Civic Media Observatory – Global Voices

GV webinar: The ABCs of digital repression in Venezuela

Civic Media Observatory — Fri, 27 Sep 2024 13:55:03 +0000

The event was co-organized between Global Voices’ Civic Media Observatory and Advox

Originally published on Global Voices

Image courtesy of the Civic Media Observatory.

On September 24, 2024, Global Voices hosted a discussion in English about Venezuela’s regime strategy for digital repression, from propaganda to harassment and persecution strategies enabled by the use of technology.

On July 28, 2024, Venezuela's National Electoral Authority (CNE) declared President Nicolás Maduro the winner late on election night without sharing the electoral tallies with the detailed outcome. Hours after the CNE announcement, opposition leader Maria Corina Machado contested the results, claiming González Urrutia had won and presenting the tallies to support her claim.

Protests immediately erupted and have steadily continued for over six weeks, with protestors demanding recognition of the results shared by the opposition, particularly in traditionally pro-Chávez neighborhoods, with over 1,700 detained and 24 killed. International pressure has also mounted on the CNE to release the complete election data while the Nicolás Maduro regime has escalated its repression tactics against dissenting voices.

What does data governance mean to you? Join us for an online discussion on September 30

Giovana Fleck — Thu, 19 Sep 2024 07:59:34 +0000

The Data Narratives Observatory will host a session with Conneced by Data, an organization working to include communities at the center of data narratives.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image courtesy of Giovana Fleck.

For the last year, the Civic Media Observatory (CMO) has developed a research project to understand and analyze the discourse on data used for governance, control, and policy in El Salvador, Brazil, Turkey, Sudan, and India. The Data Narratives Observatory concludes with a session in partnership with Connected by Data, an organization working to include communities at the center of data narratives, practices, and policies.

What does data governance mean to you? With that question in mind, we will discuss on September 30 (1 pm UTC / 2 pm London / 9 am Washington) what makes data governance relevant when it comes to its impact on people’s lives. The discussion will primarily take place in English.

Register here

Connected Conversations is a series of informal, virtual discussion sessions focused on the principles of collective, democratic, participatory, and deliberative data governance. These events aim to explore and deepen understanding of how data can be managed and governed in a way that includes diverse perspectives and promotes shared decision-making.

According to our research, in Sudan, activists and researchers see data governance as the regulations and practices that manage data, with a strong focus on responsible handling to prioritize the well-being of people. Brazil’s regulatory approach acknowledges the complexity and scope of data governance, viewing it as both political and multifaceted. In El Salvador, it is seen as a legal framework centered on data protection, privacy, integrity, and authenticity, especially in relation to artificial intelligence and cryptocurrency regulation. India approaches data governance in layers, addressing data protection, security, and online content governance, recognizing the significant influence of Big Tech in these areas. In Turkey, data governance is viewed as part of digital governance, connected to internet and information governance, but it faces challenges in definition due to overlapping and broad terms.

In this Connected Conversation, we will ask what these ground-up perspectives might mean for global campaigns on data governance, exploring how the findings from the Civic Media Observatory support or challenge existing advocacy for collective and community-driven data governance.

Register here

What online narratives tell us about the aftermath of the election in Venezuela

Civic Media Observatory — Fri, 30 Aug 2024 08:20:41 +0000

We delve into two narratives forging the current political climate in Venezuela a month after the 2024 presidential elections.

Originally published on Global Voices

Nicolás Maduro in Caracas on July 23. Photo: RS/via Fotos Publicas edited by Giovana Fleck.

On July 28, 2024, Venezuela held presidential elections, which were expected to bring hope and change to the Venezuelan people after years of a prolonged economic crisis.

According to the Carter Center, a US-based organization working on enhancing democracy, invited by the Venezuelan regime to observe the election, the process took place in an “environment of restricted freedoms,” and the Venezuelan Electoral Authority (Consejo Nacional Electoral) showed clear bias towards Maduro's government.

Maria Corina Machado, the opposition candidate, was banned from running. After failing to register Machado’s replacement, the opposition was forced to support Edmundo González Urrutia, an ex-diplomat already registered as a presidential candidate.

Citizens abroad also faced significant barriers to participating in elections due to short registration deadlines, limited public information, and unusual legal requirements. UNHCR, the UN Agency for Refugees, documents that, by the end of 2023, there were “over 7.7 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants globally,” of an estimated population of little over 30 million people. Only 69.000 Venezuelans living abroad were registered to vote at the moment of the election, leaving most of the estimated 3.5 –5.5 million Venezuelans eligible to vote excluded from the election.

Despite the challenges, Machado and González ran the campaign together, articulating one of the country's most significant civil society efforts to ensure electoral transparency. Their campaign messages focused on promising a better future where those living abroad could reunite with their families.

Nicolás Maduro, the current president of Venezuela, ran a reelection campaign that highlighted their efforts to combat imperialism and argued that he was the only one capable of guaranteeing peace in the country.

On the night of July 28, 2024, shortly before midnight, the Venezuelan Electoral Authority declared Nicolás Maduro the election winner but did not provide detailed results by state. Hours later, Maria Corina Machado held a press conference, asserting that they had a representative sample of the electoral tallies and that Edmundo González Urrutia was the clear winner. The results published by the opposition, backed by the tallies and coherent with what the electoral witness reported, indicated that González Urrutia had received twice as many votes as Maduro.

Protests broke out after the election in historically pro-Chavismo neighborhoods, demanding the regime recognize the opposition's published results. In the first two days, over a thousand civilians were detained, and more than 21 people were killed. The majority of the international community has since called on the Venezuelan Electoral Authority to release the detailed election results.

Narrative: “Fear us! If you are not with us, we are going after you”

According to the regime, imperialism, linked to the opposition, is the leading cause of the ongoing political and economic crisis in Venezuela, and any claim of foul play led by the Venezuelan opposition is considered false and an action that promotes the agenda of the US rather than defends the interests of the Venezuelan people.

Government officials assert that the current administration believed its strategies to hinder voting would secure a favorable outcome and that the results released by the opposition appeared to catch the regime off guard. Meanwhile, traditional regional allies, such as Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, continue to demand evidence of the results before recognizing Maduro as the election victor. As a result, the government has shared little to no celebration spirits and instead intensified its repressive tactics, advertising new initiatives to target and criminalize dissent, like Operación Tun Tun (Operation Knock Knock) — a new wave of repression now aimed at electoral witnesses and voters, groups previously not targeted.

The regime then focused on spreading the message that anyone who questions or doesn't support the Venezuelan government should be afraid because showing any sign of discontent is an act of treason — advertising control and repression while spreading fear. It has declared it will use all its forces to stop what it calls a “cyber-fascist” coup, targeting people publishing dissident content on social media and even banning platforms.

How this narrative circulates online

Diosdado Cabello, recently appointed Minister of Interior, Justice, and Peace, advertises the efficiency of “Operation Knock Knock” on Instagram.

The video first shows a TikTok clip of a man insulting Nicolás Maduro and Diosdado Cabello. Then Billy the Puppet from the Saw horror movie says, “Let the game begin,” a countdown starts, and a series of images show state forces detaining the man in the middle of the night, who later apologizes.

Knock Knock is also the name of a famous Venezuelan Christmas song. The song's chorus says, “Knock Knock, who is there? People of peace, please open the door. Christmas has arrived.”

The slogan of Operation Knock Knock is “sin lloradera,” which means no whining, no crying, a common expression used in Venezuela to dismiss other people's suffering.

The item received over 35,000 likes on Instagram and was ranked -3 on our civic score card, the lowest ranking possible, as it incites hate against any show of discontent in the country while celebrating the repressive tactics and human rights violations committed by the state forces. See the full analysis of the item.

Narrative: We share most of our struggles, and that unites us

For Venezuelans, the current situation exceeds the region's traditional dichotomy of left versus right and evidences a sense of overcoming polarization. There is a general belief inside Venezuela that ideological discussions and confrontations are no longer a priority. The focus is on the challenges that unite the Venezuelan population rather than the elements that separate them.

This narrative conveys a renewed sense of trust among citizens and a shared desire to move forward. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the country's health system and economic weaknesses. The state enforced lockdowns through repressive measures, drastically altering daily life. Isolated communities began to rely on their neighbors for protection from both the virus and repression, while urban areas saw a surge in delivery services as a new form of employment. “Motorizados” (generally people informally working as couriers using their motorcycles), once viewed as criminals or linked to state-backed armed groups, became trusted couriers, fostering a shared sense of community amid widespread hardship and exhaustion.

Many were moved by Machado's and González's promise of a better future where families would reunite after years of being forced apart — a desire shared by all social classes in Venezuela and unifying the country.

How this narrative gains life online

In a video shared by VVperiodistas, members of the Carirubana municipality police removed their uniforms, some even in tears, in front of a group of protesters that chanted “freedom” while applauding.

By removing their uniforms, police officers implicitly tell protestors that they no longer will follow their superiors’ orders to continue repressing them.

The protest was held in Carirubana, a municipality ruled for the last 24 years by the regime's party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) —former V Republic Movement (MVR).

The item ranked +2 in our civic scorecard. It showcases the officers’ willingness to disobey the regime's orders, prioritize people's safety, and seek a peaceful resolution of the country's conflict. See the full analysis of the item.

Since the start of the elections, Global Voices has published special coverage with stories from our community about Venezuela.

News from the Civic Media Observatory

We are excited to share that Undertones will resume bi-weekly with stories from our Data Governance Observatory. Since the start of 2024, our team of researchers has been identifying and understanding the discourse on data used for governance, control, and policy in El Salvador, Brazil, Turkey, Sudan, and India. We are excited to share those with you. If you haven’t already, subscribe.

One hundred Turkish lira for your data: How Turkish citizens lost all expectations of data security and privacy

Sencer Odabaşı — Wed, 21 Aug 2024 01:00:14 +0000

Leaks have offered almost unlimited access to Turkish citizens’ data

Originally published on Global Voices

Image made by Giovana Fleck, used with permission.

This story is part of Data Narratives, a Civic Media Observatory project that aims to identify and understand the discourse on data used for governance, control, and policy in El Salvador, Brazil, Turkey, Sudan, and India. Read more about the project here and see our public dataset for the full analysis covered in the text below.

Since 2018, Turkey has been experiencing a severe economic crisis, with rising inflation, a significantly devalued currency, and an increased cost of living. A few years ago, TRY 100 (around USD 17, pre-crisis) could last a few days in Turkey, but these days it doesn’t buy much anymore, especially in big cities.

In the megacity İstanbul, a single “balık ekmek,” a grilled fish and lettuce sandwich that used to be a cheap working-class staple, costs TRY 120 to 150 (around USD 3,50 to USD 4,50) nowadays. Even getting to Eminönü, a district on the coast where the Golden Horn and İstanbul’s historic old town meet, which is famous for its balık ekmek, costs TRY 105 using the city's public transportation network, assuming you have to change vehicles once. If you decide to stay home and order a Big Mac from the nearby McDonald’s, even that would cost TRY 170 today.

