Central Asia & Caucasus – Global Voices

Children of the border: Uncovering the crisis of child labor and sexual exploitation at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border

Asfandiyar — Fri, 06 Dec 2024 00:00:26 +0000

The exploitation of children navigating perilous borders is often overshadowed

Originally published on Global Voices

Twelve-year-old Ahmar is working in locomotive workshops to collect automobile parts. Photo by Ramna Saeed. Used with permission.

At Torkham, the bustling Pakistan-Afghanistan border crossing in North-West Pakistan, the air is filled with the constant buzz of trucks and trailers transporting goods and essential supplies across the border. Amidst the bustle, a striking yet unsettling image unfolds of young children darting between big trucks, their petite frames burdened by loads of stuff.

They navigate the perils with remarkable agility, avoiding the moving traffic and the security personnel's ever-watchful gaze. Their presence highlights critical concerns about survival, exploitation, and the dark economic underbelly of this precarious region.

In the border area of Ghazgi, a town in west Afghanistan, children like twelve-year-old Ahmar face similar hardships. Ahmar, along with other young boys, haul scraps of automobiles across the Afghan border to Pakistan, embodying the struggles of a generation burdened by harsh labour and despair.

Dressed in worn-out clothes and a patched-up traditional Pashtun hat, Ahmar contributes to the family income. For the past year, he has been carrying a five-kilogram bag filled with spare automobile parts back and forth between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He explained that his sister waits for him at the border crossing to take goods from a commission agent or a warehouse in Pakistan or Afghanistan and cross the border. When a shipment of automobile scrap arises at the border, she heads toward her home to bag the commercial goods. Sometimes, she spends the entire night by the roadside, waiting for the chance to help her brother by collecting leftover scrap for him. There are also some children whose parents task them with smuggling commercial goods, and they make the perilous journey to the border on their own.

A warehouse supervisor, speaking to the Global Voices team on the condition of anonymity, revealed that an organized mafia colluding with the border administration is involved in sending and receiving goods across the border. He further explained that many of the children involved in these activities do not have adult family members accompanying them. However, some children are brought by their parents, who work at the warehouse, to assist in smuggling goods across the border. These parents often coordinate with warehouse operators in Afghanistan to transport goods on their return journey. In exchange for their involvement, the parents receive compensation for their work.

Farman Shinwari, the former president of the labor union for workers in Torkham, revealed in a face-to-face interview that more than 3,000 laborers are engaged in commercial activities at the border, 70 percent of whom are children.

Seven-year-old Kashmala is also from Afghanistan. She works as a labourer in Torkham, Pakistan, with her relatives and other neighbouring children. Kashmala's home is located an hour away from Torkham, and she returns home every few days to give her mother 2,000–3,000 rupees (USD 7.2–10.8). This money is used to support her two brothers and three sisters. Upon asking about her work, her parents shared in a pained voice that incidents of sexual assault and violence against children are alarmingly common in this line of work.

According to Farman Shinwari, child labour has not been completely restricted by law in Pakistan because, if it were banned outright, children would attempt to cross the border on foot through dangerous areas, climb over fences, or hide in vehicles and trailers, which could lead to even more accidents. During occasional meetings with Pakistani and Afghan border authorities, he also participates as a labour union representative. He claims that in every meeting, the authorities strongly emphasize the need for restrictions on children bringing and taking goods, and sometimes, they halt the movement of children at the border for several days.

Based on his data, thirty children have died in the past two years after being run over by goods-carrying vehicles. However, the government has no record of these children, and there is no system in place for financially assisting their families.

The sexual abuse of child labourers

Azam Khan is twelve years old and hails from Pakistan's Landi Kotal town. He crossed the border on foot from Afghanistan and reached a warehouse located within Pakistan’s borders, carrying twenty packs (cartons) of cigarettes on his shoulders. His sweat-soaked clothes were weighed down by dust, and he was sitting near a water cooler to quench his thirst. When asked about the marks and scars on his face, he revealed that he had been subjected to physical abuse multiple times by Pakistani security personnel at the border as well as Afghan Taliban fighters.

