine ruptured in Brumadinho, a town in the same state, leaving 270 people dead. Many attribute the tragedies to weak regulations and lax enforcement. 

There is one additional factor for concern in Brazil, alerts José Gomes Landgraf, professor at the Polytechnical School at the University of São Paulo. “One thing we should combat is the possibility of out-of-control mining in areas of Brazil whe§re we have ionic clay [one of the rare earth minerals],” he said, explaining that this was a problem for China in the 1990s and 2000s. It wouldn't be the first time illegal minerals feed the tech supply chain: in 2022, Repórter Brasil revealed how Apple, Google, Microsoft and Amazon used gold that had been illegally mined in Brazil. 

A village flattened by the Mariana dam collapse in Minas Gerais, Brazil. Image from Wikimedia Commons, license CC BY 3.0 BR

According to Yao, from De LaSalle University, erasing all environmental threats is difficult. “What is critical is to ensure in place, first, a clearly established set of environmental regulations, and second, a society wide effort to enforce the regulations and third-party monitoring. So, transparency and participation is the key,” he explained to Global Voices via email. 

Yao points out that, as a result of extensive field investigations in two major rare earth sites (one in the North and another in the South), China has tightened environmental regulations and their enforcement using a set of tools such as levies and quota systems. And, as it has matured its industry, the country has learnt how to make the processes more sustainable, he said.

He makes the case that, despite seeking to gain independence from China, countries should consider cooperating with China, which would save them the “unnecessary effort of ‘reinventing the wheel’” in developing their rare earth industries. Yao also said countries may consider attracting Chinese direct investment with technological transfer. “Both parties will mutually benefit from these cooperating opportunities,” he told Global Voices.  

Perhaps this is the inevitable outcome for all those who attempt to establish themselves as players independently of China. In Canada, such a cooperation is already taking place, according to a report by CBC News from December 2023. The Nechalacho mine project, which for years had been sold as a way for Canada to gain independence from Chinese rare earth supply, received a 9.9 percent stake from Chinese company Shenghe Resources. 

In Brazil, there is so far no news of Chinese investment in rare earth operations, but there is opportunity. In a 2023 report about Brazil's minerals, the Xinshijie Industry Research Center said that Chinese companies have a promising prospect laid out for them in Brazil due to “the relatively backward mining technology and the lack of attention from the government.”

This past June, a group of industry representatives from Minas Gerais went on a technical mission to China to establish strategic partnerships for the production of rare earth magnets. The objective of the visit, which had the support of the Brazilian embassy in China, was to find potential suppliers of the raw materials for production in Brazil. 

But on the federal front, there are no signs of cooperation so far. Neither the Brazilian federal government nor the Chinese Ministry on Foreign Affairs have published on any news or information about partnerships regarding rare earth its websites. Brazilian officials also chose not to touch upon this topic in recent visits to China. 

To learn more about the intersection of Chinese development projects and climate justice in the Global Majority, see our Climate Justice Fellowship Project:

Global Climate Justice Fellowship

The Global Climate Justice Fellowship partners independent Sinophone journalists and journalists from Central Asia, Francophone Africa, and Latin America to assess the role of China in mitigating the global climate crisis.

Written by Laís Martins, Luo Jieqi

Originally published on Global Voices

A beachside fish market in Dakar, Senegal, filled with boats and fishermen. Image via Flickr. Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Moktar Diop and Mohamed Jawo are young Senegalese friends who, like their parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, and many others in their coastal community, work in the fishing industry off the coast of Dakar.

Moktar shared how he found himself in this profession:  

Je me suis convertie à la pêche comme la plupart des membres masculins de ma famille car je n'arrivais pas à trouver du travail après avoir quitté l'université. J'ai joint mes forces avec mon ami Jawo pour faire face à la vie. Cependant, je ne gagne presque rien à cause de la présence de vaisseaux étrangers incontrôlés qui détruisent les nids de poissons.

I converted to fishing just like most of my male family members because I could not find jobs after leaving university. I joined forces with my friend Jawo to cope with life. However, I earn almost nothing due to the presence of uncontrolled foreign vessels that destroy fish nests.

Now, the pair are struggling to make a living and considering abandoning their community in order to make ends meet. Senegal is one of many countries affected by devastating overfishing due to illegal Chinese fishing vessels. Senegal’s unemployment rate remains high because, according to Greenpeace, an environmental organization working in more than 50 countries in the world, including West and Central Africa, the introduction of mass-scale fishing techniques by Chinese vessels has devastated local fishing industries, leaving many without their livelihoods. 

Fishermen in a brightly colored fishing boat, commonly found in fishing communities off the coast of West Africa. Image from Wikipedia, Creative Commons license CC BY-SA 2.0

The arrival of distant-water fishing vessels from China and other countries like Russia has devastated the local fishing economy. When large trawlers enter local waters, traditional fishers using dugout canoes struggle to compete. These trawlers use nets up to a mile long, sweeping up everything in their path and sometimes damaging local fishing nets. 

These types of vessels have sparked international debates over environmental damage, as bottom trawling can significantly harm and even kill aquatic fauna and fish species that rely on aquatic fauna for food, shelter, productivity, and thus sustainable harvest may diminish with increasing levels of seabed disturbance.

A Chinese fishing trawler. Image from Picryl. Public Domain.

Greenpeace estimates that more than 400 Chinese fishing vessels are currently operating off the coast of West Africa. These vessels rake in over EUR 400 million annually through their fishing activities, according to figures from the Ministry of Fisheries of the People's Republic of China.

In Senegal, about 220000 people work in the fishing industry; 90 percent are artisanal fishers, while the remaining 10 percent work on foreign vessels, joint ventures, or local industrial trawlers. 

Now, Moktar and Jawo must reach remote waters to get fish, as much of the coast is occupied by Chinese vessels. The competition between Chinese vessels and local boats has become impossible, they say, and, in a country where the jobless rate exceeds 23 percent, many young people are losing hope.

To compensate for the declining domestic catches, China has also expanded its distant-water fishing (DWF) operations since 2000. But the expansion of China’s distant-water fishing industry has sparked international debate over its lack of sustainability and transparency. According to the China Fisheries Statistical Yearbook, in 2022, China's pelagic fishery production was 2,329,800 tons, and the number of pelagic fishing vessels was approximately 2,551.

According to a report by the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), much of China's fishing fleet operates across various developing countries, with one-third of the operations located in Africa, Asia, and South America. These regions often have limited fishing capacity but heavily rely on fisheries for economic development and food. Chinese fleets often employ large-scale fishing techniques that pressure local fisheries and fisheries’ livelihoods. Some activities are allegedly illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU), attracting external scrutiny.

Since 1989, China has been the world’s largest fishing nation, capturing 13.14 million metric tons (MMT) of fish in 2021, nearly double the second-largest producer, Indonesia, which captured 7.2 MMT. In 2022, China's fishing output accounted for 40 percent of the global catch, with a significant portion coming from its distant-water fleet.

Overfishing in West Africa

According to the International Collective in Support of Fishworkers, illegal fishing has resulted in the loss of over 300,000 artisanal or traditional fishing jobs in West Africa. Consequently, many people are forced to seek work in other industries or even abroad. Many young people, unable to stay in their hometowns, try to migrate to Europe through Morocco, risking their lives along the way.

West African coastal nations, such as Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia, face similar challenges. Although some have signed fishing agreements with China, ongoing illegal fishing continues to affect local ecosystems.

To promote sustainable fishing, China has heavily invested in aquaculture in recent years and gradually reduced marine capture fisheries. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), China’s marine catch dropped from 14.4 million tons in 2015 to 11.8 million tons in 2022, a decrease of about 18 percent.

However, China’s distant-water fishing has not declined. According to the China Fisheries Statistical Yearbook, China’s distant-water fishing output reached 2.33 million tons in 2022, a four percent increase from the previous year, accounting for nearly 18 percent of the world’s total fishing output.

Domestically, China has actively promoted sustainable aquaculture since 2021, focusing on green farming technologies, managing wastewater emissions, reducing the use of drugs for aquatic animals, and substituting compound feed for juvenile fish. The proportion of aquaculture has increased annually, with China contributing 55.4 percent (3.3 million tons) to Asia’s aquaculture growth in 2022. However, China has not transferred these sustainable aquaculture technologies to West African countries, focusing instead on training local fishermen and establishing processing factories, which accelerates the exploitation of local marine resources.

The pitfalls of fishing agreements

Despite China’s official statements emphasizing the protection of fisheries, there are frequent reports of Chinese vessels fishing illegally. For instance, in May this year, Senegal’s Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Economy published a list of approved vessels, but Chinese ships were absent. Nevertheless, local fishermen reported seeing Chinese fishing boats in nearby waters.

People's Republic of China President Xi Jinping shaking hands with Guinea-Bissau President Umaro Mokhtar Sissoco Embaló. Image via YouTube Screenshot. Free to use.

Not all of the Chinese vessels are fishing illegally. For instance, China has maintained fishing agreements with several West African countries, such as Guinea-Bissau, where the China National Fisheries Corporation established its first overseas production base in 1985 and currently deploys 11 bottom trawlers.

However, even publicly signed sustainable fishing agreements have proven detrimental to West African countries. A study analyzing EU sustainable fishing agreements with West Africa found that these deals often resulted in unequal outcomes — the financial compensation received by West African nations was far less than the value of their marine resources. China and Russia are among the participants in these agreements.

Some West African countries have recognized the inequality of these fishing agreements. Senegal’s new government, for instance, has announced plans to renegotiate previous economic contracts with the EU and carry out fisheries reforms.

