Image made by Giovana Fleck, used with permission.

This story is part of Data Narratives, a Civic Media Observatory project that aims to identify and understand the discourse on data used for governance, control, and policy in El Salvador, Brazil, Turkey, Sudan, and India. Read more about the project here and see our public dataset for the full analysis covered in the text below.

Sudan is strategically located at the crossroads between Arabic speaking countries and Sub-Saharan Africa, connecting nations in Eastern and Central Africa to the Red Sea. This vital location has made it a country of interest for major regional and international players. Their deep involvement in Sudanese affairs has led to a state of instability, including incidents that pushed authorities to shut down communications for citizens.

The Sudan uprising in 2018 marked the beginning of an increasing trend of internet shutdowns, especially during political unrest, national exams, and military coups. Authorities have used these shutdowns to restrict several rights, including the right to freedom of expression, access to information, and the right to free assembly.

However, when there is no other option, the authorities bypass their own shutdowns. For example, the authorities in Sudan used Starlink, a satellite internet network, during the internet disruption that occurred in February 2024.

The impact of the Rapid Support Forces on Sudan’s telecommunications and society

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is a paramilitary group established by the ousted president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir in 2013, initially to combat rebel groups. In 2017, the Sudanese parliament passed the RSF law, legalizing their activities, and bringing them under the direct command of the president, rather than the official army, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). In 2015, Human Rights Watch labeled the RSF “men without mercy,” reflecting their human rights violations.

In December 2023, the RSF announced their takeover of the data center operated by Sudatel company, the main internet provider in Sudan. Subsequently, during a widespread shutdown, reports emerged accusing the RSF of being responsible for disabling the data centers of various Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Khartoum. The RSF did not comment on these accusations. However, the Telecommunication and Postal Regulations Authorities (TPRA) Sudan's telecommunication regulator, publicly accused the RSF of being responsible for the telecommunication outage. Corroborating these claims, the former CEO of the Zain Telecommunication company confirmed that the RSF had indeed cut off the power to the data centers.

Our sources confirmed that @RSFSudan forces tookover data centers of ISPs in Khartoum, #Sudan.#KeepItOn pic.twitter.com/150qnemJPL

— Digital Rights Lab – Sudan (@DRLab_Sudan) February 4, 2024

Controlling telecommunications infrastructure might empower the RSF by giving them access to critical data, control over the flow of information, and the ability to wiretap the telecom traffic, in addition to the ability to collect funds from the service operators.

On February 8, 2024, several civil society organizations, including the Hadhreen Initiative, the Sudanese American Physicians Association (SAPA), and the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA Network), issued a joint statement condemning the RSF and holding them accountable for the blackout. Hadhreen and SAPA serve as the medical arms of the Sudanese Revolution, supporting the healthcare needs and daily lives of those injured in the revolution. These organizations have continued to work uninterrupted, even after ousting the old regime, maintaining their original mandates, which underscores their professionalism and neutrality.

The RSF reportedly shut down the telecommunication in protest against the ISP’s failure to solve the ongoing communication issues in Darfur, which have persisted for several months since February 2024. Several reports accused the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) of causing telecommunication blackouts in the Darfur region of western Sudan. Following the investigation, Hadhreen mentioned that SAF leadership has directly ordered the shutdown of communication services in large areas of Darfur and Kordofan since the beginning of the war.

The Keep It On coalition published a statement condemning the shutdown, highlighting the rights violation and possible implications of this action. Moreover, Clementine Nkweta-Salami, the UN’s Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, mentioned that the telecom shutdown impedes critical humanitarian response efforts and restricts access to life-saving information.

Legal-historical perspective

In the past, internet shutdowns were legally justified under several laws, including the Telecommunications and Post Regulating Act (TPRA) of 2018, and the Law on Emergency and Public Safety of 1997. It is important to note that Sudan has ratified key international human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). These agreements uphold the right to receive, impart, and disseminate information. Additionally, the constitutional charter of Sudan in 2019 guarantees internet access.