Azam explained that during work, child labourers become targets for physical and sexual abuse. He mentioned an incident where he once went to a place provided by the warehouse manager to sleep, and there, an attempt was made to molest him.

Ferman Shinwari mentioned that the number of children working in difficult conditions in Torkham has increased due to the arrival of the Taliban in Afghanistan and international sanctions. Ten of 100 children are Pakistani, while the rest are Afghan. Most of these children are the sole breadwinners of their homes whose elders have died or become disabled in the conflict.

Without revealing his name, an official of the Landi Kotal Sub Jail mentioned that in Torkham, children are used for smuggling commercial goods and drug smuggling. He stated that in the past year, 20 children were arrested, but due to the lack of a specific place for children in the jail, their cases are quickly dealt with, and legal action is taken. He further stated that a significant number of arrested children are Afghan, and they are later handed over to Afghan authorities.

Sufyan, Kashmala's elder sibling working in a welding shop on the Torkham border. Photo by Ramna Saeed. Used with permission.

How many child labourers are there?

The exact number of child laborers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is unavailable, according to Lehaz Ali, a journalist working with Agence France Presse. He mentioned that there is no comprehensive data or effective planning by the government to address the issues faced by child laborers in the region, making it difficult to ascertain the exact number of child laborers.

According to the last survey conducted in 1996, around 3.3 million children in Pakistan were engaged in various forms of child labor in specific sectors. Of these, a significant number, approximately 1 million children, were from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. However, tribal areas, Afghan refugees, and informal sectors were not included in this survey.

“The formal data collection work for the survey began in January 2022. After the data collection phase in October 2022, the data validation and correction process started, which was completed in April 2023. It took five months to compile the report. The commission identified Afghan children who were victims of various issues and, with the help of the mentioned authorities, reached out to their families in Afghanistan. Currently, more than thirty Afghan children are present in the commission’s rehabilitation centers”, said the head of the Child Protection and Welfare Commission in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Ajaz Muhammad Khan in an interview with Global Voices.

Child protection laws

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, after amendments to the Protection of Children and Welfare Act 2010, it was re-passed in 2015, the Compulsory Primary to Secondary Education Act 2017, the Prevention of Child Labor Amendment Act was enacted in 2015, in which the conditions regarding child labor were clarified. After the increase in cases of sexual violence against children in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, there was increased pressure from social activists and the public to bring amendments to the Protection of Children Act 2010. The bill was presented to the provincial cabinet in 2021, and the draft of the bill was unanimously approved after a disputed section was removed. The disputed proposal suggested making a public a video of hanging child sexual offenders, but it was dropped from the bill after dissenting opinions emerged.

According to the amended law, a person involved in child sexual abuse will be punished with life imprisonment, a death sentence, and a fine of up to PKR 5 million (USD 18,000). Making videos of child sexual abuse will attract 20 years in jail and a fine of PKR 7 million (USD 25,222) while sharing the video will attract 10 years in jail and a fine of PKR 2 million (USD 7,200). The bill removed the death penalty and amputation of the sentence for a sexual assault convict.

It remains to be seen whether this law and other steps against child abuse and dangerous child labor will protect the vulnerable children at the border, but activists are remaining hopful and vowing to continue their fight.

Journalist and human rights activist Murat Temirov, an ethnic Circassian from Russia, talks about Circassians

Ramil Niyazov-Adyljan — Mon, 02 Dec 2024 01:56:21 +0000

The right of Circassians to return to their native lands will only be possible with recognized statehood

Originally published on Global Voices

Glade Taulu, the confluence of the Sofia and Psysh rivers. Arkhyz, Karachay-Cherkessia, Western Caucasus, Russia. Image by Vyacheslav Argenberg via Wikimedia commons. CC BY 4.0.