In addition, countries like Senegal and other African countries depend much more on the financial leniency of China, which often opens its wallet to finance government works on the continent and in Senegal as well through it's Belt and Road Initiative. 

In the meantime, those suffering most under these policies are the local small-scale fishermen who, for generations, have relied on the coast to sustain themselves and their families. Mohammed Jawo said: “We have skills, but we watch helplessly in the face of this injustice inflicted on us by contracts that grant our oceans to others who will enrich themselves. We hope that the new Government of Ousmane Sonko will renegotiate these unfair contracts.”

To learn more about the intersection of Chinese development projects and climate justice in the Global Majority, see our Climate Justice Fellowship Project:

Global Climate Justice Fellowship

The Global Climate Justice Fellowship partners independent Sinophone journalists and journalists from Central Asia, Francophone Africa, and Latin America to assess the role of China in mitigating the global climate crisis.

Written by Ruohan Xie, Desire Nimubona

Originally published on Global Voices

The BYD Han and Xpeng P7 electric vehicles. Chinese car manufacturer Xpeng plans to increase its green vehicle investment in Central Asia. Image from Wikipedia, license CC BY-SA 4.0.

China's burgeoning electric vehicle (EV) industry is making significant inroads into Central Asia, a region historically reliant on traditional automotive technologies and fossil fuels. During a recent visit to Tajikistan in July, Chinese leader Xi Jinping emphasized the need for collaboration on green energy cars. Two of China’s biggest EV companies, Xpeng and Li Auto, recently announced plans to focus on emerging markets in Central Asia and the Middle East. Chinese state media hailed electric vehicle exports as a sign of friendship and collaboration between China and Central Asia.

However, experts caution that China’s EV expansion may come with some short-term environmental costs, particularly in Central Asia. This region is rich in minerals critical for EV production but heavily reliant on fossil fuels for its own energy consumption.

Central Asia's energy landscape: Reliance on fossil fuels

China is at the forefront of the global transition to electric vehicles (EVs) largely because it has spent decades investing in and building up its talent, production capacity, and infrastructure in the green technology field. Its comprehensive approach includes robust manufacturing capabilities, significant investments in battery technology, extensive training and education, and substantial government support.

This steady investment has created something of an overcapacity issue, as numerous international researchers and economists say China's green technology output level and capacity outpace global demand. Chinese officials and state-run media outlets staunchly deny these claims, calling them “slander.” Nonetheless, in seeking consumers for its green energy and technology products, China is increasingly turning to foreign markets. This approach has been quite successful as, despite high tariffs imposed by the US and Europe aimed at curbing its EV expansion, China now accounts for close to 60 percent of all new EVs sold worldwide. 

While EVs are becoming an attractive option for clean transport worldwide, their environmental impact might be uneven within Central Asia, a region where energy consumption is dominated by fossil fuels, particularly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In 2021, coal produced 67 percent of energy in Kazakhstan. In Uzbekistan, production of coal has also increased in the last two years by up to 40 percent. 

“(Chinese EVs) are affordable. They reduce demand for oil products, a share of which are imported from Russia, and they are the future trend,” Laurent Ruseckas, an analyst with S&P Global Commodity Insights, told Global Voices. “But In the short term, they are less helpful for reducing carbon emissions than one might think. The power grid in Central Asia is very far from decarbonized.” For example, Kazakhstan has the cheapest coal in the world and despite the Kazakh government setting up its goals of transformation to green energy, like other Central Asian countries, moving to low carbon technologies requires significant investments.

Regional collaboration on EVs

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have become regional hubs for Chinese EVs. As China’s biggest trading partner in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has pledged to increase collaboration on EVs and critical minerals. For Uzbekistan, China’s leading EV company BYD began producing new energy vehicles in an Uzbek factory, marking the establishment of its first factory in Central Asia. BYD has ambitious plans to increase its production in Uzbekistan to 500,000 cars a year.

The BYD Song Plus EV. One of the region's most popular electric vehicles. Image from Wikipedia, license CC BY-SA 4.0.

Despite the increasing popularity of EVs, in Kazakhstan, the share of EVs as opposed to gas/diesel-based cars is only 0.11 percent. Thus far, Uzbekistan is the leader of EVs in the region, where EVs make up 5.7 percent of the total vehicular landscape. 

While some are concerned that the widespread adoption of EVs will increase electricity demand, potentially leading to increased emissions — particularly as much of the region's electricity is currently generated from coal — numerous studies and reports have debunked this fear.

Studies by the University of Cambridge in the UK and Nijmegen in the Netherlands show that electric vehicles are still more environmentally friendly than gas cars in 95 percent of the world, even when their power comes primarily from coal. However, the benefits of an EV transition could be blunted in a coal-based power grid unless a nation's green energy capacity is simultaneously expanded.

To bolster this green transition, Uzbekistan has committed to producing 30 percent of its electricity from solar energy, with plans to build solar and wind electric stations with a capacity of eight gigawatts by 2030, aided by foreign investors. However, this green grid development is already facing some hurdles, as Western investors are hesitant to invest in Uzbekistan due to a lack of rule of law and protection of investments, according to people close to the Uzbek foreign investment environment who spoke to Global Voices on condition of anonymity. 

Increased demand for minerals due to EV expansion

In addition to selling EVs to Central Asia, China is also tapping into the region’s rich mineral resources to fulfil its demand for nickel, cobalt and lithium, which are all critical minerals in the manufacturing of batteries for electric vehicles. Kazakhstan, for example, has seen significant Chinese investment in mining infrastructure to supply EV production and battery manufacturing needs. 

During his recent visit to Kazakhstan in July, Chinese leader Xi Jinping pledged to cultivate growth and cooperation in areas including renewable energy and critical minerals. Last year, Kazakhstan agreed to collaborate with China's leading metal producer, Zijin Mining Group, to improve its mining technology.

Aside from lithium, Kazakhstan is also rich in copper, an essential mineral in EV batteries. Kazakhstan is among the top 15 countries globally for copper production and reserves. Last year, China and Kazakhstan signed a memorandum to collaborate on clean energy in Zhezkazgan, the most important copper mining town in Kazakhstan.

This mining further complicates Kazakhstan's green energy transition, as mining activities can take a significant environmental toll and also negatively affect the health and quality of life for workers and those in the surrounding regions.

For decades, Zhezkazgan has seen environmental degradation and poor health among residents due to reliance on copper mining. Zhezkazgan’s overall mortality rates from cancer and respiratory diseases are much higher than the national average of Kazakhstan. And new Chinese investments in Zhezkazgan’s copper industry are unlikely to address residents’ concerns over water and air safety, or poor working conditions, according to Yipeng Zhou, who studies the history of mining in Central Eurasia.

Reducing the region's carbon footprint and pivoting to clean energy requires scaling up of EV deployment, a market dominated by China. However, the expansion of Chinese EVs also puts a strain on mineral resources in Central Asia where mining practices have put the local environment and residents’ health at risk.

Written by Shahida Yakub, Global Climate Justice Fellowship

Originally published on Global Voices

Water distribution in the Horn of Africa. This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license.

Cameroon, a country on the West Coast of Central Africa, is struggling to deliver potable drinking water to its population of 27.91 million people — particularly in rural regions, which are significantly affected by armed groups like Boko Haram insurgents and Anglophone separatists. Despite large loans from the World Bank and the African Development Bank to support water facilities and sanitation projects, this clean water deficit persists, even as Cameroon remains the African country with the greatest freshwater resources.

This is largely due to intense internal conflict in recent years. Since 2017, Cameroon separatists have been fighting for independence, leading the ruling government to mobilize thousands of military personnel to contain the Anglophone insurgency. According to a World Bank report, household survey data collected in 2021 and 2022 indicated that 23.0 percent of the population in Cameroon lives below the extreme international poverty line of USD 2.15 per person per day (PPP), largely because of the aforementioned conflict. 

Only 43 percent of Cameroonians have access to basic sanitation facilities due to climate change, poverty, violent conflict, ongoing drought in some regions, and other related causes.

Chinese development within Cameroon

Since the early 2000s, China (officially known as the PRC) has sought to strengthen relations with Cameroon in order to improve its standing in the African continent. As a result, the Asian powerhouse has funded development projects such as a water treatment plants, railways, electricity facilities, roads, ports, and more.

Béatrice Kauli Ngumo, a resident of the capital Youndé, shared the positive impact of the project and the PRC's investment in a phone interview with Global Voices: 

At the start, we lived with illnesses and scarcity. Cholera was our neighbor we were doing six kilometers from here to get water. Intestinal worms were common while COVID-19 had wreaked havoc due to lack of potable water as well.

In 2010, China, through the Export-Import Bank of China, offered Cameroon a USD 743 million (5.33 billion Chinese Yuan, CNY) loan for the aforementioned water project. In 2017, China opened its wallet again and granted Cameroon another USD 81.5 million (CNY 594 million) for water facilities and sanitation development. In 2014, China Overseas Group's Cameroon division (中地海外水务有限公司) constructed drinking water treatment plants and related facilities in four cities in the country. In 2017, the Bafoussam drinking water treatment plant was completed and quickly put into official use.

In an interview with Chinese official media, project deputy manager Han Wei stated:

作为对旧水厂的扩建，新水厂目前可日产一万立方米水。为应对当地频繁断电造成无法输水的问题，水厂还新建了两座水塔，以便停电时利用重力势能持续为用户送水.

As an expansion of the old water plant, the new water plant can currently produce 10,000 cubic meters of water per day. The plant has also built two new water towers to continuously supply water to users using gravitational potential energy during power outages.