Sitting at home in your İstanbul apartment, eager to spend your TRY 100 and trying to forget that you had to skip lunch, what can you buy to keep yourself entertained? Those familiar with Turkey will not be surprised to hear that one option is all identity-related data of any citizen or resident of Turkey, including insurance numbers, phone numbers, addresses, employment information, healthcare information, property deeds, and all family relations. For the meager price of TRY 100, people can buy all this information and more about anyone who resided in Turkey in the recent past. (Current prices might differ slightly. Prices change fast in Turkey; inflation affects cybercriminals too. It is, however, still dirt cheap.)

How could such sensitive information be that cheap, you might ask? Well, when competition is high in a sector with low marginal costs, prices tend to decrease. In other words, it is cheap because everyone has it. So the real question then becomes, “Why does everyone have it?”

The answer to this is data leaks. Turkey has a long history of data leaks, and the scope of this article wouldn’t be enough to detail every single one of them. The latest significant public data breach happened less than a year ago, around June 2023, when 85 million citizens had their e-devlet (a web-based system that provides online access to government services for Turkish citizens and residents) data stolen. Apparently, the government’s measures to protect citizens’ data were so weak that even the hackers who leaked the data were complaining about it, as well as accusing the state of selling personal data to private companies.

The government itself, on the other hand, refuses responsibility. Ali Taha Koç, the ex-president of the Office of Digital Transformations (DDO), a department responsible for the digitalization of services and cybersecurity that is directly tied to Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, claimed that the source of the leaks was the private sector and that the government has protected all data entrusted to it. While Koç did not give any names, he most likely implied the successive Yemeksepeti data leaks. The food delivery app that had a near-monopoly status in Turkey for years leaked information about its over 30 million users not once but twice in the span of a few months.

Regardless of who the real culprit is (the hackers themselves, as mentioned above, point toward the government), the result is an almost complete loss of any expectation of privacy. Turkish citizens do not expect any privacy online anymore. Whenever there is a data leak — and yes, they are frequent enough to talk about data leaks as such without specifying which one — social media users take a mocking tone, making fun of anyone who overreacts to it.

The fatalistic acceptance that is created in this environment can be summarized with this Twitter user’s discussion of the threat of doxxing: “You have my ID? So does everyone who can pay 2$ to get e-devlet leaks. You are not special.” When the expectation of a right does not exist, that right itself also tends not to exist practically, even if it exists legally. Law #6698 on protecting personal data is supposed to secure the constitutional right to privacy. Still, in practice, anyone who knows the right Telegram groups to search for can break this law for the equivalent of a couple of US dollars.

This loss of expectations means that many citizens have given up on other basic citizen entitlements as well. It is subtle but clearly visible in the public psyche. In May 2023, former Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu, as a demonstration to the interviewer from a tech news site called ShiftDelete, showcased an application called KİM on his phone, which, after taking a photograph of the interviewer, accessed all information, including name, surname, ID number, and several other pictures concerning him. Naturally, this showcase, which Soylu claimed, in the video, “showed the power of the state,” caused quite a controversy.

Opposition politicians and public figures harshly criticized the use of such an app. Merve Kara-Kaşka of BBC Turkey interviewed many of these experts, who criticized the use of the app by the minister of interior, questioning who exactly has access to this program and who is allowed to use it — all very relevant criticisms. There was one line of questioning that was missing here, though, with the notable exception of Veysel Ok, the co-director of the Media and Law Studies Association Turkey (MLSA Turkey). Why does the state collect and keep all this data on its citizens in the first place? The expectation of data privacy has been so eroded that a lot of experts and the overwhelming majority of citizens did not even think to ask that fundamental question in the first place. So many public and private, legal, and illegal organizations have easy access to the personal data of Turkish citizens that the Ministry of Interior keeping that data seems like the most natural thing in the world.

After the 2023 elections, where the former Istanbul governor Ali Yerlikaya was elected to the office of the minister of interior, the new minister denied that the ministry had ever used the KİM app, implying that it was a personal, not institutional, problem that the former minister had access to the said app. With that, institutional responsibility was waived and any responsibility, legal or otherwise, of using the app was transferred to the person of the former minister Soylu. The question of the use of data was seemingly “resolved.” There is no reason to believe that the ministry still does not store the same data, but nobody talks about it.

It would be easy to blame Turkish citizens, accusing them of not being conscious enough of their rights and entitlements and giving up on online privacy too easily. However, one has to realize that the public reaction of indifference is perfectly reasonable. I am writing here about data privacy, but if someone had a problem with my article and decided to leak my personal information online, I would hardly be shocked, either. It is too normalized, and basic data regarding citizens, like everything valuable that was ever uploaded to the internet, will remain on the internet, easily accessible forever. How to approach this reality is a complex question for the politics of data privacy. On a theoretical level, policies are made with the assumption that private data can be kept private. The reality is far messier.

Starlink in Sudan: A lifeline or war facilitator?

Digital Rights Lab — Tue, 20 Aug 2024 12:35:58 +0000

Internet is being used as a weapon by warring parties

Originally published on Global Voices

Image made by Giovana Fleck, used with permission.

Since April 2023, Sudan has experienced armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) — the official military of the Republic of Sudan — and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an armed group formed in 2013, during the regime of the ousted president Omar al-Bashir. This conflict escalated dramatically when, in February 2024, the RSF seized control of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Khartoum, the capital city of Sudan, and imposed a telecommunication blackout in the country. The telecommunication blackout deprived Sudanese people from means of telecommunication.

The RSF narrative, promoted by its supporters, seeks to justify the group's action by spreading the idea that they are pressuring the SAF and the ISPs to restore internet services in the Darfur region, which is largely under RSF control. However, civil society organizations have confirmed that the telecommunication blackout in the region was ordered by the SAF.

Impact on public services and banking

The ongoing war has severely damaged Sudan’s ability to offer essential public services, including national banking services. The Electronic Banking Services Company (EBS), which oversees governmental e-banking operations, lost the ability to offer clearing services, which disrupted bank-to-bank transactions. Furthermore, the RSF looted banks in several cities in Sudan, leading to long queues at bank offices and further complicating traditional banking operations.

RSF profiteering from Starlink in war zones

It has been reported that the RSF is leveraging Starlink to offer internet access for profit in its controlled areas. The exact number of Starlink devices in these areas is unknown, but they include al-Gezira state except for Almanagil locality, and Khartoum state excluding parts from the Omdurman locality. Additionally, they are present in the South, East, West, and Middle Darfur states. Prices for one hour of connection exceeded 3000 Sudanese Pounds, approximately $2.5. Some reports mentioned that the cost of a one-hour connection can reach six dollars in some areas.

Moreover, in February 2024, the Executive Director of al-Genina City imposed “usage fees” for those who want to operate Starlink for commercial purposes. These fees were set to be 150,000 Sudanese pounds annually, approximately $100.

Blocking telecommunications to cut off revenue

Even though both sides in Sudan’s war are making use of the internet for revenue, they both actively seek to block each other’s financial resources, including telecommunication.

Ahmed Ben Omer, a notable Sudanese economist told Global Voices in an interview via WhatsApp: “RSF’s shutdown of telecommunication intended to stop the tax supply that finances the government and SAF together.” However, as of 2018, the telecommunication sector accounted for 14 percent of Sudan’s economy, with telecommunication value-added tax of 40 percent and other commercial taxes.

The Wall Street Journal claimed that the SAF requested an internet company to shut down devices operating in the RSF-controlled areas, which illustrates the depth of the war’s impact on infrastructure. It is important to note that Starlink is unregulated in Sudan. However, SAF, using the Telecommunication and Postal Regulation Authority (TPRA), decided to block any imports of Starlink devices to Sudan. The decision was taken prior to the internet shutdown by the RSF.

Starlink’s strategic role in conflict zones

The U.S.-based satellite internet provider, SpaceX, has become the main internet provider in areas under RSF control. It is also used in different areas that are under SAF control and experience coverage gaps, such as mining areas. In general, Starlink’s utility extends beyond Sudan, providing essential services in various hotspots affected by armed conflict.

For example, Russian troops use Starlink on the frontlines of their conflict with Ukraine. In Lebanon, the government has established an agreement with Starlink to ensure emergency connectivity in case any catastrophe occurs in the ICT infrastructure in the country due to the complications caused by the ongoing Israel-Lebanon conflict. Similarly, it is used in Yemen, a country enduring a decade-long conflict.

Despite its benefits, the widespread use of Starlink in such sensitive scenarios poses ethical challenges. SpaceX must balance supporting human rights, with the potential misuse in criminal activities and crisis situations. SpaceX must implement robust security measures to prevent its technology from participating in prohibited acts that violate human rights, even if it is unintentional.

Website blocking in India: One arrow for all

Shubhangi Heda — Mon, 19 Aug 2024 12:21:31 +0000

In India, government power over online spaces has been expanding

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Giovana Fleck, used with permission.

In recent years, the Indian government has been proactive in expanding its control over online spaces, and website blocking has been a strategic tool in its arsenal. A report last updated in March 2024 by digital rights organization Geeks for Geeks observed that 55,607 websites were blocked between 2015 and 2023. Around 48 percent of the websites were blocked under the Information Technology Act (IT Act). These blocks have targeted independent news websites, hate speech trackers, and streaming websites.

The expansive targeting of websites becomes particularly concerning as the existing laws give the government leeway to not disclose the reasons for blocking a website. The law gives the government power to arbitrarily block content, which can create a chilling effect on free speech and expression, specifically when the targets are independent news websites. Moreover, the power to block websites, which was earlier limited to only the Ministry of Electronic and Information Technology, was also conferred to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting as of 2021. This indicates that government power over online spaces has only been expanding.

To disclose or not to disclose

Existing laws in India, specifically Section 69A of the Information and Technology Act (IT Act), allow the government to shut down websites to protect India's sovereignty and integrity, defense and security, ensure no harm to friendly relations with other countries, maintain public order, and prevent incitement to commit offences. However, the meaning of these conditions is not clearly defined in Indian jurisprudence, allowing leeway for broad interpretation. On top of vague interpretation, Rule 16 of the Blocking Rules of 2009 allows the government to keep the reasons for the blocking confidential if the government claims that the blocking is done for national security reasons. This means the government does not have to disclose which websites they have blocked and the reasons or grounds for blocking. Because of this clause, many Right to Information applications filed by civil society that sought a list of blocking orders issued by the government were denied. Ultimately, because the reasons for the blocking are not disclosed upfront, it becomes difficult to hold the government accountable for it. While these blocking orders can eventually be challenged in the courts, there is no recourse apart from going through long-drawn court battles while the websites remain blocked.

The Data Governance Observatory's research shows that websites like Hindutva Watch, India Hate Lab, and Kashmirwalla have been the targets of secret blocking orders. The confidential nature of these blocking orders gives the government a strategic advantage, as it can issue takedown notices for websites that represent dissenting voices. Knowing that the government cannot be held accountable for these blocking orders right away without going through a long-drawn legal battle creates a chilling effect on minority voices that speak against the government and the Indian state.