As of November 2024, in the ongoing Russian–Ukrainian war, approximately 200 people from Kabardino-Balkaria, 150 from Karachay-Cherkessia, and 200 from the Republic of Adygea, along with about 250 Chechens and 910 Dagestanis, have reportedly died, according to publicly available data. All of them hail from the North Caucasus region of Russia, the most “Muslim” part of the country. To what extent these figures may underestimate the actual numbers is unknown.

The proportion of people conscripted into the war from the North Caucasus appears disproportionate. The mortality rate — the number of deaths per 10,000 men aged 16 to 61 — is 8 in Kabardino-Balkaria, 11 in Karachay-Cherkessia, and 14 in Adygea. For comparison, this figure is 2 in Moscow and 4 in Saint Petersburg, even though Moscow's population is six times larger than the combined populations of these three Caucasian republics. The participation of Caucasian peoples in this war is especially contradictory, given their historical traumas — from the brutal expansion of the Russian Empire and forced deportations during the Soviet period to present-day repression by the Kremlin. While the region may appear loyal to central authority, achieving this appearance has taken the Kremlin two centuries of repression.

The North Caucasus was conquered in 1864 after a century-long Caucasian War — the longest in the history of the Russian Empire. The war ended in mass killings and the expulsion of approximately one million Circassians to the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the majority of the Circassian people live outside their historical homeland, with only a minority remaining on their indigenous land.

This event is referred to in Russian historiography as the “Circassian Muhajirism” (“Circassian Pilgrimage”). However, among Circassians outside Russia, especially in Turkey and the Middle East, it has long been called the “Circassian Genocide” (“The Tlapserykh” or “Tsitsekun”). As of 2024, only Georgia officially recognizes the mass deportation of Circassians as genocide. Similar recognition is now being considered by Ukraine: in June 2024, reports emerged that Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada would consider a resolution to recognize the genocide of Circassians during the Caucasian War of 1763–1864 by the Russian Empire. However, the project of “Ukrainian irredentism,” which aims to claim not only the annexed Crimea and the so-called DPR/LPR but also the Kuban region as historically Ukrainian, has a complicated relationship with the Circassian national project, as both lay claim to the same indigenous lands.

Global Voices spoke with renowned journalist and human rights activist Murat Temirov, an ethnic Circassian from Russia, about how Circassians maintain connections despite being scattered across the world, whether there is a unified Circassian national movement, and what its goals are. Journalist Alexandra Sharopina contributed to the interview's edits.

Global Voices (GV): Can Circassians maintain national unity despite being scattered across the globe?

Murat Temirov (MT): Yes, a certain connection is maintained, though not necessarily unity. This connection among Circassians is preserved not only through language, norms of behavior, and traditional clothing but also through a shared tragedy.

The mass deportation, essentially genocide, carried out by the Russian Empire against the Circassians in the 18th and 19th centuries — when Circassians were expelled from their native lands and replaced with loyal populations — serves as a point of consolidation for Circassian identity.

Any Circassian in the world, from Australia to Canada, will tell this story in more or less detail.

The shared identity of the Circassians persists, in part, due to this tragedy. However, I believe it is not entirely beneficial that this tragedy anchors their collective focus in the past. A healthy community should aim toward something more, toward achieving victory.

GV: Is there a unified Circassian movement in the diaspora? Are its goals focused on repatriation and reclaiming indigenous status?

MT: No, there is no unified movement. There are fragmented organizations, often based on regional or local associations. In Turkey, for instance, there are numerous influential organizations like Kafkas Vakfı and Çerkes Vakfı. They are influential but largely avoid engaging in current political matters.

There have been attempts to create a unified pan-Adyghe movement. Three years ago, I proposed holding a Unified Circassian Congress in Belgrade. We began preparations but did not complete them.