Before the 2024 shutdowns, the Sudanese authorities invoked such legal acts and laws to justify the telecommunications shutdown. The TPRA used its power over service providers and operators, compelling them to comply with these orders. However, each incident of internet shutdown challenges the contractual agreement between service providers and their clients, as highlighted by a court ruling during the internet shutdown following the military coup in October 2021.

Read more: In Sudan, the court stands on the side of unrestricted access to the internet

Late in 2023, the TPRA banned the import of satellite internet devices without its explicit permission. This decision came after reports of Starlink being used in the areas affected by telecommunication blackouts in the Darfur region.

Despite restrictions on satellite communication in Darfur, the communication shutdown by the RSF prompted the Sudanese government to adopt extraordinary measures. In some areas controlled by the SAF, the government began to provide internet to citizens in the Omdurman area for free via Starlink. This marks the first instance where Sudanese authorities have provided the citizens with communications services that are not under their control.

Starlink, like any satellite service provider, offers coverage that limits the control of governments and regulators. Its wireless connectivity challenges, the physical control of governments. This feature highlights Starlink’s potential as an effective tool to confront internet shutdowns in the future, presenting a promising alternative for maintaining connectivity during events where information flow is restricted.

Advocacy for RSF action

One narrative propagated by the RSF advocates is their defense of control of the ISP's data centers in Khartoum. They argued that such actions were justified as a response to injustices by the SAF, particularly pointing to internet shutdowns in the Darfur region, which is largely under RSF control. They also claimed that by controlling the internet, they were highlighting the suffering of people in the Darfur region. Accessing the internet via Starlink costs SDG 2,000 to 3,000, approximately USD 2.5 per hour, which is very expensive compared to the income level of the Sudanese.

Furthermore, it was reported that the RSF offered the Starlink service commercially and imposed a kind of tax in some areas, including Algenina.

SAF reputation-washing

The initiative undertaken by the SAF to provide free internet service via Starlink in the Oumdurman area is viewed as an attempt to improve its public image, which was damaged during the transitional period that preceded the war. During this time, the SAF was responsible for several shutdowns associated with human rights violations and repression of peaceful protestors. However, by providing internet during the war, the SAF aims to garner favor among the citizens, contrasting itself with the RSF, which has been cutting off services and committing acts of violence and horrific violations of human rights in the areas it controls.

This outreach is also intended to signal to the international community that the SAF represents the legitimate interests of the Sudanese state and is the country's official military force with broad popular support. A Facebook post praised the SAF’s solution, and argued that the action showcased how the SAF is a guarantor of Sudanese “welfare.”

Despite the online narrative battles between the SAF and RSF, where each party defends its actions and accuses the other, voices from within the community, such as the former Minister of Telecommunication and Digital Transformation, have criticized the RSF’s approach to shutting down the telecommunication service, which is the exact tactic used during the demonstrations, but now executed by the de facto authority.

Potential impact of ongoing and future shutdowns in Sudan

The narratives surrounding internet shutdowns in Sudan are designed to distort public perception, often using emotional manipulation to justify such actions, potentially influencing the future of internet governance.

Likewise, narratives defending the actions of the RSF may increase the feeling of hatred and anger against the social components of these forces, complicating efforts towards peacemaking. Looking ahead, the future of the internet in Sudan may go through a wide rehabilitation process, especially in terms of regulations and legal aspects. The emergence of out-of-governmental-control services such as Starlink represents a new era that authoritarian regimes need to reckon with. Moreover, the RSF’s actions have prompted ISPs to create new data centers in other cities, which may lead to new policies advocating for decentralized infrastructure to enhance disaster recovery purposes.

These steps are important to maintain business and information flow in the region, especially as Sudan provides its landlocked neighbors like Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Chad with connectivity using its marine cable on the Red Sea. In the post-war context, investors might demand changes to ensure their interests are safeguarded, possibly urging authorities to amend laws and regulations that currently facilitate service closures. This evolving landscape underscores the need for a robust legal framework that balances security concerns with the imperatives of an open and accessible internet.