Urban versus rural water access

In March 2024, on International Water Day, the United Nations shared that the population with access to water increased from 45.3 percent in 2007 to around 70 percent in 2024. It is a notable improvement, however, the situation remains precarious in rural areas, where less than half of households have access to drinking water compared to 8 out of 10 households in urban areas. 

In addition, the quality of the water available is not always good and sometimes leads to diseases and malnutrition.  

Even in large cities like Yaoundé, many people still consume water from boreholes, said activist Christophe Nyemeck Beat, an environment and sanitation journalist in Yaoundé, in an interview with Global Voices

A child uses a borehole in Ghana. Image from Flickr, license CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

In the city of Douala, some neighborhoods or districts rejoice in the presence of drinking water flowing freely through their taps. But in other places, like the island district of Manoca, located near Douala, there is no pumping station and people often suffer from diseases and water-borne illnesses. 

The violence in separatist regions has also contributed to this inequality. Since the intensification of fighting, attacks, and abductions, in 2017, separatist regions have faced increased poverty and a lack of water. The mixture of misery, lack of potable water, drought, and COVID-19 made the separatist region nearly unlivable. Humanitarian assessments show that at least 3,000 people have been killed, while another 730,000 civilians have fled their homes so far.

This instability poses challenges for potential Chinese investors: It is difficult for corporations to work in places that are actively fighting against the government they hope to work with. The Chinese Embassy has explicitly requested Chinese enterprises evacuate the country's war-torn areas to ensure their workers’ safety.

In March 2023, nine Chinese miners were killed in an armed attack in the Central African Republic, triggering outrage in Beijing, which called for the immediate repatriation of Chinese citizens from the country, and demanded a strong punishment for those involved. Chinese-owned companies are also frequently attacked in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which further limits China’s work in Africa, including Cameroon.

Economic exchange between China and Cameroon 

China, for the last 20  years now, has become the key player in the African continent's industrial development.

While many beneficiaries of Chinese investment (often called the Belt and Road Initiative project) are concerned about the so-called debt trap associated with this project, in Cameroon, citizens, and government officials are still enjoying the benefits of this relationship.

In 2018, Cameroonian President Paul Biya visited China in person and, during this official visit, signed five trade agreements with the economic giant. Over the past 20 years, China has provided developing countries with aid programs worth over one trillion dollars as part of its South-South cooperation plan. However, there is also criticism that this substantial investment has pushed Global South countries into debt crises, with debt growth outpacing their economic capacity. Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, has stated that 40 percent of African countries are in debt distress.

Cameroon is one of the countries with high debt burdens. According to statistics, the proportion of the national budget allocated to external creditors is still significantly higher than that of the Ministry of Defense. Cameroon's external debt to China is more than USD 5 billion for 45 loan projects.

In recent years, China's aid has gradually shifted from helping to build infrastructure to providing “emergency assistance” to help these countries repay their debts.

The Chinese government has repeatedly denied that its aid is linked to the debt burdens of African countries. In 2019, China forgave 450 billion CFA francs (equivalent to USD 78 million) of Cameroon's debt. Cameroon holds significant strategic importance for China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

However, this repeated debt forgiveness has sparked public outrage among some Chinese citizens. Critics question why China continues to lavish money on Africa when at least 30 million Chinese people still live in poverty, with an annual income of less than CNY 2,300 (about USD 340).

This context has put China in a challenging position in relation to Africa. On one hand, China now has a significant stake in seeing African nations prosper and develop their infrastructure due to the significant capital still owed. On the other, domestic criticism and instability in some of the African markets have made the path forward uncertain. 

Written by Desire Nimubona, Ruohan Xie

Originally published on Global Voices

A vehicle in one of Chile's salt flats. Creator: Diego Delso. Copyright: CC-BY-SA 4.0.

Amidst the shimmering, ecologically diverse salt flats spanning Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina, a delicate balance has long existed between nature's pristine beauty and human habitation.

But in recent years, the global surge for lithium is transforming landscapes across these Andean wetlands, known as the “Lithium Triangle.” Lithium, powering electric cars and batteries, plays an essential role in the global green energy transition. At the same time, the pursuit of “white gold” comes with significant environmental and social costs. 

The “Lithium Triangle,” home to around 54 percent of the world's lithium resources, is one of the driest places on Earth. Mining operations, including drilling holes in the salt flats and converting lithium into commercial forms, consume vast quantities of water. All this will exacerbate existing water scarcity issues and threaten the species and communities that live around these fragile ecosystems.

Socio-environmental organizations from Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina formed an alliance in 2023, before the 28th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28), to promote the protection and conservation of these ecosystems, as well as water, biodiversity, and the ways of life of the Indigenous and rural communities that depend on them.

A map of the Lithium Triangle on the “Arid diagonal”. The triangle is observed as a contiguous area in northern Chile, northeastern Argentina, and southwest Bolivia. Source: Own work. Author: Mamayuco.

China’s role in developing South America's lithium industry

Meanwhile, the rising global demand for lithium has prompted the three South American countries to explore strategies to industrialize their lithium production.

China, the world's largest producer of electric vehicles and the largest consumer of lithium globally, has, so far, shown its willingness and ability to collaborate with the Andean countries in building local lithium processing facilities. 

Since 2019, Chinese companies, including state-owned companies Citic Guoan (中信集团) and the world’s largest battery maker for electric vehicles, CATL (宁德时代), have signed deals with the Bolivian state-owned company Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB), committing to build industrial facilities for the production of lithium carbonate in Bolivia, which holds one of the world's largest lithium reserves. 

Salar de Uyuni, the world's largest salt flat, located in southwest Bolivia. Image via UN photo. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Under Bolivian law, any extraction of lithium in Bolivia must be conducted by YLB or through agreements where YLB holds a majority share in a joint venture. This requirement has caused hesitation among private international investors. China is now ahead in the race.

“Multiple Chinese state-owned enterprises were willing to take up that challenge, even though it means slower profits and a longer-term commitment,” Rebecca Ray, Senior Academic Researcher at Boston University's Global China Initiative, said in an online interview with Global Voices. “Chinese investors have been patient and just kind of rolled with whatever the needs are.”  

In Chile, President Gabriel Boric said on April 21, 2023, that he would nationalize the country’s lithium industry. On the same day, the leading Chinese electric car maker BYD (比亚迪) agreed to invest USD 290 million to build a lithium cathode battery production factory in Chile. Chinese state-owned company Zijin (紫金矿业) is also in talks with Argentina's state-run firm YPF Sociedad Anónima (YPF) to establish a lithium battery cathode plant in Catamarca province.

Experts point out that Chinese state-owned companies, which have received green finance and loans from the country’s policy banks, are better positioned to “patiently” engage in the industrialization of the lithium industry alongside South American nations. Meanwhile, private foreign companies might hesitate due to uncertainty about when they would achieve a return on their investment.

China’s new green guidelines

To go green in South America's “Lithium Triangle,” the most effective approach is likely to improve regulatory oversight from the top. 

In 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced China would “step up support for other developing countries in developing green and low-carbon energies (中国将大力支持发展中国家能源绿色低碳发展).” Following that, China pushed financial institutions and markets to prioritize green development and on June 1, 2022, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) issued a set of “Green Finance Guidelines.”

“It’s a hopeful moment,” said Ray. She reiterated that these new Guidelines indicate a significant shift, as Chinese investors would probably start to directly engage with local communities, despite their limited history of such engagement.

At the end of 2023, the balance of China's green loans in local and foreign currencies stood at 30.08 trillion yuan (about USD 4.23 trillion), up 36.5 percent from 2022, according to the country's central bank. In President Xi’s 2024 New Year’s address, he highlighted the country's achievements in this area.

新能源汽车、锂电池、光伏产品给中国制造增添了新亮色。中国以自强不息的精神奋力攀登，到处都是日新月异的创造.

New energy vehicles, lithium batteries, and photovoltaic products are a new testimony to China's manufacturing prowess. Everywhere across our country, new heights are being scaled with dogged determination, and new creations and innovations are emerging every day.

This move can also be viewed as a practical initiative to mitigate risks caused by social and environmental concerns, as Chinese overseas projects have previously encountered obstacles due to conflicts with local community interests. Despite that, this development offers a glimmer of hope. 

For positive changes to occur, progress must be made on both sides. Ray said the challenge is that the host governments haven't yet figured out their development strategies. On one hand, the development of the lithium industry is still relatively new; on the other hand, implementing standards for environmental sustainability could impact their immediate profits or even lead to conflict.

Local backlash

The three host governments, which all signed the Escazú Agreement, still largely follow broad principles rather than detailed directives concerning their mining strategies. The Agreement is a landmark regional treaty aimed at promoting transparency, public participation, and access to justice in environmental matters across the region. But so far, local residents near the Lithium Triangle have very little access to information regarding how new projects would affect their communities and have nearly zero participation in environmental decision-making processes. 

In Bolivia, the government launched an international call earlier this year for companies who were interested in building facilities for lithium carbonate production in seven of the country’s salt flats. Among the 21 companies qualified for Phase III are enterprises from China, Russia, and the United States. Environmental activists and community leaders argued that the state-owned YLB didn’t conduct prior consultation with the affected communities ahead of the bidding process. 

“Right now, everything is handled secretly, “ Yamile Cruz, executive secretary at Bolivia’s Regional Federation of Workers and Peasants of the Southern Altiplano (FRUTCAS) told Mongabay. “We have to think about future generations, about the future of our children — because water is life. But as long as there isn’t that information, as long as we don’t have specific studies, everything is uncertain.”