For example, in the particular instance of blocking the website of a news organization, Kashmirwalla, operating out of Kashmir reporting on issues in the region of Jammu and Kashmir, the website was just taken down without any adequate notice. In response to this, many news organizations and civil society organizations expressed their condemnation of the government's action. They claimed that blocking the Kashmirwalla without disclosure of the ground of takedown impacted the representation of voices from Kashmir, which remains a sensitive and conflict-ridden region in India and has already been facing frequent internet shutdowns. Within their condemnation of the government's action, journalist organizations like Committee to Protect Journalists, Network of women in Media in India, and Editors Guild India also highlighted that taking down the websites that represent dissenting voices has become a trend, creating a chilling effect on the voicing of opinions and perspectives that go against the state.

The ever-expanding remit of the state

Though the framing of the IT Act and the blocking rules do limit the government's ability to not disclose the reasons for blocking, the Indian government continues to use blocking orders to discipline online spaces.

Apart from targeting dissenting voices and news websites, the government has also targeted websites like Dowry Calculator, a satirical website that aims to raise awareness about the issue of dowry. When the website's owner challenged the government order, and the court obligated the ministry to disclose the reasons for the blocking, it defended the blocking order, claiming that the website could lead nudge people to commit the offence, and so it argued by the government that website would lead to abetment to commit the offence. However, there is no proof that any offence has been committed because of the website. The blocking of Dowry Calculator showcases that the government can issue blocking orders without any legitimate reason, and now there is growing intolerance even for satirical representation.

From blocking news websites to satirical websites, the government has also blocked streaming websites on grounds of showing obscene content. While the determination of obscenity remains a complex matter, and courts also adopt specific legal tests to determine if the content is obscene or not, the government issues blocking orders without any such tests. Again, there is no determination of whether the content is in fact obscene. Instead, the government just wants to show that it holds the power to discipline online spaces. The blocking of streaming websites came after they were issued a warning from the Minister of Information and Broadcasting to stop showing obscene content. The warning and the subsequent blocking of streaming websites signaled that if government demands are not met, the websites will be blocked and/or taken down. With the government already trying to impose more content norms on streaming with the proposed Broadcast Bill, the website blocking adds to the uncertainty and pressure felt by a creative community that is already feeling the pressure of self-censorship pending such regulations.

Whether it is blocking news websites, satirical expression, or streaming websites, the government's actions indicate to creators and journalists that it remains a strong intervening force in online spaces.

‘It must be justified if the government is doing it’

The research by the Data Governance Observatory found that when the reasons for blocking websites are not disclosed, right-leaning publications and entities come up with their own reasons for it. For example, the blocking of Kashmirwalla was interpreted as the government taking proactive steps to stop Islamic propaganda. This showcases the way narratives around website blocking are created by Hindu rights groups, which add to an already polarized environment where dissenting voices are under institutional pressure.

Even for blocking streaming websites, there is an agreement that this would help curtail obscenity online; however, this narrative again covers up the fact that this promotes a trend of government censorship. The support around website blocking legitimizes government action in a popular sense, deflecting from the fact that due process needs to be followed in government action.

The two deaths of the ‘Brazilian DSA’

Alice Lana — Wed, 14 Aug 2024 15:55:10 +0000

A new character emerged and thrust the platform regulation agenda: Elon Musk

Originally published on Global Voices

Digital image made by Giovana Fleck, used with permission.

This story is part of Data Narratives, a Civic Media Observatory project that aims to identify and understand the discourse on data used for governance, control, and policy in El Salvador, Brazil, Turkey, Sudan, and India. Read more about the project here and see our public dataset for the full analysis covered in the text below.

In 1959, Brazilian writer Jorge Amado wrote a book called “A Morte e a Morte de Quincas Berro d'Água” (“The Two Deaths of Quincas Wateryell”). It tells the story of the presumed first and second deaths of Quincas, a bum who had been a respected civil servant but walked out on his family. After his body is found, his death ignites a dispute over Quincas's memory between his “decent” family and his drunken friends. During the funeral, organized by a secretly relieved family, his friends seem to believe he is still alive and steal his corpse for one last bender out on the town, which only ends with his second death. I know this doesn't seem to have much to do with the debate on platform regulation but bear with me here.

Growing up in Brazil, Amado's books were always good companions, and, being a millennial, so was the internet. As I got older, I decided to pursue a legal career working with human rights online, with the foolish idea that lawyers could help fix the world. For this reason, the debate on Big Tech regulation was always close to my heart. When Brazil, in 2020, started discussing a bill aimed at regulating Big Tech power — Bill 2630/2020 — I followed the discussions closely.

Brazil's political scenario over the last few years has been hectic. In 2018, then-president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was arrested under corruption charges and forbidden from running for a new term, despite leading vote intention polls. Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right former military officer and Congressman for almost three decades, was elected. His management of the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020 led Brazil to register over 700,000 deaths. In 2022, with previous charges overturned, Lula was elected for a third term and faced attacks and a coup attempt a week after his inauguration. Amidst all this, the increasing role and power of social networks in Brazil has become unavoidable.

Bill 2630/2020, sometimes dubbed “Fake News Bill” by Brazilian mainstream media or the “Censorship Bill” by Brazilian right-wing media, emerged as part of this scenario. International news has also compared it to a “Brazilian DSA” (a reference to the EU platform regulation effort, the Digital Services Act). Its real name, “Brazilian Law on Freedom, Responsibility and Transparency on the Internet,” better showcases its aim: to regulate Big Tech here just as much as the Digital Services Act expects to do in Europe.

Internet shutdowns in Sudan allow the bypass of regulations

Digital Rights Lab — Wed, 14 Aug 2024 12:39:19 +0000

That battles over control of telecommunications infrastructure and internet access

Originally published on Global Voices

Image made by Giovana Fleck, used with permission.

Sudan is strategically located at the crossroads between Arabic speaking countries and Sub-Saharan Africa, connecting nations in Eastern and Central Africa to the Red Sea. This vital location has made it a country of interest for major regional and international players. Their deep involvement in Sudanese affairs has led to a state of instability, including incidents that pushed authorities to shut down communications for citizens.

The Sudan uprising in 2018 marked the beginning of an increasing trend of internet shutdowns, especially during political unrest, national exams, and military coups. Authorities have used these shutdowns to restrict several rights, including the right to freedom of expression, access to information, and the right to free assembly.

However, when there is no other option, the authorities bypass their own shutdowns. For example, the authorities in Sudan used Starlink, a satellite internet network, during the internet disruption that occurred in February 2024.

The impact of the Rapid Support Forces on Sudan’s telecommunications and society

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is a paramilitary group established by the ousted president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir in 2013, initially to combat rebel groups. In 2017, the Sudanese parliament passed the RSF law, legalizing their activities, and bringing them under the direct command of the president, rather than the official army, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). In 2015, Human Rights Watch labeled the RSF “men without mercy,” reflecting their human rights violations.

In December 2023, the RSF announced their takeover of the data center operated by Sudatel company, the main internet provider in Sudan. Subsequently, during a widespread shutdown, reports emerged accusing the RSF of being responsible for disabling the data centers of various Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Khartoum. The RSF did not comment on these accusations. However, the Telecommunication and Postal Regulations Authorities (TPRA) Sudan's telecommunication regulator, publicly accused the RSF of being responsible for the telecommunication outage. Corroborating these claims, the former CEO of the Zain Telecommunication company confirmed that the RSF had indeed cut off the power to the data centers.

Our sources confirmed that @RSFSudan forces tookover data centers of ISPs in Khartoum, #Sudan.#KeepItOn pic.twitter.com/150qnemJPL

— Digital Rights Lab – Sudan (@DRLab_Sudan) February 4, 2024

Controlling telecommunications infrastructure might empower the RSF by giving them access to critical data, control over the flow of information, and the ability to wiretap the telecom traffic, in addition to the ability to collect funds from the service operators.

On February 8, 2024, several civil society organizations, including the Hadhreen Initiative, the Sudanese American Physicians Association (SAPA), and the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA Network), issued a joint statement condemning the RSF and holding them accountable for the blackout. Hadhreen and SAPA serve as the medical arms of the Sudanese Revolution, supporting the healthcare needs and daily lives of those injured in the revolution. These organizations have continued to work uninterrupted, even after ousting the old regime, maintaining their original mandates, which underscores their professionalism and neutrality.

The RSF reportedly shut down the telecommunication in protest against the ISP’s failure to solve the ongoing communication issues in Darfur, which have persisted for several months since February 2024. Several reports accused the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) of causing telecommunication blackouts in the Darfur region of western Sudan. Following the investigation, Hadhreen mentioned that SAF leadership has directly ordered the shutdown of communication services in large areas of Darfur and Kordofan since the beginning of the war.

The Keep It On coalition published a statement condemning the shutdown, highlighting the rights violation and possible implications of this action. Moreover, Clementine Nkweta-Salami, the UN’s Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, mentioned that the telecom shutdown impedes critical humanitarian response efforts and restricts access to life-saving information.

Legal-historical perspective

In the past, internet shutdowns were legally justified under several laws, including the Telecommunications and Post Regulating Act (TPRA) of 2018, and the Law on Emergency and Public Safety of 1997. It is important to note that Sudan has ratified key international human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). These agreements uphold the right to receive, impart, and disseminate information. Additionally, the constitutional charter of Sudan in 2019 guarantees internet access.

Before the 2024 shutdowns, the Sudanese authorities invoked such legal acts and laws to justify the telecommunications shutdown. The TPRA used its power over service providers and operators, compelling them to comply with these orders. However, each incident of internet shutdown challenges the contractual agreement between service providers and their clients, as highlighted by a court ruling during the internet shutdown following the military coup in October 2021.

Advocacy for RSF action

One narrative propagated by the RSF advocates is their defense of control of the ISP's data centers in Khartoum. They argued that such actions were justified as a response to injustices by the SAF, particularly pointing to internet shutdowns in the Darfur region, which is largely under RSF control. They also claimed that by controlling the internet, they were highlighting the suffering of people in the Darfur region. Accessing the internet via Starlink costs SDG 2,000 to 3,000, approximately USD 2.5 per hour, which is very expensive compared to the income level of the Sudanese.

Furthermore, it was reported that the RSF offered the Starlink service commercially and imposed a kind of tax in some areas, including Algenina.

SAF reputation-washing

The initiative undertaken by the SAF to provide free internet service via Starlink in the Oumdurman area is viewed as an attempt to improve its public image, which was damaged during the transitional period that preceded the war. During this time, the SAF was responsible for several shutdowns associated with human rights violations and repression of peaceful protestors. However, by providing internet during the war, the SAF aims to garner favor among the citizens, contrasting itself with the RSF, which has been cutting off services and committing acts of violence and horrific violations of human rights in the areas it controls.

This outreach is also intended to signal to the international community that the SAF represents the legitimate interests of the Sudanese state and is the country's official military force with broad popular support. A Facebook post praised the SAF’s solution, and argued that the action showcased how the SAF is a guarantor of Sudanese “welfare.”

Despite the online narrative battles between the SAF and RSF, where each party defends its actions and accuses the other, voices from within the community, such as the former Minister of Telecommunication and Digital Transformation, have criticized the RSF’s approach to shutting down the telecommunication service, which is the exact tactic used during the demonstrations, but now executed by the de facto authority.