From my perspective, creating a unified Circassian movement under current circumstances is impossible. I once had the idea of establishing a Circassian Analytical Center to regularly provide these fragmented organizations with materials and recommendations on key issues involving actors like Ukraine, the United States, and the United Kingdom. This analytical center would have been the first step toward a Circassian movement because analysis must precede action. However, this idea has not yet garnered support or been realized.

The right of Circassians to return to their native lands will only be possible with recognized statehood. There are certainly ideas for restoring statehood, but their realization would only be feasible in the context of a global war, requiring military force — which does not currently exist.

GV: Is it true that the Circassian national project conflicts not only with Russia's neo-imperial ambitions but also with the radical Ukrainian nationalist project, which claims Kuban as solely Ukrainian land, excluding Circassians?

MT: Yes, that is true. On Circassian lands, those we now call Ukrainians appeared relatively late, just over 200 years ago. These events are well-documented in Russian and non-Russian historical sources.

The so-called Kuban Ukrainians are natural competitors for us. They seized our lands and consider them theirs, with Zelenskyy almost declaring them exclusively Ukrainian. I personally see them as no less dangerous rivals than the Russians.

Yes, this is a global redivision, a world war; it is inevitable, and it is unclear who else will lay claim to our land. However, the fact that we were expelled gives us the right to this land because such a crime has no statute of limitations, and sooner or later, there will be accountability. If not the current perpetrators, then their descendants.

GV: What is your position regarding the Ukrainian Rada's proposal to recognize the Circassian genocide, considering the issues we have discussed?

MT: Yes, I’ve heard this news. It is not yet clear in what form this recognition will come — as a law? I’m not sure Ukraine is prepared to take such a large-scale step, so I believe it will likely be a declaration similar to the one adopted by the Georgian Parliament, without legal consequences.

I, of course, welcome this step by the Ukrainian authorities but do not expect it to bring significant improvements for Circassians in their efforts to reunite on their homeland.

On the contrary, I fear that this move might stigmatize Circassians within Russia, portraying them as collaborators with the enemy. Both Georgia and Russia tend to remember the Circassians when they are in a difficult position. For Georgia, this happened after their defeat in the 2008 war with Russia.
Such declarations often have internal political motivations and are only distantly related to the Circassians themselves.

Georgian police crack down on pro-EU demonstrators after halting EU membership bid ‘until 2028’

Arzu Geybullayeva — Sat, 30 Nov 2024 10:17:43 +0000

Protests which started in October following election results, continue unabated

Originally published on Global Voices

Protester with ‘Reclaim the vote’ sticker outside parliament on November 17, 2024. Image by Mariam Nikuradze/OC Media used with permission.

This article was first published on OC Media. An edited version is republished here under a content partnership agreement.

Georgia Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced on November 28 that Georgia was halting its EU membership bid “until 2028.” The news sparked widespread demonstrations as thousands took to the streets and demanded the government continue its EU trajectory. Riot police in the capital, Tbilisi, have violently cracked down on the protestors and arrested dozens.

In his announcement, the prime minister added that the government would also be refusing any budgetary support from the EU. The latter was in response to the EU's previous announcement that it was halting funding to the Georgian government over the controversial foreign agent law and other anti-democratic moves by the ruling Georgian Dream party.

Exactly one year ago, the European Commission recommended that the EU grant Georgia candidate status, but anti-democratic developments within the country have derailed its plan to become an EU member.

In October, Georgian Dream was reelected in what independent observers described as an unfree and unfair election and called for the vote to be redone. This included the country's President Salome Zourabichvili and four key opposition groups. However, there was no budging from the ruling party, which has further distanced the country from its EU aspirations.