Similar cases also unfolded in Chile. In January, hundreds of protesters blocked access to the Atacama salt flat, the world’s largest lithium deposit, demanding the government include Indigenous communities in negotiations before signing an agreement that would directly affect them. In May, Chinese electric car maker BYD announced the postponement of plans to build a lithium cathode battery production factory in the country. The Chief of BYD America, Stella Li, told Reuters there was “a lot of uncertainty” around the project.

A more encouraging case was seen in Argentina. In March, the Supreme Court of Justice in Catamarca granted an injunction filed by an Indigenous community leader, halting future mining activities in the Salar del Hombre Muerto, one of the largest lithium basins in the region. The decision suspended new project development and required companies to submit “cumulative and comprehensive” environmental impact reports. Concerns arose after previous lithium projects almost dried up the floodplain of the Trapiche River, a major source of water for the community. 

“They are sucking up all the water. They intended to pump 380,000 liters per hour through an aqueduct. This would cause enormous damage. The rivers will dry up and there are areas where the water will no longer reach. Who will take care of that?” Román Guitián, the community leader told El Pais. He has fought for this case since 2018.

Previously, Argentina adopted international standards to ensure that Indigenous communities “shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall receive fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of such activities.” However, the country has not yet introduced specific regulations for investors to meet those standards.  

The three Andean countries are navigating a delicate balance between developing local lithium industries and caring for the environment. The specifics of how they will work with China under the new Guidelines remain unclear. However, the Guidelines show China is considering environmental implications in overseas projects, which is crucial for mitigating risks and advancing its objective of creating a Green Belt and Road Initiative. 

Written by Alicia Chen, Gabriela Mesones Rojo

Originally published on Global Voices

Image via Canva Pro.

China controls over 75 percent of Tajikistan’s output of gold and for the last 30 years, it has remained the biggest foreign investor in the country’s struggling economy.

There are currently 40 known gold deposits in the country with an estimated 500 tons of total gold resources — much of which has remained unexplored.

The government of Tajikistan has strategically focused on increasing mining production for the three decades since its independence in 1991. This is because 93 percent of its territory consists of mountainous areas that contain more than 50 types of minerals, including silver, gold, zinc, and molybdenum. 

Tajikistan's Pamir Mountains, heading toward the Khargush Pass in Tajikistan. Image via Flickr License CC BY 2.0

However, as the poorest country in Central Asia in terms of GDP per capita, Tajikistan has generally lacked the financial resources to develop new mines or expand output at existing ones. Therefore, China’s interest in gold mining has been very useful for Tajikistan. But the inflow of Chinese capital into Tajikistan’s gold mining sector has been a double-edged sword, raising several critical issues, particularly with regard to environmental risks and damages, and labor rights. 

Environmental concerns

While efforts are being made in some countries to reduce the environmental impact of gold mining, in most jurisdictions, it remains one of the most toxic industries in the world. Gold mining frequently contributes to deforestation, soil erosion, and contamination of water sources with hazardous chemicals like cyanide and mercury, which are used in the mining process. These environmental impacts not only threaten local biodiversity but also jeopardize the health and livelihoods of communities dependent on these ecosystems.

In almost 20 years Tajikistan increased its gold production more than tenfold, from 1 ton in 1995 to almost 12 tons in 2022, with Chinese companies and joint ventures playing a major role. 

Overall, China is by far Tajikistan’s main source of foreign direct investment. In 2021, businesses from China invested more than USD 211 million in Tajikistan, representing 62 percent of total foreign investment for the year. This investment mainly went toward the extraction and processing of lead, zinc, and tin ores, and the mining of precious and semi-precious gems and metals.

“Zarafshon,” the leading gold producer in Tajikistan which accounts for 70 percent of Tajik gold output, is co-owned with Zijin Mining Group, China’s main gold producer. However, it is hard to call “Zarafshon” an equal partnership between the two sides, with the Tajik state owning 25 percent and Zijin Mining holding a controlling 75 percent of the enterprise. 

The gold deposit being developed by the joint venture is located 300 meters away from Khumgaron village in northern Tajikistan. This is a mountainous area where cattle breeding is traditionally the main source of income. Local residents remember that 25 years ago, their village was beautiful and unspoiled, with fresh air and clean water. When Zarafshon started their operations there in 1997, not much changed at first, but with the expansion of mining activities over the years, more and more land was being taken for gold mining and production, leaving local residents with little pasture for cattle grazing. Firuza Kakhkhorova, a resident of Khumgaron village, says, “They took our lands, which we used to graze our cattle, and now we have no space to do so.”

In 2023, Zarafshon launched a metallurgical plant for the integrated extraction of gold and copper in Penjikent, in northern Tajikistan. The plant’s capacity allows it to process 165 thousand tons of gold-copper concentrate annually. While this project is presumably bringing profits to the company’s shareholders (including the Tajik state) and employment for some, there are clear negative consequences for local people. One local journalist, who visited the area and spoke to Global Voices on the condition of anonymity, reports that “smoke coming out of this factory is so strong that leaves on the trees are gray from the dust. Ultimately, this creates health problems for the local residents and people complain of respiratory problems.” According to this journalist, for the last ten years, local residents have been begging local authorities to relocate them further away from the gold mining operations. Despite multiple reassurances that this would happen, nothing has been done, and “the prospect of being relocated is almost non-existent.” 

Face excavator and UAZ-469 in Tajikistan. Via Wikipedia Creative Commons license CC BY-SA 2.0

Local residents are also highly concerned about water pollution. In a video published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) in Russian, one of the local villagers says that “they [Zarafshon] are using cyanide to develop and mine gold. It causes great harm to people. It was bad enough when the first factory was built in the lower reaches of the village, and now they are building a new one in the upper reaches near the source of our stream. Our water is already undrinkable and if they start working by the source of the stream it will become even more toxic.”

Another joint venture, called the Tajik-Chinese Mining Company, is active in mining for gold and other minerals in Zarnisor village in northern Tajikistan. The license for these mines was issued in 2006 and the first gold was produced in 2016. According to a journalist who visited this area, who preferred to stay anonymous for security reasons, local villagers here are also facing water problems. Because this is a mountainous area, people depend on water from mountain streams, but in recent years as the Tajik-China Mining Company expanded its operations, the available water has been redirected to meet the needs of the mining activity, leaving local villages with either 30 minutes of water per day or no water at all. 

Labor and social issues

Labor practices associated with Chinese mining investments have sparked significant controversy in Tajikistan. There are frequent complaints about poor working conditions, low wages, and the employment of Chinese workers over local labor. In 2021, Tajik workers in the Upper Kumarg gold mine, owned by Chinese TBEA, started a strike over bad food in their canteen. This mine is located high in the mountains and workers who spoke on a condition of anonymity complained that the food that was provided was, as the workers put it, “not nutritious and low quality.”

Moreover, there is a huge discrepancy in the wages of Chinese workers and Tajik workers. According to the local journalist who spoke to Global Voices on conditions of anonymity, Tajik workers’ average wage is USD 300–400 per month, whereas Chinese workers receive USD 5,000 as well as other benefits. Tajiks who work at Zarnisor mine are all local villagers and this is the only employment available for them in the area. 

In 2018, Chinese company TBEA received a license to develop a big Tajik mine, Upper Kumarg, which according to the local geologists, has 30 tons of gold. In return, China agreed to build the power station “Dushanbe-2.” Construction of this power plant was 95 percent financed by Chinese Eksimbank. The terms and conditions of the agreement between the two stated that TBEA can extract gold until Tajikistan fully pays back the loan. This project was hailed by the Chinese state media the People's Daily as contributing to the local economy. However, there is no information available about when and how this repayment is going to happen.

Why does China invest in Tajikistan?

China is the world's leading gold producer, accounting for 11 percent of the global gold production, so why would China need to invest in Tajikistan? One of the reasons is that China isn't rich in gold. Its domestic gold production has been decreasing for years. The country's gold industry heavily relies on imported raw materials. 

The lack of stringent environmental regulations and enforcement in Tajikistan allows Chinese mining companies to operate with minimal accountability, increasing environmental harm. 

While Chinese investments in Tajikistan's gold mining sector bring much-needed capital and development opportunities, they also present numerous challenges. Environmental degradation, economic dependency, labor disputes, and geopolitical ramifications are critical issues that need to be addressed to ensure that these investments benefit Tajikistan sustainably and equitably.

While some Tajiks are pushing the government to implement robust regulatory frameworks and engage in transparent, equitable negotiations with Chinese investors, given the track record of the Tajik government addressing such issues, it is unlikely that these measures will be addressed anytime soon. For the time being, the Tajik government is more focused on expanding gold mining and getting investment, rather than the environmental degradation of gold mining regions.

Written by Shahida Yakub

Originally published on Global Voices

A Nissan leaf electric vehicle operating as a taxi in Rio de Janeiro. Image from Wikipedia license CC BY-SA 3.0

Brazil has the sixth-highest greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, with transport alone responsible for around 16 percent of the country's total emissions. One of the main reasons for this is the significant consumption of diesel and gasoline. Research shows that electric vehicles (EVs), despite requiring more energy to manufacture due to their batteries, produce significantly less carbon emission over their lifetimes compared to gasoline-powered vehicles. Because of this difference in emissions, EVs will play a crucial role in Brazil’s green energy transition. 

The vast majority of EVs in Brazil are imported from China. To protect its burgeoning domestic industry, Brazil reintroduced an import tax on EVs from China, and at the same time issued Mover, a new policy to support domestic companies’ innovation through investment. Chinese companies are adjusting to the new policy and also trying to gain some control in Brazil's lithium extraction industry — a key raw material in manufacturing batteries for EVs.