Potential impact of ongoing and future shutdowns in Sudan

The narratives surrounding internet shutdowns in Sudan are designed to distort public perception, often using emotional manipulation to justify such actions, potentially influencing the future of internet governance.

Likewise, narratives defending the actions of the RSF may increase the feeling of hatred and anger against the social components of these forces, complicating efforts towards peacemaking. Looking ahead, the future of the internet in Sudan may go through a wide rehabilitation process, especially in terms of regulations and legal aspects. The emergence of out-of-governmental-control services such as Starlink represents a new era that authoritarian regimes need to reckon with. Moreover, the RSF’s actions have prompted ISPs to create new data centers in other cities, which may lead to new policies advocating for decentralized infrastructure to enhance disaster recovery purposes.

These steps are important to maintain business and information flow in the region, especially as Sudan provides its landlocked neighbors like Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Chad with connectivity using its marine cable on the Red Sea. In the post-war context, investors might demand changes to ensure their interests are safeguarded, possibly urging authorities to amend laws and regulations that currently facilitate service closures. This evolving landscape underscores the need for a robust legal framework that balances security concerns with the imperatives of an open and accessible internet.

Controversial hacktivists may have prompted El Salvador’s censorship of Telegram

Abigail Paz — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 06:02:27 +0000

Hackers offer insights in exclusive interview

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Melissa Vida for Global Voices.

The president of El Salvador Nayib Bukele has become the face of technological progress in Central America, despite relentless cyberattacks against Salvadoran public institutions that have resulted in the data of millions of citizens being compromised.

In 2021, Bukele impressed international onlookers by making Bitcoin legal tender in El Salvador and in 2024, he announced Google’s new office in the country, promising to digitize the educational and healthcare sectors. However, there has been no public acknowledgment of over a dozen data breaches against public infrastructure throughout April and June of 2024 alone.

According to researchers, El Salvador continues to fall short of basic cybersecurity compliance standards and regulations, preventing any affected civilians from mitigating the potential risks they face.

In the beginning of April 2024, local media La Prensa Gráfica reported that two new data breaches occurred within a week. The public release of 5.1 million Salvadoran personal identification numbers was the most significant (as it was previously paywalled), potentially impacting 80 percent of the country’s population. The disclosure of high-definition headshots containing biometric data corresponding to each citizen caused concerns about identity theft and fraud. Along with another hack that impacted the Ministry of Transportation, the breach went unacknowledged.

Screenshot of the hack into the Ministry of Transportation, disclosed on breached.in. Fair use.

Yet another hack impacted the Savings and Credit Society, a private financial institution, where over 400 gigabytes of data were obtained by a ransomware group. The Savings and Credit Society published a public statement in response to the attack, confirming that a security incident had occurred but denying that customer data had been compromised.

A similar statement was issued on May 1 when the entirety of the source code of Chivo Wallet, a company developing the official Bitcoin wallet of the government of El Salvador, was leaked. Stacy Herbert, the wife of US broadcaster Max Keiser, who is currently employed as an advisor to President Nayib Bukele, dismissed all reports of the hack. However, by this point, several cryptocurrency news outlets had reported and verified the contents of the breach.

‘We will not stop,’ say hacktivists

The majority of the hacks have been orchestrated by one hacktivist collective, CiberInteligenciaSV. In an exclusive interview between the group’s representative and Global Voices through Telegram, we asked about their motivations and goals.

The hackers say they seek to expose government corruption and challenge state repression. CiberInteligenciaSV, the Salvadoran chapter of the CiberInteligencia collective comprising members from Latin America and Europe, claims that they have been active in the hacker sphere for years. While the group is secretive about their connections, they admitted they are affiliated with several hacktivists, most notably Focaleaks. The group has recently garnered recognition on breachforums for the number of data breaches they produced in a short period of time.

Screenshot of a list of hacks under the official CiberInteligencia profile's threads on breached.in. Fair use.

When asked about the government’s lack of response to cyberattacks, they said, “So far, it has been handled internally and in a cowardly manner,” but regardless of acknowledgement, they recognize that their breaches make the government look incompetent. “They want to maintain their image,” said the group's representative, who asked to remain anonymous.

The ethics of leaking the private data of millions of citizens may be questionable to some, including breachforum members who commented on CiberInteligenciaSV’s leak of medical records. When asked if members of the group ever questioned their actions, they answered, “Does the state ever question itself leaving everyone's information unprotected?”, adding sarcastically, “Sure the state invests in politicians’ salaries and benefits — it's better than people's digital security.”

In previous public statements, the group has expressed a desire to expose the dangers of a modern digital society and the control of information, citing controversial US domestic terrorist and anarchist Ted Kaczynski as a key influence.

Their motivation page states: “We seek to crudely show people the dangers of modern digital society, how a few incompetent people have control over information and use it to control the masses, and how all citizens are guilty of continuing to perpetuate a system of manipulation and control.”

Screenshot of a conversational thread on breached.in about CiberInteligencia's ethics. It mentions Alejandro Muyshondt, a Salvadoran politician who died in custody in February 2024.

A breach of the Ministry of Education’s database caused teachers to urge an investigation on data storage, citing that sensitive data related to underaged children should be a concern. Still, when contacted by La Prensa Gráfica for a statement, the institution did not give a public response.

“We will not stop until the government recognizes their poor infrastructure,” CiberInteligenciaSV said. “Whenever there is a breach or a place we can infiltrate, we will expose it and compromise it.”

On May 2, CiberInteligenciaSV launched a new series of attacks against the government, taking down several government-affiliated news publications such as Diario El Salvador and El Blog. The state immediately responded by altering the security settings on the web security platform Cloudflare, using their Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) protection services.

On the very same day, CiberInteligenciaSV managed to breach El Salvador’s digital citizen services portal through its login page, causing delays to public services for a few days. Public services did not initially respond to the cyberattack and hearsay attributed the downtime to an update involving data records. An official statement was released the following day, denying reports of a cyberattack.

CiberInteligencia’s critics

As the attacks continued throughout May, Carlos Palomo from the Salvadoran non-profit Transparency, Social Oversight, and Open Data Association (TRACODA) urged citizens to file a complaint with the Constitutional Chamber or prosecutor’s office to pressure the government to investigate the data breaches in accordance with the country's Special Law against Computer and Related Crimes.

An editor from the journalistic organization DDoSecrets, Lorax Horne, expressed concern with the ongoing situation due to the amount of compromised data, stating that citizens’ information should be protected and it is ultimately the responsibility of the targeted institutions to secure their infrastructure.

One of CyberInteligencia’s most vocal critics has been Mario Gómez, a software engineer who was arrested in 2021 after criticizing Bitcoin and several of Bukele’s policies. At that time, CiberInteligencia had issued statements calling for Gómez’s release, but in April 2024, Gómez criticized both the tactics and the motives of CiberInteligencia.

In turn, CiberInteligencia responded that they will continue to release data in its entirety, while encouraging researchers and journalists to comb through published leaks. Not even the seizure of BreachForums on May 15 would dissuade CiberInteligenciaSV from their goal; the group simply moved their uploads to various Telegram channels.

Telegram inaccessible after more leaks

Access to Telegram was deliberately restricted by Salvadoran internet service providers (ISPs) in early June, after Nayib Bukele started his second presidential term — a mandate deemed unconstitutional by lawyers and journalists. Salvadoran citizens were trying to access the leaks of a hack into the Supreme Court Justice and Tribunal Ethics Committee and reported not being able to open Telegram through mobile data or Wi-Fi. Instead, they were forced to use Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) or proxies to access it. The Open Observatory of Network Interference’s (OONI) Web Connectivity Test revealed abnormal network activity on June 1.

Internet monitoring non-profit Netblocks later corroborated that access to Telegram was restricted by multiple ISPs in El Salvador. Two of these companies, Movistar and TIGO, were previously impacted by CiberInteligenciaSV’s data breaches.

The head of El Salvador's media association, Angélica Cárcamo, warned that this blocking could lead to censorship, “just like in Russia or China.”

In June, the hacktivist collective continued to leak files. They released various legal documents related to the controversial death of a former security advisor in custody, the secret release of a top rank MS-13 gang leader, and those related to Pegasus spyware, which was previously used to surveil journalists and human rights activists. Later that month, statistics obtained by the group revealed that the National Civil Police had 183 reports of rape from January 1 to March 15 2024, the majority involving children, all of which remain unsolved.

Not only have these revelations raised questions about state corruption, but they have also revealed that the Salvadoran government is incapable of mitigating data breaches or prosecuting hacktivists, even if they wanted to.

Note: This investigation was done under the framework of the Civic Media Observatory at Global Voices.

Editorial fixes: Lorax Horne's name was initially misspelled and erroneously described as an alias.

Bitcoin mining's toll on El Salvador leaves communities without water

Abigail Paz — Fri, 31 May 2024 13:35:54 +0000

Eight thousand people lost access to running water for over a month

Originally published on Global Voices

Image edited by Giovana Fleck, used with permission.

Two years ago, fifteen communities from the Nueva Concepción municipality, located north of El Salvador’s central region, gathered to ask the government to halt the construction of a solar plant along the Gavilán Gorge and Lempa River, concerned that access to drinking water would decline. Neither the mayor nor the city council were informed of the project or its details. The solar plant is only one of many renewable energy projects powering Bitcoin mining in the country. La Geo Power Company began using geothermal energy to mine the cryptocurrency under Bukele’s direction in September 2021, shortly after the controversial Bitcoin Law was approved in June, which made Bitcoin an official form of legal tender across the country.

Bitcoin mining is commonly misunderstood as a practice because of the connotation of physical mining. Bitcoin is the world’s first cryptocurrency. The digital asset is outlined in a white paper published in 2008 under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto. Mining Bitcoin involves running programs to maintain the blockchain ledger in the Bitcoin network. This is essentially a link to every single Bitcoin transaction to date. Because of the decentralized nature of Bitcoin, every person on the network has their own version of the ledger. The chain with the most blocks is deemed the valid blockchain. Miners who complete an entire blockchain on the network are rewarded an amount of the digital asset as an incentive for miners to maintain the network.

Bitcoin mining relies on an enormous amount of computing power, which is generated using a proportionately enormous amount of electricity. Water is used not only to cool computers enabling Bitcoin transactions, but in the energy plants that provide electricity.

In March 2024, for over a month, eight thousand people living in the Santa Teresa Project in San Martín, east of capital city San Salvador, haven’t had access to running water despite their complaints to government-owned services. The National Administration of Aqueducts and Sewers (ANDA) sent nine water pipes to the neighborhood shortly after La Prensa Gráfica, one of the most popular newspapers in El Salvador, published their article covering the situation. Eleven kilometers southwest of the San Martín municipality lies the town of Ilopango, where residents of the Altavista neighborhood reported no drinking water for nearly a week. Both neighborhoods are situated in the San Salvador Province, hosting the nation’s capital, sharing the same name. In spite of several public complaints over the years, ANDA has reported 90 percent drinking water coverage in the district of San Salvador. Salvadorans living without water must rely on foreign aid from relatives, bottled water, private services, or whatever means necessary to survive.