The results have also been challenged in the Constitutional Court, which has yet to make a final ruling. Since the October election, the country has been rocked by protests and drawn harsh criticism from the EU, including a resolution adopted by the European Parliament on November 28 rejecting the legitimacy of Georgia’s parliamentary election and calling for a new vote within a year. Despite the calls, the ruling government approved the mandates of all 150 MPs on November 25, ignoring the explicit dissent of 61 opposition members who were absent during the opening of the parliament in Tbilisi, some of them protesting outside the parliament alongside other demonstrators.

A number of the country’s top legal and constitutional experts have stated that approving mandates while the results of the election were being challenged in the Constitutional Court represented an outright violation of the constitution.

Changing tides

Georgia formally applied for European Union (EU) membership in March 2022. The move represented a U-turn for the ruling party, which had insisted it would not accelerate its initial timeline of applying for membership in 2024.

The shift was largely driven by increasing pressure from the domestic opposition, as well as thousands of protesters who participated in a “March for Europe,” organized by Georgia's liberal activist group, the Shame movement, and other pro-democracy groups in a bid to “demonstrate the commitment of Georgian people to its European choice and Western values.”

In June 2022, Georgia's candidate status was denied, and the state was given a list of 12 conditions the country had to fulfill before their application could be reexamined. Among these conditions were reducing political polarization, reforming the judiciary, ensuring functioning state institutions, strengthening anti-corruption measures, including de-oligarchisation, and others.

Then, in December 2023, Georgia was finally granted this status following an EU Council meeting. That decision, however, came amid a growing rift between Georgia's ruling government and Western allies as well as the local civil society groups insisting that the government has failed to fulfill the 12 priority conditions.

The government continued to crack down on freedoms and human rights with violent dispersals of protests, attacks on the independent media, and a widening rift between society and state leadership.

The ruling party has faced criticism for its deepening anti-LGBTQ+ stance, all the while cozying up with Russia ever since the latter invaded Ukraine. Last year, the ruling party attempted to impeach the country's president but failed to do so.

The country's track record on freedoms and democracy has also been deteriorating. In May 2024, the government adopted a controversial foreign agent bill despite ongoing protests against the law. The bill severely restricts all media outlets and non-governmental organizations in Georgia, and according to local civil society, it “would entail monitoring from the government, which could compromise organizations’ internal communications and confidential sources.”

Pushback against the new government

The official results of the October elections gave the ruling Georgian Dream party a large majority in parliament, with 54 percent of the vote, an increase from the previous 48 percent support the party received in the 2020 election.

The final results were released by the Central Election Commission on November 18, confirming Georgian Dream's victory and prompting more protests by opposition groups and the public at large, accusing the CEC of dismissing documented widespread electoral fraud and irregularities.

On Thursday, November 28, the ruling Georgian Dream party approved a slightly reshuffled government cabinet led by incumbent Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze. The new government was endorsed without a single opposition member present, as the new parliament has been boycotted by all four opposition groups.

The same day, Kobakhidze announced that Georgia was halting its EU membership bid.

All four major opposition groups instantly condemned the announcement. The outgoing president, Zourabichvili, called the move a “constitutional coup.”

Kobakhidze's announcement sparked more protests. Thousands of demonstrators stayed overnight on Rustaveli Avenue, one of the key streets in Tbilisi, periodically clashing with riot police who were using pepper spray, water cannons, tear gas, and physical violence against demonstrators, opposition figures, and journalists.

While several demonstrators were detained throughout the night, the Interior Ministry has yet to confirm the number of detainees.

In Tbilisi, protesters gathered around the ruling Georgian Dream party’s headquarters before proceeding to march to Rustaveli Avenue, where parliament is also located.

Tensions between the protesters and police continued to escalate throughout the night, as police heavily reinforced their numbers as the protest went on. The Ministry of Interior later published a statement saying that the demonstration had gone “beyond the norms established by the Law of Georgia on Assemblies and Demonstrations.” Riot police then escalated by indescriminently deploying large amounts of pepper spray and water cannons to disperse the protesters from the sides of parliament onto Rustaveli Avenue.