Within Brazil's population of 215 million people, EVs have steadily grown in popularity over the past few years. In 2023, there was a 91 percent increase in EV cars sold compared to the previous year — much of this due to Chinese EV imports and the growing influence of Chinese producers. But as Chinese companies make headway in Brazil's market, they are set to face obstacles, such as high prices, lacking infrastructure, and a market currently limited to Brazil's upper economic classes. 

Brazilian legislators have long been encouraging the green transition in the auto sector. As early as 2018, the Brazilian federal government began the “Rota 2030” plan, which set a goal that electric vehicle sales would account for 30 percent of Brazil's total car sales by 2030. Last December, “Mover,” a new program to replace Rota 2030, was launched to grant carmakers access to financial credit in return for investments in sustainable mobility, including EVs and hybrid cars. The program is meant to expand investments in energy efficiency, set minimum thresholds for recycling in car making, and create incentives to pollute less through tax subsidies.

It was touted as the “biggest decarbonization program in history” by Brazil's vice-president, Geraldo Alckmin. By January 2029, the program will have doled out approximately USD 3.5 billion in financial credits. According to global consultancy KPMG, Mover has the potential to accelerate decarbonization in the automotive sector.

Momentum in Brazil's EV market

These programs seem to be working in spurring the EV market. Data from the Brazilian Electric Vehicle Association (ABVE) shows that in 2023, sales of light electric vehicles (LEVs), a category of electric-powered vehicles that are typically smaller, lighter, and more energy-efficient compared to conventional vehicles (like E-bikes, electric scooters, and electric microcars), reached nearly 94,000 units in Brazil. Although this represents only 4.3 percent of all vehicles sold in Brazil in 2023, EVs are on a definitive upward trend.

“China realized that this technology had the potential to solve several important problems, such as reducing air pollution, dependence on imported oil, and rebuilding the economy after the 2008 financial crisis,” says Murilo Briganti of Bright Consulting, one of the leading consultancies on the automotive market in Brazil, according to the reporting from Dialogue Earth.

To incentivize the development of the local industry, Brazil increased import taxes on new energy vehicles starting in July 2022. Since January 2022, fully electric vehicles faced a 10 percent import tax, which will increase to 18 percent this month, and will reach 35 percent by July 2026. To avoid these hefty import taxes, some Chinese car companies began to shift some production capacity to Brazil. BYD, a major Chinese EV manufacturer, has started construction of a large production base in Bahia, northeast of Brazil, with the new factory expected to start operating by the end of 2024 or early 2025. Great Wall Motors, a private Chinese EV manufacturer, announced last year that its factory in Iracemápolis, São Paulo state, is scheduled to begin operations in the second half of 2024. 

The lithium paradox

Another factor that makes Brazil attractive as a hub for EV carmakers is the country's vast lithium reserves, as lithium is used to make batteries for electric vehicles. The Jequitinhonha Valley, which sprawls across a dozen of municipalities in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais, hosts the country's largest lithium reserves, consisting of 45 deposits. That same region is home to dozens of traditional Brazilian groups, like quilombolas (quilombos are communities of people who descend from former enslaved persons who fled to find freedom) and Indigenous communities. 

Brazil, which in 2015 had practically no lithium production, accounted for two percent of the world market in 2023, according to a report by the CEBC. That same year, Brazil exported its first batch of lithium mined in that region to China, but Chinese companies like BYD have shown interest in having a bigger say over the material. In January, Reuters reported BYD was in talks with Sigma Lithium, the current operator in Minas Gerais, over a possible supply agreement, joint venture, or acquisition. Although lithium is a key component in the transition to electric vehicles, its extraction has a high environmental and ecological cost, impacting landscapes, wildlife and people located near the reserves. 

The environmental impact of lithium mining is obvious and far-reaching. For example, massive quantities of fresh water, classified as a precious resource in those mining areas, have been diverted for lithium mining operations.

The demand for lithium  in electric vehicles manufacturer  is much higher than that in electronics assembly lines or cell phones, reaching an average of 50 kilos (110 lbs) in cars and 200 kilos (441 lbs) in buses. It can be estimated that the global demand for lithium will grow in the coming years and could reach 1.8 million tons in 2030, six times more than recorded in 2020,  according to the CEBC report.  

Even as the industry looks promising, EV carmakers have two important hurdles to overcome in Brazil: High prices in comparison to combustion vehicles and a lack of a solid infrastructure for charging stations in a country with massive continental proportions. Around 57 percent of Brazilians consulted in a survey run by EY, an international accounting company, in late 2023 said they intend to purchase an EV, pointing to high fuel prices as the main motivator. The same survey revealed that around 30 percent of respondents are hesitating to purchase EVs at this time due to inadequate charging infrastructure 

In 2019, there were only 220 charging stations in Brazil, according to the Third Annual Directory for Electric Mobility. The next few years saw a huge increase and, as of December 2023, there were 3,800 stations operating in Brazil. By 2025, the National Platform on Electric Mobility (PNME) estimates there will be 10,000 stations in operation. The companies themselves are having to go the extra mile to build up infrastructure. In February, BYD announced it was joining forces with Raízen, a sugar and ethanol firm controlled by Shell and Cosan, to create a network of 600 charging stations across eight Brazilian cities, as reported by Reuters. 

Another important factor in the discussion is who are the Brazilians who will be able to take part in the EV transition?

Research by the PNME shows that EV purchases are still very concentrated in the Southeast of Brazil, which accounted for half of all the EV sales in 2023. The North region, in comparison, represents a little under three percent of sales. Data suggests that the states purchasing more EVs are the richest ones, which underscores the need for national policies that ensure equal access to such equipment. With EVs having a production cost between 10 percent to 30 percent higher than combustion-based vehicles, they may end up being accessible only to upper Brazilian socioeconomic classes. 

Written by Laís Martins, Luo Jieqi

Originally published on Global Voices

Workers pick cotton in Uzbekistan. Image via Wikipedia. Creative Commons license CC0 1.0

In recent years, the international community has boycotted cotton sourced from Xinjiang, a vast region in northwestern China, due to concerns over human rights violations. Under the leadership of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Beijing has subjected Xinjiang’s Muslim minorities to arbitrary detention and forced labor. Some global cotton buyers, in response, have turned to other regions to fulfill cotton demands.

The boycotting of Xinjiang cotton has created something of a ripple effect in other parts of the world, where cotton harvesting is associated with environmental challenges and human rights abuses. One of the most glaring examples of this is Uzbekistan, where cotton production contributed to one of the biggest environmental catastrophes in the world, the drying out of the Aral Sea, as well as decades of forced labor practices.

The Xinjiang cotton industry under scrutiny

Situated in northwestern China and bordering Central Asia, Xinjiang is home to approximately 12 million Uyghurs, a Turkic-speaking ethnic group that is predominantly Muslim. The region began to see large-scale cotton production in the 1950s when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) placed its economy under the control of a paramilitary institution known as the Production and Construction Corps (or bingtuan 兵团). 

Researchers and human rights organizations have found that the Bingtuan forced members of local communities and prisoners — potentially more than half a million people — to work in mining, construction, manufacturing, and cotton harvesting under harsh conditions. Today, Xinjiang is pivotal in China’s cotton production, accounting for over 85 percent of the country’s output and 20 percent of the global supply. The Bingtuan is still responsible for around one-third of Xinjiang’s cotton production.

The cotton industry in Xinjiang has historically relied on manual picking. Despite the Chinese government’s claims of significant progress in machine harvesting, 60 percent of cotton harvesting in southern Xinjiang, remains a manual effort, according to Chinese state media and government statistics. In recent years, human rights organizations and international news media have uncovered evidence of systematic forced labor programs that coerced Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities to work in cotton fields and factories. 

According to Chinese state media, the cotton textile industry in Xinjiang employs close to a million workers, although Beijing denies allegations of forced labor. These labor programs are part of Beijing’s broader strategy to maintain political stability in Xinjiang, international organizations say. The US government first banned Xinjiang cotton imports before subsequently passing a law to ban nearly all imports from the region in 2021. Brands like Nike, H&M, and Burberry have also publicly severed ties with Xinjiang cotton suppliers — moves that drew condemnation and boycotts from Chinese consumers.

This widespread international backlash has not only affected Xinjiang but also led to scrutiny of the cotton supply chain worldwide, as nations and companies reevaluated their dependencies on China.

Shifting tides of cotton sourcing

In recent years, many industries including textile and clothing have shifted operations from China to countries like Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Turkey, in order to avoid increased labor costs in China and the West's heightened regulatory scrutiny for Chinese products. However, paradoxically, in some cases, this increased demand for a more just cotton supply chain is exacerbating local environmental issues and worsening labor rights conditions.

Cotton is one of the most resource and labor-intensive agricultural commodities in land, water, and labor. In developing countries and regions, the cotton industry has long grappled with labor abuses and environmental issues, such as the depletion of water, soil contamination, and overuse of pesticides.

In Uzbekistan, Central Asia’s top cotton producer, an estimated 60 percent of agricultural water is wasted yearly due to mismanagement and obsolete technologies. The country is also known for labor exploitation in cotton production. Since 2011 Uzbekistan’s cotton products faced global boycotts because of the use of child and forced labor. Over 330 international brands and retailers supported this boycott. International pressure forced the Uzbek government to commit to agricultural reforms and eradicating forced child labor during the cotton harvest, which resulted in the lifting of the boycott in 2022.

However, experts believe that the labor risks are still very high. In an interview with Global Voices, Umida Niyazova, director of Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, a non-governmental organization based in Germany said:

Uzbekistan is still not willing to change its anti-market rules of regulation of its cotton industry. The central government and local authorities are still operating on a quota basis, whereas every region of the country has to produce a certain amount of cotton and assigns land to farmers specifically to grow only cotton.