ANDA has previously admitted that there is not enough water to meet the public demand for each household in El Salvador. While several experts agree that there is a water shortage in the country, the water crisis is not a priority for the Bukele administration, which instead passed The Water Resources Law favoring the privatization of water. On top of the existing water pollution stemming from volcanic soils, as in the case of Lake Ilopango, Salvadorans face increasing water scarcity as a result of the resource demands of Bitcoin mining.

The approval of the law was a shock to most Salvadorans unfamiliar with the cryptocurrency, and critics have commented on the involuntary nature of Bitcoin’s implementation. Article 7 of the Bitcoin law explicitly states that economic agents must accept all payment transactions offering Bitcoin as a form of payment when acquiring goods or services. In 2021 less than 40 percent of Salvadorans had any form of banking account, which only raised questions about the possibility of mass adoption. In the fall of 2023, the use of Bitcoin or the government-backed Chivo Wallet continued to decline.

The same year the Bitcoin Law came into effect, residents of several cantons in Berlin, Usulután, protested against the construction of wells for geothermal mining because of water scarcity, a mysterious creamy substance polluting their water, and deforestation caused by good construction. Public complaints were left unheard as activity at the plant continued.

Volcano Energy, a renewable energy and Bitcoin mining company, announced the launch of Lava Pool last fall, which boasts the use of renewable energy to mine the currency. Users of the service can combine computational resources to mine Bitcoin, and Volcano Energy claims that they can potentially offset the overall environmental cost of Bitcoin mining. The company has also listed plans to construct a solar and wind power park, but its location has not yet been disclosed. While El Salvador has several renewable energy projects, most are going directly towards Bitcoin mining, an unsustainable practice because of Bitcoin mining’s resource demands.

Alex de Vries, researcher and founder of the Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index, has stated that more than half a percent of global energy consumption is related to Bitcoin mining. Many cryptocurrency critics and enthusiasts are aware of the power that Bitcoin mining consumes, which is precisely why renewable energy continues to appear alongside Bitcoin mining projects. Even in Iceland, geothermal energy fails to cover the costs of Bitcoin mining.

Water consumption is a lesser-known problem plaguing Bitcoin. It is used for cooling, air humidification, and the generation of thermoelectric power. According to de Vries, Bitcoin miners in the United States consume up to 120 gigalitres of water annually, but the geographic location has a direct impact on how much water will be consumed. Despite having a significant amount of Bitcoin miners compared to the US, Kazakhstan has a larger water footprint due to its climate. This further raises questions about the viability of mining Bitcoin in the tropical climate of El Salvador.

De Vries also commented that using different forms of renewables is not a viable solution, as hydroelectric power has the largest water consumption of all power sources. El Salvador currently utilizes hydroelectricity through The Lempa River Hydroelectric Executive Commission’s (CEL) four plants. The Lempa River Basin, where energy is sourced, experiences rampant pollution and contamination.

Although the Bukele administration celebrates Bitcoin gains and progress in the race for “cultural supremacy,” the stark truth remains seen across several districts struggling for water equity. A survey conducted by the University Institute of Public Opinion (Iudop) of the José Simeón Cañas Central American University (UCA) in 2023 found that 40 percent of Salvadorans receiving water one day a week had access for less than six hours. This year, on World Water Day, Salvadoran organizations protested the General Water Resources Law, the privatization of water, and environmental concerns amid mass deforestation. As El Salvador sets a precedent for crypto investments, neighboring countries such as Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica will begin to experience compounded water stress. Additionally, increasing regulation from global superpowers will only lead to the strategic placement of mining centers in regions with little environmental oversight. Consequently, smaller nations will be forced to shoulder crypto mining’s toll on water equity as increasing literature exposes the industry’s ramifications on US soil.

Editorial note: this story has been amended on July 17, 2024, regarding Alex de Vries, researcher and founder of the Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index, who said that more than half a percent of global energy consumption is related to Bitcoin mining, instead of half of global energy consumption, as previously stated.

The Brazilian and Indian dilemma: How to regulate AI and Big Tech?

Shubhangi Heda — Fri, 31 May 2024 13:08:36 +0000

Both Brazil and India have elections in 2024

Originally published on Global Voices

Image courtesy Giovana Fleck/Global Voices.

As the baton of the G20 presidency passed from India to Brazil in December 2023, digitization has emerged as a focal point for both countries, with Big Tech and Artificial Intelligence at the center stage of conversation and deliberation, both for its benefits and regulations. But, does this enthusiasm for harnessing AI's benefits for their economies and ensuring control over emerging uses of AI overshadow something else?

Brazil and India, as two prominent economies from the global majority and strong BRICS members, are also among the countries holding elections in 2024. India is finalizing its national election process, and Brazil will vote for municipal representatives in October. Both nations exhibit a keen interest in pioneering regulatory frameworks for new technologies, notably AI, which may reflect a desire to inspire other global majority countries.

While the eagerness to regulate new technologies is understandable, it can sometimes result in unintended and adverse consequences. Underdiscussed measures may infringe upon civil rights or fail to resolve the issues they were designed to tackle in the first place. Brazil and India's 2024 electoral processes exemplify this tension, with both countries introducing enforceable norms — though not formal laws — aimed at governing the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in elections.

Brazil: Concerns for freedom of expression

The Brazilian Superior Electoral Court (“Tribunal Superior Eleitoral” or TSE) issued 12 resolutions at the start of March, introducing new electoral rules already applicable to the upcoming 2024 elections. The elections will be held in October, only at a municipal level, to elect mayors and city councilors from over 5,570 cities in the country.

The TSE introduced several provisions concerning AI and the country's platform liability regime in the cases of electoral propaganda. According to the court's official website, notable measures directed at political parties and social media companies include the prohibition of deepfakes, a requirement for disclosure regarding AI use in electoral propaganda, and restrictions on using bots for voter engagement. There is also a provision holding major tech companies liable for not promptly removing during the electoral period content deemed to pose electoral risks — such as disinformation (including deepfakes), hate speech, and anti-democratic content.

Even though the specific rules regarding the use of AI during elections have some positive ramifications, the resolution has raised alarms regarding freedom of expression among Brazilian civil society. It directly challenges the established platform liability regime in Brazilian law, primarily governed by the Marco Civil da Internet (Civil Rights Framework for the Internet), enacted as Law No. 12.965/2014. By the time of its approval, the law was highly valued by important digital civil rights actors worldwide. Under this framework, as a general rule, platforms enjoy intermediary liability, shielding them from responsibility for user-generated content unless they fail to comply with a court order mandating the removal of specific illegal material, as outlined in Article 19.

However, the TSE's new provisions could impose a burden on platforms to monitor and filter user-generated content, directly changing the country's liability regime. Failure to comply could result in legal consequences, which can incentivize platforms to err on the side of caution by overzealously removing potentially legitimate content to avoid liability.

It is not known how TSE defined these rules. Organizations that defend users’ rights in Brazil, such as Coalizão Direitos na Rede (Rights in Network Coalition), suggest that the TSE should discuss the serious consequences of this provision and talk to civil society and experts to find ways to repair the undesirable effects that the new resolution could have on society — such as the massive takedown of legitimate content:

However, this is not the only recent development to cast doubt on the stability of Brazil's liability regime. Challenges to the constitutionality of Article 19 loom large, with the Federal Supreme Court (STF) poised to address the issue in the coming months. Additionally, Congress deliberated for four years on Bill 2630/2020, colloquially dubbed “the Brazilian DSA” (as a reference to the European Digital Services Act), which sought to revamp platform regulation and heighten the responsibilities of major tech players. Even though the bill may seem dead after the events of April 2024, another bill is to be presented soon, and the scenario suggests change is on the way.

India: Addressing political bias in AI regulation

In India, what started as a frenzy over the AI deepfake video of an Indian actor released in November 2023 soon became a burning issue with concerns around the use of AI and deepfakes to spread misinformation during India's election. In fact, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, belonging to the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP), in a public address, lamented deepfakes as an emerging threat that needs to be curbed urgently by developing a global AI regulation. However, the ongoing research by the Data Governance Observatory found that the narrative around the use of AI and deepfakes by anti-national actors and the opposition parties was used to bolster the urgency to regulate the use of AI and deepfakes and depict harms arising from such content.

During the state legislature elections in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu, a deepfake video of a BJP political leader who was then chief minister of Madhya Pradesh was circulated. In the video, the BJP leader was seen lauding the Indian National Congress (INC), the main opposition to the BJP. A prime-time news channel's coverage on “weaponization of AI and deepfakes during elections” highlighted the video of the BJP leader to emphasize that stringent regulations are necessary to regulate the use of AI deepfakes. The news debates used the deepfake video of the BJP leader as an illustration of the malicious use of deepfakes by opposition parties like INC. On the one hand, opposition parties are indirectly targeted for wrongful use of deepfakes. Still, the news coverage, on the other hand, showed the prime minister's positive approach to AI. The news debate, while not directly stating that AI and deepfakes are used by opposition parties, through its juxtaposition of the deepfake video of the BJP leader and the prime minister's positive approach to AI, advances the narrative of deepfakes being used by opposition parties rather than the BJP.

While opposition parties became a token to depict malicious AI use, the agencies and businesses involved in making deepfake videos and platforms hosting deepfake videos were framed as the cause of the problem. The agencies that make AI deepfakes for malicious use and platforms that fail to remove AI misinformation do have liability, but are they the only source and cause of the AI misinformation threat? The political parties who employ these agencies and political leaders who forward misinformation at the time of election should also share the responsibility.

To tackle the issue of AI misinformation, the Indian government issued a deepfake and AI advisory. The deepfake advisory obligates platforms to clearly inform users that posting deepfakes can lead to criminal prosecution under the law. Along with the advisory, the government warned that it will develop stricter regulations soon. After the deepfake advisory, the government also issued two iterations of an AI advisory. In the first draft, the advisory mandated all AI developers and platforms to seek government permission before launching a new AI model in India. This was later changed, and the obligation to obtain permission from the government was removed. Instead, a self-regulatory approach was introduced in which platforms must self-label AI-generated content. The government also intends to bring a proper AI regulation in June–July, which aims to harness AI’s economic potential while also curbing any potential risks and harms.

The analysis from the Data Governance Observatory shows that civil society and business alliances have called the government's approach reactive. They claim that taking down deepfakes and enforcing restrictions is a stop-gap measure that does not adequately consider their impact on innovation and also does not recognize the role of political parties. During elections, political parties are held more accountable, and bodies like the Election Commission of India could pressure them to ensure more transparency around deepfakes. Civil society actors claim that, while deepfakes and AI are just another tool to spread misinformation, the larger problem of tackling a weak media system and polarized atmosphere looms large for India. So even when the government issues advisories to tech platforms to take down deepfakes, the lack of clear consultations around the capacity of tech platforms to address the issue of deepfakes, and the role of bodies like the Election Commission of India makes the advisories a band-aid solution.