The persistence of this quota system and the associated administrative pressures became evident during a video conference wherein the Deputy Advisor to the  President of Uzbekistan Shukhrat Ganiev directly threatened farmers: “I don’t care what you do but you must deliver 11 thousand tons of cotton. Don’t play with it, don’t play — otherwise, it will end very badly for you and for the regional governor.”  

The lifting of the boycott on Uzbek cotton in 2022 coincided with sanctions being imposed on cotton from Xinjiang. Uzbek officials looked to take advantage of this situation, even as many textile brands were wary of partnering with Uzbekistan in light of its unresolved environmental and human rights violations. Brands’ hesitation to move their production chain from Xinjiang to Uzbekistan didn’t stop the Uzbek president from announcing his ambitious plans to turn his country into a textile hub and increase the production of yarn up to 100 percent by 2027. In order to stimulate this strategy, the Uzbek government intends to create textile production zones and release them from taxation until 2027. 

Due to a combination of political, geographic, and social factors, Uzbekistan is especially vulnerable to the climate crisis, with environmental watchdogs ranking it 96th out of 181 countries in 2020 for climate risk. To mitigate this, Uzbekistan signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement in 2015, as well as the United Nation’s Europe Protocol on Water and Health, which aims to protect human health and well-being through better water management. However, despite the pledges made by the Uzbek government, the lack of progress in agricultural reforms and tight control over farmers makes experts skeptical about the progress

China was and still remains one of the key foreign investors in Uzbekistan. Since 2017, the scale of China’s investments in the country increased fivefold and amounts to USD 11.1 billion, according to Uzbek Minister for Trade and Investments, Laziz Kudratov. One of the key areas of China’s investment is textiles and agriculture. Though partnership with China is hailed by the Uzbek government, human rights defenders are concerned about transparency in observing labor rights and care for the environment. In an interview with Global Voices, Umida Niyazova, director of the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights said.

When we talk about Chinese-owned textile factories or cotton clusters, we need to forget about any sort of advocacy. When we carried out our campaign to boycott Uzbek cotton, Western companies were signing up for this, but Chinese companies didn’t care. They continued to buy Uzbek cotton and they didn’t care about human rights violations or environmental justice. It would be much better if Western companies came to Uzbekistan, because they follow very strict regulations when it comes to labor or environment. We don’t see this happening with Chinese companies.

Written by Shahida Yakub, Global Climate Justice Fellowship

Originally published on Global Voices

The Gouda Wind Farm in Gouda in the Western Cape of South Africa. Image via Wikipedia license CC BY-SA 4.0

When touring some East African countries (EAC), like Burundi, Uganda, South Sudan, Somalia, and others, it is common to find village schools, town roads, hospitals, homes, and many more places without electricity. Students must revise their lessons by torchlight, some hospitals and clinics struggle to preserve temperature-sensitive medicines, including vaccines, and citizens navigate daily life without reliable electricity.

This is a common issue across East Africa, where insufficient electricity supply suppresses development, as well as the quality of education and healthcare. Currently, no country in East Africa has achieved full electricity coverage, and there are significant differences in electricity supply between countries. Kenya currently has the highest electricity coverage (the access rate compared to demand), reaching 75 percent in 2018 while Burundi had only 10 percent electricity coverage the same year.

At the same time, Africa has abundant geothermal and solar resources, giving it natural advantages for its energy transition. With the help of renewable energy, affluent countries such as Kenya and Rwanda are expected to achieve universal electricity coverage by 2030.

Kenya is the main beneficiary of Chinese renewable projects in the EAC member states. Environmental conservationist and green energy champion Steve Omondi, whose community is a renewable energy beneficiary through China-Kenya cooperation told Global Voices in an interview: “China has financed and built large solar and wind farms across Kenya, helping expand renewable energy access, particularly in rural areas.” He adds that renewable energy has accounted for nearly 90 percent of the electricity generation in Kenya as of 2022.

China's role in helping Africa obtain renewable energy

Over the past few decades, China has become the largest investor in Africa's new energy market, with large-scale hydropower, solar, and wind projects worth billions of dollars attempting to turn the continent's clean energy potential into reality.

A solar panel field in Rwanda. Image via Flickr. License CC-BY-SA 2.0

According to a report from the African Climate Foundation, from 2010–2020, China's investment in Africa's renewable energy sector had an average annual growth rate of 26 percent, primarily through solar, hydropower, and wind technologies. Based on a Chinese government report from its “Belt and Road Initiative,” in 2022, China made an additional direct investment of USD 3.4 billion in Africa. By the end of 2022, China had established more than 3,300 overseas enterprises in Africa, with a total direct investment exceeding USD 40 billion.

Lei Bian, a policy fellow at The London School of Economics and Political Science told VOA news that “Chinese overseas renewable energy investments aim to deliver China's international climate commitments of accelerating the energy transition away from fossil fuels in Africa, China's largest trading partner.” Meanwhile, China also benefited from the collaboration in terms of economic development and energy security.

Most of China's direct investment (FDI) in Africa is carried out through the Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM) and the China Development Bank (CDB). However, this investment isn't without controversy. Studies have shown that China's direct investment in Africa over the past few decades has had a negative correlation with local sustainable development. This is largely because China's expanding investments have increased pollution through projects such as road construction and natural resource extraction.

Many “Belt and Road” initiative projects have prioritized the power sector in Africa. In Kenya, the Chinese state-owned enterprise Jiangxi International Economic and Technical Cooperation Co., Ltd. (中国江西国际经济技术合作有限公司) and Kenya's Rural Energy Authority (REA) jointly built one of the largest photovoltaic power stations in Garissa town. This project was supported by part of the Belt and Road Fund established by China in 2018, which allocated 6 trillion Kenyan shillings (KES) to help expand Africa's infrastructure construction capacity.

China has helped to build over 80 big power facilities for Africa. Most are hydro, wind or solar power plants, like the Noor Ouarzazate Solar Complex, the world’s biggest solar power station, and the Garissa solar power plant, East Africa’s largest photovoltaic power station. https://t.co/g3Muj1knjy

— Chinese Embassy in Kenya (@ChineseEmbKenya) January 7, 2021

In addition to providing funds, China has increasingly offered technical support in recent years. The funding for the Garissa photovoltaic power station came from loans provided by the Export-Import Bank of China, while the Chinese company undertaking the project was responsible for the entire process, including design, procurement, construction, installation, and training. The power station has an installed capacity of 54.66 megawatts and can meet the electricity needs of 70,000 households, totaling more than 380,000 people in Kenya.

The paradox of energy overcapacity in African countries

Numerous independent studies have shown that China is facing an overcapacity in its energy sector. The sector is producing more goods than the market can absorb, which then end up being exported at lower prices to other markets. China has invested decades of time and billions of dollars in building its production lines and technology in the solar, wind, and hydroelectric industries. Africa has emerged as seemingly the ideal marketplace for these products. 

As China exports its green energy technology globally and sees its demand surge in Africa, some competitors in the US and EU are concerned about China's dominance in this field. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has indicated that China's overcapacity threatens emerging industries in the US and warned that “flooding the market with cheap goods” could undercut competition. Meanwhile, in June 2024, the EU began imposing additional tariffs of up to 38 percent on electric vehicles exported from China to EU countries.

The Chinese government has consistently denied claims of “overcapacity” and has cited the International Energy Agency's “Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2023,” which estimates that global demand for new energy vehicles will reach 45 million units by 2030. If China maintains an annual production growth rate of 20 percent, it will produce 34.352 million new energy vehicles by 2030, still below global demand.

According to Oxford Economics’ analysis, there is preliminary macro evidence to support the current geopolitical narrative of China's overcapacity. However, there is no compelling evidence that China is undermining global manufacturing competitors with unfair pricing.

Likewise, Africa is grappling with its own overcapacity issues, with studies showing severe overcapacity in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda. These countries have installed capacities exceeding peak demand by more than 50 percent, yet many households still lack electricity. The main reasons for this paradox vary from country to country but mainly stem from overly optimistic forecasts of real demand by national energy ministries alongside mismanagement within energy bureaucracies.

Another reason for Africa's overcapacity issues can be traced to private investors. For example, Kenya Power, a public distribution company, purchases electricity from private companies at high prices that far exceed what it can sell, leading to high electricity costs for citizens. The significant involvement of the private sector and signed Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) with private Chinese companies have exacerbated this situation.

Africa's opportunity

Many African leaders view speculation about China's energy overcapacity as an opportunity that might encourage China to shift its supply chain production to Africa.

Although China has been increasing its investments in African countries under the Belt and Road Initiative, a large portion of Africa's exports to China still consist of raw materials such as crude oil, copper, cobalt, and iron ore. These products accounted for more than half of the total import value in 2022. Currently, investment in the new energy manufacturing sector, mainly in the electric vehicle field, is still largely concentrated in relatively wealthy African countries like Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa.

Some African financial experts are suggesting that China should consider relocating part of the supply chain of this industry to Africa, rather than merely viewing the continent as a source of raw materials.

The Chinese and African markets seem poised to complement each other in a symbiotic partnership, however, some barriers remain. While Africa's energy glut can be solved by lowering the cost of access, the challenge will be in ensuring that the procurement relationship between private companies and governments is transparent and fair and that the energy transition does not damage the original ecosystem. 

Written by Ruohan Xie, Desire Nimubona

Originally published on Global Voices

Caption of Youtube video Mina de Buriticá: minería moderna de Colombia para el mundo. By Zijin-Continental Gold. Fair use.