While, within the country, the regulation of AI and deepfakes remains messy and lacks appropriate consultation, at international forums like the G20, the government has presented itself as a protector of its citizens and a pioneer amongst the global majority of countries for inclusive and transparent digitization with a well-thought-out approach towards regulation. While this gives India accolades at international forums, the fact remains that the existing approach lacks effective and transparent policy consultation that can address political bias and clarify the role of political parties in dealing with AI use during elections.

What are the next steps?

As the international community focuses on Brazil and India as centers of technological innovation, the half-baked AI and liability regulations carry forward issues of free speech, reinforce pre-existing political bias, and lack appropriate consultation. In India, the media ecosystem has been increasingly polarized, and, with the current government, dissent and debate on regulations have diminished, which is happening now with AI regulations. Unless there is appropriate consultation with stakeholders and inclusion of stakeholder perspectives, the AI regulations may not be efficient. On the other hand, Brazil, even though it's under a left-leaning government, is also facing great political polarization, with the digital agenda — especially around platform and AI regulation — being one of the critical points in the discussion. Thus, issues around AI regulations are specifically problematic for both countries as, while India is already in the election phase, and Brazil will soon go into elections, a politically charged atmosphere will only increase the severity of these concerns.

Amid the lack of consultation, narratives around electoral regulations in the digital realm only give a partial picture of the concerns posed by AI and Big Tech; however, they hold the power to influence the general public and perception of the international community as they look towards India and Brazil as front runners in the new tech regulation race.

The efforts of global majority nations to create their own solutions appropriate to their realities without drawing solely on European and US approaches are positive and deserve praise. However, this cannot be done at the expense of the fundamental rights of the people of these countries. Although these regulations are urgent and necessary, it is equally important that they rightly tackle the problems they intend to solve. Hastily made rules can create new problems and further complicate the already complex politically divided scenario in these countries.

Lion or mosquito: The state of the AI debate in Turkey

Sencer Odabaşı — Fri, 31 May 2024 13:07:45 +0000

AI's real impact is subtler than its political implications.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image courtesy of Giovana Fleck/Global Voices.

The discourse around AI entered Turkey with the naivete attached to most innovations in the contemporary age, just like anywhere else in the world. Could AI drive our cars? Will robots speak to us? Can AI cure cancer? Will all social problems be resolved in seconds now that we have the perfect incorruptible and unbiased technocrat? In short, any existing problem was viewed in the framework of AI. The possibilities seemed endless! AI: the king of the jungle, the mighty lion, will get rid of the flawed pretenders and save us with its perfection.

But, while elsewhere around the world discussions around AI are widespread and accessible, in Turkey this has not been the case. Not yet anyway. Although an abundance of AI experts exist, their interaction with the public at large is rare. This has created a very broad understanding of what AI is: in most people's minds, it is machine learning and associated technologies. As such, there is a profound lack of overall knowledge about the technology, including its limits or growing concerns around its broader impact. The use-cases of AI elsewhere already indicate that all the noise around this technology is far from the lion's mighty roar and more like the annoying buzz of a mosquito.

Less than 40 years have passed since the triumph of neoliberalism, which declared the end of grand narratives, the end of politics, and the end of history. Today, these statements are seen as even more ridiculous than they were decades ago, as history manifests itself clearly and violently in every possible instance. Still, the idea of depoliticized and enlightened despotism by an unbiased and incorruptible technocracy survives in many geographies, including Turkey. Perhaps this search for incorruptible rules isn’t shocking, considering that Turkey ranks 115 out of 180 countries on Transparency International's corruption perception index. In comes the king of the jungle, our AI overlord, to solve any controversial problem with the certainty only a sci-fi android can have.

The use of AI in elections and political blackmail

So where and how is AI being utilized when it comes to Turkey? Most recently, AI “magic” was used during the latest municipal elections. While answering questions about the list of controversial candidates ahead of the local election, the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Özgür Özel, pointed towards AI as the culprit — apparently the party leadership relied on this technology before announcing the party candidates. Meanwhile, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s mayoral candidate for Istanbul, Murat Kurum, vowed to solve the mega city’s zombie traffic problem using AI. Making a good guess about a candidate’s chance to win and then balancing that with a party’s values is a difficult task. So is declaring one’s stance on car-centric infrastructure and the state of public transport as a candidate for the municipality of a megacity. Any decision made will mean a political sacrifice for the possibilities rejected, unless there is a perfect machine making those decisions, of course. AI for the win-win!

However, as election results indicated, even AI could not help the ruling party in the local elections. The AKP received the lowest percentage of votes in the history of its participation in municipal elections in Istanbul and across the country overall. Neither did AI help the main opposition, the Republican People's Party (CHP). Although the party secured a historic victory (the controversial candidate Özel referred to was picked by AI) , it actually lost to the AKP candidate. Surely, neither of the results is ascribable to AI, even if partially. Yet there is no doubt these examples will be brought up whenever someone mentions AI in a political context again.

Where AI can actually touch people’s lives and make itself felt, the narrative about it is much less incredible than its claimed and/or its hypothetical usage in politics.

In most real-life examples and case studies, we see AI mentioned as something far away from the omnipotent technocrat that can solve complex problems, from local politics to urban infrastructure. These examples and cases illustrate the annoying at best, if not the abusive side of AI technology.

A search of “yapay zeka” (Turkish for artificial intelligence) on any online search engine first lists results celebrating AI, similar to the sentiments shared by politicians. Potential and (sometimes not exactly accurate) actual uses of AI, mostly abroad, are shown through rose-colored glasses. Keep scrolling and another face to the AI debate emerges. Here, we see scores of people complain about AI, describing it as annoying and frustrating. Devoid of empathy and competence, AI technology starts sounding more like the late cultural critic Mark Fisher’s conceptualization of “boring dystopia.”

The dark side of AI tech

Irritating is not the worst AI can be. There is a darker side to it. Even before Taylor Swift's deep fakes alerted the US Congress, we had instances of deepfake methods being used to harass people sexually in Turkey. A young woman alerting the media about a stalker who used deep fakes based on her social media images sparked public discussions. Just before the 2023 general elections, a member of the parliament and the leader of the Turkey Workers’ Party (TİP) Erkan Baş also had AI-generated pornographic photographs of him distributed on Twitter. Since then, those images have been entirely deleted from social media. In both of these examples, it becomes clear that neither relatively unknown people nor public figures are safe from this postmodern sexual harassment method.

Another way deep fake technology is used in Turkey is to mimic voices, as a conman attempted to do with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s voice to demand money from his victims. The mosquito metaphor should be more evident now than it was at the beginning of this article. For a lot of people, AI just buzzes around their heads, annoying and disgusting, threatening to carry old diseases in a more efficient way.

The discourse that exists, of course, follows its actual usage. For example, there is, no honest discussion about the use of AI to recreate public discrimination as was the case in the Netherlands, since AI isn’t used in public services in Turkey yet. As AI keeps growing in use, so will the discourse. However, this growth and debate should be supported by expanded critical discussions by people who actually understand the technology and what it entails — the good, the bad, and the ugly.

In the end, while the technology does have potential uses, the current reality of AI in Turkey is closer to the bothersome mosquito than the majestic lion. A fitting metaphor, considering the lack of expert knowledge in public discourse as well. After all, lions do not actually live in jungles.

Undertones: Myanmar’s E-ID system means progress or surveillance?

Civic Media Observatory — Tue, 12 Mar 2024 15:30:20 +0000

The new system collects biometric and biographic information from residents

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Giovana Fleck, used with permission.

This story is part of Undertones, Global Voices’ Civic Media Observatory‘s newsletter. Subscribe to Undertones here.

In February 2021, the military staged a coup in Myanmar, citing allegations of “electoral fraud” by the National League for Democracy (NLD) party in the 2020 general elections. We've been monitoring the country since and registered the rise in authoritarian narratives and practices from the military. Our researchers have been on the frontlines of understanding Myanmar's media ecosystem and the many shifts in the narratives spread by the military junta.

One of our researchers wanted to dive deeper into the junta's attempt to implement an electronic biometric identification system, and how that would worsen the country’s human rights situation. The result is the story you can read below, written by our researcher based in Myanmar, whose identity will be kept private for security reasons.

Progress or surveillance?

One midnight, as I was drifting into sleep in a small town in Myanmar, a loud noise banged on my door, startling me awake. With a touch of worry, I opened the door to find the ward administrator, police, and a few soldiers inspecting citizenship ID cards and searching for unregistered guests. It seemed they had received information from informants about unregistered guests suspected of belonging to an opposition anti-coup movement. The following morning, I discovered that my neighbor, the head of the household, had been beaten and taken away for hosting overnight guests without informing the authorities.

Since the coup on 1st February 2021, citizenship ID card inspections by Myanmar's military regime authorities have become commonplace on roads, at checkpoints, and during nighttime house inspections. Citizenship ID cards play a vital role for Myanmar people in daily life; facilitating travel, accessing public services, opening a bank account, making banking transfers, purchasing a SIM card, or applying for a passport. Without civil documents, it's nearly impossible to live a normal life in Myanmar, as access to various services is restricted.

However, citizenship ID cards have been controversial, with different types (CSC, ACSC, NCSC, NRC, FRC, and the latest NVC) given in accordance with discriminatory citizenship laws. Certain ethnic and religious minority groups, especially Muslims, Indians, and Chinese, face restrictions from obtaining full citizenship cards (CSC), limiting their access to rights and services. The Rohingya's plight is particularly devastating, resulting in statelessness and the forced displacement of millions of Rohingya refugees.

The military junta is now attempting to implement an electronic identity card (e-ID) scheme in Myanmar, collecting biometric and biographic information from residents. While the e-ID system is not a new initiative, having been started by U Thein Sein’s USDP administration (2012-2015) and Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD administration (2016-2020), its potentially destructive effects on the population were warned by human rights defenders and activists in the past. The issuance of a smart ID card would be based on the discriminatory 1982 citizenship law and its procedure. Despite public criticism, the previous government appeared cautious in implementing the e-ID system. To develop the structure, financial and technical support was received from foreign Western governments. However, in the post-coup context from 2021, the military junta aggressively resumed the e-ID system, raising serious concerns about its motives amid escalating human rights violations and increased surveillance of citizens and dissidents posing a threat to their power.

In the context of the polarization between anti-Junta resistance groups fighting for the return of democracy and pro-military lobbyists who believe in the military’s fundamental role, two opposing narratives have emerged regarding the e-ID system's implementation in Myanmar.

Pro-military Narrative: “Myanmar's new e-ID system will improve public life”

Pro-military individuals claim that the current national identity cards in Myanmar are outdated and require serious upgrading to catch up with neighboring countries. According to the Ministry of Immigration and Population under the military regime administration, the e-ID system is a precursor to the issuance of a smart ID card in the future. Junta states that the e-ID system is not concerned with being a citizen in the country; all legal residents in Myanmar will be included. A unique 10-digit ID number will be given to all legal residents providing biographic and biometric information to the immigration ministry. Building upon this e-ID system, smart cards will be issued to Myanmar citizens at a later stage in accordance with citizenship laws through a strict verification and scrutiny process, ensuring eligibility for future smart cards. The e-ID system is part of the larger e-governance system being built by the government, with infrastructures such as the human resource database, Business database, and asset database.