On May 30, 2024, four communities in Buriticá, home to 10,000 residents in western Colombia, sent an SOS letter to public authorities, urging action against the increasing violence near the country’s largest gold mine. This mine is operated by Zijin Continental Gold, a subsidiary of the Chinese company Zijin Mining, which sued the Colombian government in November 2023 for not protecting it from attacks by local miners.

These local miners do traditional and small-scale mining in the region. They are called “ancestral” miners because they have lived and mined there for centuries before national and international corporations came. However, in the eyes of Zijin, they are illegal, or informal miners. The Colombian government sees them as both a community with valid claims to the land and a threat to Zijin's operations.

The environmental, social, economic, and legal tensions in Buriticá underscore the complex relationship between large-scale mining operations and local miners. Beyond the environmental impacts, including deforestation and water exploitation, Zijin is now facing escalating social disruption, which is quickly becoming the face of climate justice issues in Colombia.

Recently, local miners blocked the entrance to the gold mine. The blockade prevented residents from accessing food, health services, and education for children, the community letter says.

En medio de la grave situación que estamos afrontando en el municipio (…), recurrimos a ustedes como entes representantes del gobierno, para que se de una atención URGENTE a la crisis y vulneración de derechos que estamos viviendo (…)

In the middle of the grave situation we face in the Municipality, we go to you as government institutions to grant URGENT attention to the crisis and the vulnerations that we suffer (…). 

The regional body of ancestral miners initially signed a petition asking Zijin to grant them 140 hectares which they claim to have mined for over a decade. Traditional mining is essential for the livelihood of over 300 families and thousands of informal miners.

These miners who often work in deadly conditions in dozens of tunnels around Buriticá, some within Zijin’s concession, also urge the company to formalize their activities and stop labeling them as “illegal miners.” They are seeking to secure their rights to work safely in the mine.

Este bloqueo se adelanta desde hace 3 días en la potería La Estrella en la Mina Buriticá (desde el martes 28 de mayo de 2024). Este no solo ha afectado la movilidad y el abastecimiento de alimentos e insumos de 1.500 trabajadores, sino de más de 700 buritiqueños (sigue)

— Zijin-Continental Gold (@CNLGold) May 30, 2024

This blockade has been going on for 3 days at the La Estrella potery in the Buriticá Mine (since Tuesday, May 28, 2024). This has not only affected the mobility and supply of food and supplies of 1,500 workers, but of more than 700 Buriticans (continues)

Zijin pledged to mitigate the negative impacts of its mining activities and uphold the rights and well-being of local communities after it acquired the Buriticá mine, Colombia’s most prosperous gold deposit, in 2020.

Yet, frequent roadblocks and armed attacks allegedly carried out by informal miners or criminal gangs have paralyzed the company’s operations. They not only lead to economic losses but also secondary environmental impacts, as traditional miners resort to mining in sensitive areas, further contributing to deforestation and ecosystem degradation.

In response, Zijin filed a lawsuit in November last year, indicating that it might consider withdrawing its operations from the town if the conflicts persist, a prospect local communities fear could exacerbate the situation. The case is currently under review by Colombia's Constitutional Court and could risk 4,200 jobs and USD 95.4 million in taxes and royalty payments.

This move came around the time of Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s most recent visit to Beijing. He met China’s President Xi Jinping, who welcomed the Latin American country to join its global infrastructure development ambition “The Belt and Road Initiative” and commit to promoting green growth together.

A history of violence in Buriticá

Zijin Mining, whose largest shareholder is the Chinese government, extracts metals such as copper, gold, lithium, and other metal mineral resources. Founded in 1986 in Longyan, China, the company now has mining projects in 17 regions in China and 15 countries across the globe, including lithium mining in Argentina and copper mining in Peru. The Buriticá mine is the biggest gold mine that Zijin acquired in Latin America.

“Our vision is to become the best modern gold mine and the first environmentally responsible mine in Colombia,” said James Wang, CEO of Colombia Zijin-Continental Gold, a subsidiary of Zijin Mining, in the company’s 2020 sustainability report. The company’s goals include preserving biodiversity, using water resources responsibly, and maintaining harmony in the community.

Timeline by Global Voices.

The conflict in Buriticá is not new but intensified after Zijin Mining acquired the mine from Canadian Continental Gold in 2019. The gold mine, which is expected to produce 4,000 tons of gold per day has a history of violence, including worker deaths allegedly caused by informal miners. However, the growing frustration of ancestral miners and the presence of the criminal group Clan del Golfo, which uses the mining tunnels for its criminal operations, has further intensified the conflict.

Timeline by Global Voices.

One year later, Wang told Reuters that “It’s really, really challenging to handle these areas.” Thousands of informal miners have worked in harsh conditions in dozens of tunnels and about 150 clandestine processing locations in Buriticá municipality, Reuters reported. 

Zijin says that it actively engages with miners as well as local communities through projects aiming at formalizing informal mining workers and promoting social development. Yet, consistent blockades and armed attacks have repeatedly disrupted the company’s operations as well as threatened the safety and stability of neighboring communities.

Wang argued that the government needed to “give more support and to implement law and order in the region.” In 2024, the company admitted that it failed to effectively control the company’s costs from rising in overseas projects like the Buriticá gold mine.

Timeline by Global Voices

Ancestral miners in Buriticá denounce stigma

While gold mining sounds controversial in the modern context of large-scale resource exploitation worldwide, in some communities, gold mining is deeply connected to people’s culture, lifestyle, and survival. Mining in Buriticá dates to before Spanish colonization began in 1541. Today, at least 350,000 Colombians make a living directly through small-scale gold mining activities according to Harvard Review of Latin America.

In 2020, Patricia Gamba explained in an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) report that gold mining in Buriticá is an ancestral practice. She writes:

The main sociocultural characteristic of Buriticá and its neighboring municipalities is that mining (…)  especially those related to gold production is an ancestral practice. For this reason, there are groups with a common history around gold production and with shared experiences. These groups interact with each other and have collective behaviors, as they live within very similar political and economic realities.

Despite that, since 2022 Colombia’s government has given out over 7,000 mining exploration titles to national and foreign companies eager to exploit the country’s precious resources, and cracking down on “illegal mining” in Buriticá. 

Miners claim that the Colombian government breached a September 2022 agreement by continuing to crack down on small-scale mining and prosecute protest leaders, thereby undermining ongoing Mining Code reform discussions in the country.

In February 2023, authorities ordered the destruction of informal mining infrastructure in Buriticá, sparking an indefinite miner strike across 16 municipalities. Negotiations between miners and the government began then and are ongoing amid sporadic blockades and protests.

As violence increases, gold mining in Colombia presents a challenging arena for local communities as ancestral practices, international conglomerates, and global demand for the precious metal create competing interests and obligations. Meanwhile, officials must decide where they stand amid these competing interests and how to balance the protection of land, communities, and international corporate interests.

Written by Gabriela Mesones Rojo, Alicia Chen

Originally published on Global Voices

Oil wells in Balkan Provence, Turkmenistan. Image via Wikicommons license (CC BY-SA 4.0)

China is the biggest energy consumer and importer in the world. Oil, gas and coal imports to China account for around 85 percent, 40 percent and 7 percent of the country’s domestic consumption, respectively; and about 18 percent, 16 percent and 18 percent of the global trade of these commodities.

China’s economy and energy industries were and still are heavily reliant on coal, which is posing environmental and health risks both at home and abroad. In order to reduce the country’s dependency on coal, the State Council of China announced an action plan for air pollution prevention and control and proposed to move to “coal-to-gas/electricity projects” in 2013.

Although China is developing its domestic gas and oil production, it is still heavily dependent on foreign gas exports. In 2021 its dependency on foreign gas reached 44.37 percent.

China’s main natural gas suppliers are Australia Russia, Qatar and Turkmenistan, with Turkmenistan supplying more than half of its pipeline gas imports. 

Turkmenistan increases gas supplies to China

Part of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline system. Image via the state-run New China TV Youtube channel.

In 2022, Turkmenistan exported 35 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to China and overtook Russia which is now China’s second-largest gas exporter at 10 bcm per year. This increase comes even as China pays 30 percent more for Turkmen gas than for Russian gas. Reuters news agency quoted industry insiders claiming that China has failed to negotiate less cost for Turkmen gas because the Turkmen government insist on staying “in line with global pricing practices”. 

China imports pipeline gas as well as liquefied natural gas (LNG).  The difference between the two is once a pipeline is built it stays in place, whereas LNG is transported via transport tankers. In 2022, pipeline gas import accounted for 42 percent of China's total gas import. 

Workers in Xinjiang, China, inspect part of the Central Asian Gas Pipeline, which starts in Turkmenistan. Screenshot via the state-run China Global News Network's YouTube channel.

Turkmenistan supplies gas to China via the 1,833-kilometer-long Central Asia-China pipeline system. It consists of three pipelines running parallel to each other, A, B, and C and the fourth one, pipeline D is currently under construction, indicating that China is and will continue to prioritize gas exports from Central Asia over Russian gas. Reuters news agency quoted a Chinese state oil official saying, “Central Asian pipelines are considered a cornerstone investment in China's energy and geopolitical space. It's a supply channel with a strategic value that supersedes commercial concerns.” 

Turkmenistan plays a key role in China’s Central Asian gas supplies and relations between the two countries are crucial for both.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Turkmenistan President Serdar Berdimuhamedov shake hands on May 18, 2023. During this meeting, they discussed the countries’ energy trade deals, among other issues. Image via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the PRC. Free to use. 

In 2009, China signed a gas deal with Turkmenistan, where Turkmenistan committed to increasing its gas exports to China by 30 percent each year.  According to the report published by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, “China has now replaced exports to Russia as the mainstay of Turkmenistan’s gas business, and of its export revenues.” Turkmenistan is considered a high-risk country for international investors due to the government’s total control of the economy, corruption and weak regulatory legislation. At the same time, the Turkmen government doesn’t seem willing to change the current state of affairs, with one Oxford Energy report noting, “Turkmenistan now relies on two foreign companies — Chinese National Petroleum Corporation and Petronas — for more than one-quarter of its gas output”.

Turkmenistan’s export revenues and overall economy depend significantly on its gas exports to China.  In 2022, Turkmenistan exported USD 12.5 billion worth of goods, with USD 10.3 billion of that being gas exports to China — a staggering 82 percent of their total exports. 

Methane leaks in Turkmenistan

For China, buying gas from Turkmenistan not only diversifies its energy sources but also supports its effort to reduce carbon emissions. Natural gas is less carbon-intensive than coal, and transitioning from coal to natural gas in power plants and factories can cut CO2 emissions by nearly half. 

However, this doesn't come without risk. Turkmenistan is home to some of the world's most serious methane leakage incidents. In 2021, the Paris-based International Energy Agency found Turkmenistan responsible for a third of large emission events around the globe. According to energy experts, methane leaks from the country’s two main fossil fuel fields caused more global heating in 2022 than the entire carbon emissions of the United Kingdom. The climate advantage of natural gas may be negated as Turkmenistan struggles to contain the leaks. 

Methane leaks in Turkmenistan are believed to come from ageing and poorly maintained oil and gas pipelines and from the venting to the atmosphere of unwanted methane gas that is produced alongside oil. However, Turkmenistan remains one of the most closed countries in the world, and it is impossible to independently verify if work to combat methane leakage has started yet.

The importance of methane as a greenhouse gas has become much better understood in recent years, and today it is estimated that methane emissions are responsible for as much as 25 percent of greenhouse gas emissions today. Methane leaks are therefore a major threat to the fight against climate change and the natural disasters that it will bring. There is a growing global focus on addressing methane leaks from fossil fuel production sites and pipelines, which is seen as perhaps the fastest, simplest and cheapest way to slash greenhouse gas emissions.

During the 2021 COP26 global climate meeting in Glasgow, Turkmenistan’s president Serdar Berdimukhammedov pledged that his country would introduce modern technologies to tackle methane leaks. He later adopted a roadmap to implement these actions. 

Local environmentalists in Turkmenistan who spoke on a condition of anonymity are sceptical about the commitment of the Turkmenistan leadership to reducing methane leaks. 

At the same time, Beijing’s reliance on Turkmenistan for natural gas is increasing, as the world’s second-largest economy seeks new energy sources to fuel its development ambitions. While Chinese newspapers and research institutions have acknowledged the severity of the gas leaks in Turkmenistan, the government has yet to publicly address the issue in negotiations. Last year in May, Chinese leader Xi Jinping unveiled a grand strategy to coordinate Central Asia's development. In addition to infrastructure and trade, Xi said that the construction of a fourth natural gas pipeline should be accelerated. 

The push to secure stable and substantial natural gas supplies from Turkmenistan is a critical step in China's energy transition strategy, as China pivots away from coal to cleaner energy sources to meet its ambitious climate goals.  

In 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping committed to reaching net zero in greenhouse gas emissions by 2060. Since then, China has expanded its solar and wind energy capacities, as well as nuclear and hydroelectric power. Aside from the push into renewable sources, China is phasing out the construction of coal-fired power plants and filling energy demands with natural gas, which serves as a more immediate, albeit transitional, lower-carbon alternative. China’s National Development and Reform Commission, the agency responsible for the country’s macroeconomic plans, has pledged to boost the use of natural gas to 7 percent of total primary energy consumption by 2030. In August, Chinese leader Xi Jinping called to enhance the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Turkmenistan, a sign of Turkmenistan’s crucial role in helping China achieve its own environmental objectives. 

China’s energy transition has begun and is driving a major expansion of solar and wind energy, along with nuclear power and hydroelectricity plants. However coal use in China is still growing, and any serious progress toward net zero will require it to stop building coal-fired power plants and replace them in many cases with natural gas plants or green energy alternatives. 

Replacing coal with natural gas is one of the ways China is striving to meet its climate commitments, but to the extent this gas comes from Turkmenistan, the climate benefit is highly questionable.

Written by Global Climate Justice Fellowship, Shahida Yakub

Originally published on Global Voices

The image is a courtesy of Laís Martins.

For years, Chinese solar panels were king in Brazil. In 2022, around 99 percent of all photovoltaic panels purchased in Brazil were imported from China, which is the leading global manufacturer of solar energy equipment. Only 1 percent was produced locally. Now, thanks to a government decision to scrap a tax exemption that reduced the cost of importing solar energy equipment that had been ongoing since 2020, this landscape could start changing. 

The explanation for this wide-ranging adoption of Chinese products is multifaceted. It is partly due to tax reasons: Solar panels imported from China were, until recently, exempt from import taxes, which makes them 50 percent cheaper than panels produced domestically inside Brazil. Another reason Chinese panels have dominated the Brazilian market is the immaturity of the local sector, which has failed to develop itself in the absence of government-led incentive programs and policies. 

Chinese solar panels are not only cheaper in Brazil. According to estimates from the European Commission, the total cost of photovoltaic manufacturing in China is 35 percent lower than in Europe, 20 percent lower than in the United States, and 10 percent lower than in India. And even in recent years, the manufacturing price in China has continued to decrease. According to Info Link, a solar energy information agency, in 2023, the average price of modules from China was around EUR 0.25 per watt. Just a little over one year later, in early March, that price was under EUR 0.1 per watt.

Globally, China has a strong edge compared to local manufacturers thanks to its mature industrial chain — the result of more than 15 years of investment in developing technology. China’s solar PV sector development initially followed a bottom-up pattern and has gone through three distinct stages. First, until 2009, the solar PV industry primarily developed as an export-oriented manufacturing policy with the support of subnational governments. Second, China’s central government intervened by creating domestic solar markets to save the solar PV industry. Third, beginning in 2015, and somewhat unsuccessfully, the Chinese central government began removing domestic subsidies and again focused on technological efficiency, production cost, and grid integration in its domestic solar PV industry.

The low cost of acquiring Chinese-made panels has enabled countries like Brazil to initiate their green energy transition. Currently, 18.2 percent of Brazil’s energy is obtained through photovoltaic panels. But now that could be under threat thanks to a decision by the Brazilian government to slap new taxes on Chinese imports. This could lead to a reconfiguration in the sector, and not necessarily a positive one.

Being one of the cleanest and lowest-impact sources of energy, solar power is at the forefront of environmental justice. Ensuring equipment costs remain low means the population can afford to purchase and install equipment, therefore democratizing the use of solar energy. It also reduces dependency on other forms of non-renewable energy. 

Starting in January of 2024, the Brazilian government announced that it is reintroducing a 10.8 percent import tax on Chinese solar panels. “The production of equipment to generate solar energy is strategic for the country,” said Geraldo Alckmin, Brazil’s vice president and minister for Development, Industry, Commerce, and Service. “It contributes to our energy security and is aligned with the ecological transition program for a low-carbon economy,” he said, according to a government publication.  

Absolar, the Brazilian Photovoltaic Solar Energy Association, is against any new import taxes. “Increasing taxes on the equipment that is used today only makes the technology more expensive for consumers, it would hinder access to technology and would, including, destroy ‘green jobs’ that Brazil has today for people who install these systems,” said Rodrigo Sauiaia, Absolar’s president. Today, there are around 1.2 million jobs generated around the photovoltaic industry in Brazil.

Sauaia added that markets that pursued increasing import taxes saw a reduction in technological development and a delay in green energy transitions because it makes it harder for the final consumer to access the technology. 

How to support the domestic solar industry?

Experts in Brazil and China told Global Voices during phone and online interviews there are other potential measures to support the national industry instead of applying taxes. He Jijiang (何继江), Deputy Director at the Research Center for Energy Transition and Social Development at Tsinghua University told Global Voices that the Brazilian government could support the localization of “downstream industries,” such as factories to produce brackets and accessories, training personnel for assembly and establishing large-scale local photovoltaic power plants. These measures could also create local jobs, Jijiang added. 

Sauaia, from Absolar, said one of the first steps to be taken by the Brazilian government would be establishing a national industrial policy with a series of incentives for local manufacturers, including a tax reduction on the raw materials necessary to produce photovoltaic modules. A second measure would be to have the government purchase Brazilian-made solar equipment to install in government buildings, as part of government housing programs and even in the case of emergencies caused by extreme climatic events, like the one in Rio Grande do Sul, south of Brazil. Sauaia said:

The government aims to decarbonize the Amazon, to replace the diesel-based generators that are expensive and polluting. These could be replaced with battery-powered renewable systems, like solar and eolic. Why not utilize Brazilian-made equipment in this program?

But even such measures may be insufficient to counter Chinese prices. Tan Youru (谭佑儒), a photovoltaic analyst at Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), believes that a continued price drop in the photovoltaic supply chain might stunt many regions’ ambitions to develop their domestic manufacturing. According to Youru, despite the government’s efforts to promote local manufacturing plans, there will be pressure from price declines, challenging the profitability of local factories. 

He Jijiang maintains that the best path to pursue is one of a division of labor, where countries develop different industries that complement China’s expertise in the core photovoltaic industry. He said Brazil’s involvement in the upstream industry would require years and a large amount of capital investment, which would inevitably delay the green energy transition and increase its costs.

Written by Laís Martins, Luo Jieqi