Adopting an e-ID scheme, complete with a unique ID number for each person, would offer advantages by enabling authorities to retrieve information promptly and provide enhanced public welfare services.

Using the unique number, people will be able to apply for a driving license, use mobile banking services, make bank transfers, purchase SIM cards, and access education and healthcare services.

The military also claims that the November 2020 elections were full of fraud and irregularities, resulting in the military takeover of power to reestablish order. They assert that about 5 million voters did not have a citizenship ID card but voted, questioning the legitimacy of the elections. Initially, the military regime pledged to conduct the national election in August 2023 after the coup but later opted to delay it until 2025, citing the necessity for additional time for systematic preparation and the requirement for security arrangements due to ongoing conflicts in certain regions of the country. Planning another election in 2025, the de facto regime is putting efforts into issuing citizenship ID cards to citizens under the Pan Khin project, linking it with the implementation of the e-ID project. This project aims to reissue paper-based citizenship cards with smart citizenship ID cards in the future. By issuing more citizenship ID cards and implementing the e-ID system, the military aims to ensure the legitimacy of future elections and prevent illegitimate voters. Protection of race and religion remains a priority, aiming to eliminate ‘illegal’ immigrants from voting and protect the Burmese Buddhist nation. The military disseminates these messages to newly recruited civil servants, emphasizing their pivotal roles in the e-ID system's implementation and the protection of race and religion.

After the military took over power, declared terrorist groups like the National Unity Government (NUG), Committee Representing Phyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), and People Defence Forces (PDF) have caused political instability, armed conflicts, and violence across the country. Implementing the e-ID system, the military government asserts, will provide better protection, peace, and stability by helping identify individuals who may pose harm to the nation.

Counter Narrative: Myanmar's junta will use new citizenship cards as a tool to suppress resistance

In contrast, anti-coup activists and human rights defenders criticize the military regime's pursuit of the e-ID scheme, portraying it as a calculated strategy to surveil dissidents, members of armed resistance groups, journalists, and individuals deemed threatening to military rule. Following the coup, the military's digital surveillance efforts have intensified, encompassing measures such as internet shutdowns, monitoring of social media, the prohibition of opposition news media sites, and the installation of surveillance CCTV cameras in cities under the ambitious ‘smart city’ project.

Since 2021, with assistance from China, the military has been strategically placing CCTV cameras equipped with artificial intelligence systems across the country. These systems can scan and interpret individuals’ faces and license plates, promptly alerting the authorities. Digital activists have condemned the military regime for exploiting these CCTV cameras to locate dissidents, resulting in numerous arrests, detentions, imprisonments, and even executions in Myanmar.

News sources have reported that officials from the Ministry of Immigration, under the military regime, visited China in September 2023 to learn about China’s e-ID system and collaborate for the implementation of the e-ID system and organizing elections. Similar visits to India in July 2023 to explore the Aadhaar e-ID system have fueled concerns among digital activists and human rights defenders. These interactions suggest regional support for the military regime's measures, heightening safety and security concerns for democratic activists and opposition members, given the e-ID system's potential to facilitate easier tracking by the military regime.

Additionally, the e-ID system is poised to exclude a substantial portion of the population due to active conflicts in many regions, hindering military access. Ethnic areas and frontier regions, currently witnessing escalating armed skirmishes, pose challenges for implementation. Residents in these conflict-ridden areas already face discrimination based on their residency location and status on their existing ID cards, and the e-ID system is anticipated to exacerbate these pre-existing challenges. Furthermore, the e-ID system will be built upon the existing discriminatory 1982 citizenship laws that barred the Rohingya ethnic group from becoming citizens. Despite ongoing negotiations for the repatriation of displaced Rohingya from Bangladesh to Myanmar, the Rohingya steadfastly refuse to return without a guarantee of full citizenship. In light of these considerations, the implementation of the e-ID system appears poised to inflict further disastrous consequences on certain ethnic and religious minority groups, perpetuating a cycle of exclusion and marginalization.

In the midst of political polarization between anti-junta and pro-military factions, the implementation of the e-ID system in Myanmar remains a contentious issue with far-reaching implications for the rights and freedoms of its citizens. On the surface, the implementation of the e-ID scheme may appear as progress or a positive step. However, considering the timing of this e-ID implementation, the motives of the military regime are highly questionable, as it appears to lean toward establishing a surveillance state.

See the full dataset of the analysis

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Undertones: A dictionary to understand the war in Gaza

Civic Media Observatory — Tue, 05 Mar 2024 14:51:29 +0000

How linguistic warfare manipulates narratives in the ongoing Gaza conflict

Originally published on Global Voices

Image provided by Canva, and edited with permission by Global Voices.

This story is part of Undertones, Global Voices’ Civic Media Observatory‘s newsletter. Subscribe to Undertones.

Welcome back to Undertones, where we study narratives from around the world. Since the end of 2023, the Civic Media Observatory has started a new project focusing on data governance. But we still have some important stories from our Community Observatory to share. One of them comes from our researcher from Gaza, who's now living abroad but has helped us make sense of the conflict since it started. In December, we published an analysis of critical narratives coming from Israel.

This time, our researcher Haneen Abo Soad and Global Voices’ Middle East and North Africa Editor Mariam A., joined forces to write this piece about finding the right words to describe the conflict that started inside our process within the Observatory.

Decoding language in the ongoing Gaza genocide

In the intricate threads of history, we’ve seen how language has long played a strategic role, especially in the shadows of colonization. Those in power skillfully suppressed native languages to quell resistance. This tactic hasn’t lost its edge; it is alive and well today as contemporary powers manipulate language to “manufacture consent,” justifying oppressive actions and rallying public support.

In the ongoing struggle of our people in Palestine, the dance of words takes center stage. Israel and its supporters wield language, crafting a narrative that strips us Palestinians of our humanity, portraying our resistance as illegitimate, and branding it as either antisemitism or terrorism. Isabella Hammad and Sahar Huneidi, two Palestinian historians, cast light on Israel’s ploy, labeling all our resistance, even peaceful actions like economic boycotts, as terrorism. This characterization extends to the asymmetrical war between Palestinian civilians and the Israeli army, as outlined in a December 21, 2023, article in The Nation.

For us Palestinians, this manipulation of language is not a distant debate, but our daily reality intensified during the current war on Gaza. Israel and its allies wage a multi-layered war, distorting our native words, redefining them, and globally banning them, all to stifle our resistance.

In this tangled linguistic war, Israel and its allies deny the ongoing genocide in Gaza despite the graphic evidence circulating on social media for the whole world to witness.

We selected a few calculated terms used by global media with the aim of shedding light on our perspective. With 75 years marked by ethnic cleansing, 56 years of military occupation, and 17 years of siege on Gaza, we find our people ensnared in an ongoing genocide. The toll is unbearable: more than 30,000 people killed, 70,000 injured, and many more trapped beneath the rubble.

Yet, as we watch our children dying daily of bombs, starvation, and thirst, the global conversation fixates on semantic debates, diverting attention from the urgent realities unfolding on the ground.

Evacuation and Nakbah (‘نكبة’ Catastrophe’)

“Don't take all the stuff, Um Ahmed. Just grab the essentials. Come on, my dear, walk ahead of me. It's just two days, and we'll be back.” — Palestinian author Waleed Saif from the series Palestinian Nakbah.

These words resonate with every Palestinian family in the diaspora and in the refugee camps. Echoed by grandparents and parents, they linger in the air, and yet, here we are, 76 years later, and those two days have not yet found their end.

This is the very reason the term “evacuation” carries the weight of 75 years of displacement and the enduring struggle of millions of Palestinians worldwide. This weight became palpable and pushed itself into our global consciousness on October 13 when Israel ordered 1.1 million people in northern Gaza and 22 hospitals to leave before a ground offensive on besieged Gaza. This directive, condemned by the World Health Organization (WHO) as “a death sentence for the sick and injured” and labeled a potential “war crime” by Amnesty International, carried an immense weight of consequences.

The term “evacuation” typically means moving individuals from danger to safety. In Gaza, some were compelled to comply with the evacuation order, while others refused, recognizing the harsh reality that there is no safe place in Gaza, a truth underscored over the last 145+ days.

هذه الصورة التقطت اليوم في خان يونس.

واحدة من أكثر الصور قسوة على الإطلاق ، كيف لصورة واحدة أن تكون مُحملة بكل هذا البؤس !!! pic.twitter.com/C5Gpbw7pgK

— MO (@Abu_Salah9) January 26, 2024

This picture was taken today in Khan Yunis.

One of the most cruel pictures ever, how can one picture be so loaded with all this misery!!!

For Palestinians, “evacuation” resurfaces haunting memories of the Nakbah (Arabic for “catastrophe”) in 1948 — a traumatic event that violently displaced 700,000 of our kin from their homes and native lands to pave the way for the creation of Israel. This involved the destruction of our society, culture, identity, political rights, and national aspirations. Since then, we have been denied the right to return home, and for more than seven decades, we have been tirelessly fighting for that right. The resonance of the term extends to the ongoing persecution of Palestinians in the West Bank.

For Gazans, “evacuation” transforms into a chilling echo of history, thrusting them into forced displacement, this time to the Sinai Desert — with no prospects of returning home under the guise of evacuation.

Hostages and Prisoners (سجناء ‘sojanaa’)

“If the prisoner is beaten, it is an arrogant expression of fear.” — Ghassan Kanafani

It’s noteworthy that the terms “hostages” and “prisoners” are used to describe both Palestinian and Israeli captives, carrying different connotations. The aftermath of Hamas’s attack on Israeli settlements, killing 1,139 and capturing 250 individuals, led to a focus on the Israeli “hostages.”

This unfolded as Israel declared war on 2.4 million Palestinians trapped in Gaza, using dehumanizing rhetoric by labeling them “human animals.”

The hostage situation prompted a deal between Israel and Hamas, resulting in a temporary ceasefire and the release of 84 Israeli and 240 Palestinian captives. The ceasefire lasted a week.

Despite being labeled differently, the deal compelled the world to acknowledge the presence of 7,200 Palestinian individuals, including men, women, and children in Israeli prisons.

According to Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem, as of November 2023, 4,764 Palestinians were held on “security” grounds, with the majority never having been convicted of a crime. Human Rights Watch reported 2,000 in administrative detention, where the Israeli military detains a person without a trial, presuming they might commit an offense in the future.

Associated Press notes that “over 750,000 Palestinians have passed through Israeli prisons since Israel captured the West Bank, Gaza, and east Jerusalem in 1967,” including children.

Since the second Intifada in 2000, Israeli military authorities have detained, interrogated, prosecuted, and imprisoned around 13,000 Palestinian children, with 86 percent not being informed of the reason for their arrest, as reported by Defense for Children International – Palestine. It is estimated that around 460 children have been detained in the last five months alone.

These are the Palestinian “prisoners” being exchanged for Israeli hostages. They are also children. Children who were stolen from their homes. Children who just want to hug their mothers. These are the boys who the media won’t even afford the dignity of being called children. https://t.co/kdBnDuaZzK

— Yumna (@yumna_patel) November 24, 2023

Furthermore, the conditions within the prisons, the torture, and the degrading treatment of the detainees are highly dehumanizing, constituting a violation of international laws.

On February 1, 2022, Amnesty International issued a report urging accountability for Israel’s crime of apartheid against Palestinians. In this system, the Israeli government has instituted a two-tiered legal and political structure that affords rights to Jewish Israeli settlers while subjecting Palestinians to military rule and control, stripping them of basic rights under international law.

The 2.4 million people in Gaza and the 7,200 Palestinians held in Israeli prisons are, unequivocally, hostages just like the 250 Israelis, and they deserve the same attention.

Turning a blind eye to their plight reveals global double standards. Regardless of which term the world chooses to call them, it is crucial to recognize the fundamental truth that no civilian should be subjected to captivity or utilized as a bargaining chip, irrespective of which side they find themselves on.

Collateral damage and Palestinian shuhada (‘شهداء’)

“And if they ask you about Gaza, tell them that it has a shaheed, a shaheed helps him, a shaheed takes pictures of him, a shaheed bids him farewell, and a shaheed prays over him.” — Mahmoud Darwish, Palestinian poet and author

In the poignant words of Mahmoud Darwish, Gaza is painted with the presence of the “shaheed” (plural, shuhada) — not just martyrs, but witnesses to the profound injustices endured. Often mistranslated, misunderstood, and misused by Western audiences, “shaheed” is commonly translated to mean “martyr,” despite its literal meaning in Qur'anic Arabic being “witness.” It appears 35 times in the Qur'an, primarily as “witness” and only once as “martyr.” The term holds a deeper significance as witnesses who stand before God to attest to the crimes committed against them.

In the Palestinian context, the term encompasses individuals and communities killed by the violence imposed by Israel during the 75 years of occupation. It includes a diverse spectrum, such as resistance fighters, but also grandparents, parents, sons, daughters, siblings, cousins, family members, friends, civil society workers, doctors, teachers, journalists, children, and all innocent civilians impacted by the injustice, irrespective of their religion.

People who were loved, who had lives, dreams, and hopes.

These people are typically dismissed as “collateral damage” by Israel and its allies. This term is grounded in the principle that weighs whether the military advantage achieved from a particular target is “proportionate” or justifies the potential loss of civilian lives.

A recent investigation by the Guardian and the Israeli publication 972+ Magazine has exposed the Israeli army’s use of artificial intelligence (AI) during the latest war on Gaza. Operating through a platform known as “the Gospel,” this AI technology identifies additional potential targets, resulting in expanded authorization for bombing non-military sites. The report reveals a relaxation of constraints regarding expected civilian casualties. According to +972 magazine, the Israeli army maintains files on potential Gazan targets, pre-determining the projected number of civilians likely to be killed in each attack. “This number is calculated and known in advance to the army’s intelligence units, who also know shortly before carrying out an attack roughly how many civilians are certain to be killed.”

The attack near the Jabalia refugee camp, however, has raised concerns about proportionality, with accusations of war crimes and calls for greater efforts to protect civilians.

This linguistic choice challenges terms like “collateral damage” and underscores the importance of each “shaheed,” portraying lives lost as witnesses rather than casualties, emphasizing the profound impact of every human being affected by the ongoing genocide.

In conclusion, the power of language in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be overstated. Understanding the impact of language is crucial for a nuanced perspective and to acknowledge the ongoing struggle for justice amid the complex realities on the ground. The battle extends beyond the physical realm to the words we choose, emphasizing the profound consequences of linguistic choices in the quest for a just and balanced narrative.

Global Voices special coverage: “Israel's war on Gaza”

We encourage you to explore our coverage: “Israel's war on Gaza.”

Examples of stories in our coverage:

Global Voices’ statements about the war

Global Voices joined 140+ civil society organizations and activists in calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and Israel. Read the statement.
Global Voices stood alongside 29 human rights organizations expressing deep concerns regarding the systematic targeting of Palestinian journalists by Israeli forces in Gaza. Read the statement.

See the full dataset of the analysis

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Cyberbullying hinders women’s participation in Indonesia’s 2024 elections

Juliana Harsianti — Sat, 30 Dec 2023 14:37:00 +0000

Civic Media Observatory research shows how conservative narratives try to silence women online.

Originally published on Global Voices

Source: Flickr account of UN Women Asia and the Pacific. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 DEED" width="800" height="450" srcset="https://globalvoices.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/52565884922_b1131a5afa_k-800x450.jpg 800w, https://globalvoices.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/52565884922_b1131a5afa_k-1200x675.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px" />

A music and art festival gathered young Indonesians who support the campaign against gender-based violence. Photo by UN Women/Putra Djohan. Source: Flickr account of UN Women Asia and the Pacific. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 DEED

This story is part of the Civic Media Observatory, where researchers investigate narratives in media ecosystems with a specific methodology. Learn more here.

Online bullying of women and girls in Indonesia skyrocketed during the COVID-19 pandemic, and this disturbing trend has continued and even intensified ahead of the February 14, 2024 elections.

Cyberbullying makes women more reluctant to participate online which exacerbates the gender digital divide. According to research conducted by the Alliance for Affordable Internet, women are more often the targets of cyberbullying than men.

The 2024 Indonesian election campaigns are intensifying cyberbullying. The wide reach of social media means that it is used as a campaign medium by parliamentary and presidential candidates. Each candidate has a special team handling campaigns online, whom digital rights activists and scholars call “cyber-troops”.

The activity of these online mercenaries are quite alarming, because they also organize cyber-wars among candidate supporters, as well as disseminate misleading information. And they particularly bully women.

Narrative 1 : “Cyberbullying is major obstacle to women’s full participation in society”

To build a safer environment in the digital world for Indonesia's women, some civil society organizations, activists, and artists have joined forces to fight cyberbullying in Indonesia through several campaigns. They are the ones promoting this narrative, alongside the women directly concerned.

Women and girls still face difficulty being active in the digital world. Online bullying makes them step back and be less active on the internet. Cyberbullying is a serious issue because it not only makes women less involved in the virtual world but also brings severe consequences in real life, e.g., feeling ashamed and threatened.

On top of that, women who become victims of cyberbullying find it hard to file reports with law enforcement. Most of them claim to have experienced victim-blaming, with police officers more focused on finding the victim's fault rather than on the perpetrators.

According to research, the current Indonesian legal framework is insufficient to protect victims. Other research was done by AwasKBGO, a civil society organization that analyzed the current regulations and practices aimed at addressing gender-based harassment.

Feminists and researchers argue that the patriarchal culture makes online bullying even worse. Women are still treated as second-class citizens, and this is showcased when women are more aggressively targeted when they speak up online.

How this narrative moves online

Indira Tendi is a wildlife biologist. She tweets that there are many “crazy” people on X, as she was threatened just because she shared her knowledge on somebody's thread.

Verbal abuse is a common form of cyberbullying in Indonesia (we expanded the technical definition of verbal abuse to include harassment on social media). Some verbal abuses are very harming psychologically, e.g., “You're better dead” or “Just disappear from the earth.”

Tendi said somebody tweeted to her: “You'd better drink poison” when she was explaining how birds build their nests, her domain of expertise.

This item got positive score of +1 out +3 on our Civic Scorecard because she pushed back against the verbal abuse she got.

See the full media analysis here
Related narrative : “Indonesia's authorities don't care about women safety online”

Narrative 2: “Politics is no place for women”

This narrative is mostly promoted by anonymous bots and conservative influential public figures, mostly from religious communities.

Patriarchal culture and religion have a strong influence on Indonesia's public life, and this is reflected in the pervasive belief that women should be confined to the domestic sphere. When women are criticized for participating in the political process, they often end up leaving politics.

In 2003, the Indonesian government decided to allocate a 30 percent quota in parliament for women. The quota was supposed to be a game changer for Indonesian women's representation in national politics. But in reality, women's representation in parliament is only at 24 percent. Among the reasons for this is the absence of organized training for women candidates and the irrational distrust of women's capabilities.

Online attacks ramp up during elections which now also involve cyber troops running campaigns in the digital world and targeting women. Women of all stripes are concerned: those running for elections, but also those actively involved in a campaign or trying to raise awareness on human rights issues.

Still, on a day-to-day basis, women in politics face persistent challenges from influential religious and political figures who question their political work. As the general election approaches, they must also endure cyber-attacks orchestrated by online factions, adding another layer of adversity to their already demanding roles.

How this narrative moves online

In this tweet, a bot account asserts that Veronica Koman, a human rights defender, does not deserve respect because she tweeted that people who defend Palestinians forget about the West Papuan people who have been repressed by the Indonesian government.

Veronica Koman is a lawyer and human rights defender living under self-imposed exile in Australia and who works with the people of West Papua. She spoke several times at the UN Human Rights Council to defend West Papuans, an advocacy for which she faced reprisals.

She has been accused by the Indonesian government of spreading unrest, and has faced a massive attack on her social media by government-related cyber troops, especially on X. She usually fights back, with strong comments that are often intentionally twisted and misconstrued by her opponents.

Koman's tweet, embedded here, says: “Watermelon watermelon, but you're allergic to the morning star.” The watermelon is a symbol used to represent Palestine, whereas the Morning Star represents West Papua. These symbols aim to avoid censorship.

This item got a negative score of -1 out of -3 on Our Civic Scorecard because this kind of comment was an example of attempts by cyber troops to silence women who work on political and human rights issues.

See the full media analysis here

Glimmers of hope

A glimmer of hope emerged with the 2022 approval of the bill addressing sexual violence and the revision of the Law on Information and Electronic Transactions. These laws were designed to regulate cyberbullying against women.

However, advocates claim that it is crucial to closely monitor their implementation, as they are susceptible to misuse by malicious individuals and authorities to criminalize the work of human rights defenders and attack victims of gender-based violence.

Also in 2022, Indonesian women in parliament signed a declaration to end the violence against women in politics. They were supported by UN Women and civil society organizations. On that occasion, Puan Maharani, the first Speaker of the House of Representatives in Indonesia, said:

From gendered double standards to sexual harassment, the unique obstacles faced by women running for offices need to be brought into sharp relief. Today, we gather here to convey a clear message: we must act together to break the culture of silence that perpetuates violence against women.

Civic Media Observatory – Global Voices

GV webinar: The ABCs of digital repression in Venezuela

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Undertones: Myanmar’s E-ID system means progress or surveillance?

Progress or surveillance?

Pro-military Narrative: “Myanmar's new e-ID system will improve public life”

Counter Narrative: Myanmar's junta will use new citizenship cards as a tool to suppress resistance

Undertones: A dictionary to understand the war in Gaza

Decoding language in the ongoing Gaza genocide

Evacuation and Nakbah (‘نكبة’ Catastrophe’)

Hostages and Prisoners (سجناء ‘sojanaa’)

Collateral damage and Palestinian shuhada (‘شهداء’)

Global Voices special coverage: “Israel's war on Gaza”

Global Voices’ statements about the war

Cyberbullying hinders women’s participation in Indonesia’s 2024 elections

Narrative 1 : “Cyberbullying is major obstacle to women’s full participation in society”

Narrative 2: “Politics is no place for women”

Glimmers of hope