Throughout the protest, footage regularly emerged of police violently assaulting and detaining protesters.

Human rights organisations condemned the riot police’s use of force, describing them as measures “carried out with the use of unlawful and disproportionate force.”

At around 6:00 am on November 29, the opposition Coalition for Change group stated that two of their leaders, Elene Khoshtaria and Nana Malashkhia, were injured during the protest.

Journalists detained, beaten, and abused

During the protest, numerous reports emerged of journalists being targeted by riot police.

OC Media’s journalist and co-director, Mariam Nikuradze, was hit by the water cannons. She sought medical care at an ambulance nearby shortly after, reporting that there was likely pepper spray mixed in with the water.

Nikuradze’s camera was damaged. The police also knocked Nikuradze’s phone out of her hand as she was filming them marching through the street.

Riot police have also fired tear gas directly at OC Media’s editor-in-chief Robin Fabbro on Lesia Ukrainka Street, a side street off of Rustaveli Avenue despite him wearing a vest that clearly marked member of the press on it.

Journalist Aleksandre Keshelashvili, from the Georgian news outleet Publika, was also reportedly temporarily detained by the police. In a Facebook post, Keshelashvili wrote that upon his detention, he tried to tell the police that he was a journalist, but said that it only made the police — who were masked — insult and beat him more. Keshelashvili says that the police confiscated his cameras, press ID, and gas mask.

TV Formula published footage appearing to show a riot police officer tackling and hitting their journalist, Guram Rogava, on the head, who was hospitalized due to the injuries.

TV Pirveli reported that one of their camera operators, Niko Kokaia, was injured while covering the protests on Rustaveli. Kokaia said the police used pepper spray directly on his face from close range.

At around 7:00 am, RFE/RL’s journalist, Dato Tsagareli, was reportedly punched in the stomach by a masked riot police officer while he was covering the protest.

Water cannons were also used to hit journalists on duty. President Zourabichvili has posted on X (formerly Twitter) in solidarity with journalists, saying that she stood “with the Georgian media, who are disproportionately targeted and attacked while doing their job and reporting continuously.”

The COP29 is over, and so is the spotlight on Azerbaijan

Arzu Geybullayeva — Wed, 27 Nov 2024 11:10:14 +0000

Wrap up and takeaways post-COP29

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Arzu Geybullayeva.

The 29th session of the United Nation's flagship climate summit, also known as COP (Conference of Parties), just wrapped up in the capital of Azerbaijan, Baku. How did it all begin, how is it progressing, and what's next for the country's civil society now that the spotlight is over? Here's Global Voices’ wrap-up and key takeaways.

How it started

The summit is the supreme decision-making body of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The latter was adopted in 1992. With a near-universal membership of 198 states (197 states and one regional economic integration organization), the convention, through COP, is tasked with reviewing “the national communications and emission inventories submitted by Parties; [and] assess the effects of the measures taken by Parties and the progress made in achieving the ultimate objective of the Convention,” according to UNFCCC website.

Since 1995, COP has been convening once a year with country hosts chosen on a rotating basis among the five recognized UN regions — Africa, Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Europe, and other states. An Eastern European country was slotted to host COP in 2024. This year's host was decided in December 2023, after a weeks-long standstill — a consensus must be reached over the next host by every country in the host region — caused as a result of Russia threatening to veto any European Union country’s bid, given the EU's sanctions against Moscow over its war in Ukraine.

The selection of Azerbaijan, although it ended the negotiations standstill over the COP29 host, raised many more questions as yet another major energy-producing country with a dismal track record on human rights and freedoms (following Egypt and UAE) as well as its intentions to keep boosting the use of fossil fuels and lack of clear commitments to curtail emissions, was the host of one of the world's most important climate conferences.

Unsurprisingly, very few notable outcomes were reported during and at the end of COP29.

On climate

Just days ahead of COP29, Global Witness leaked a video showing Azerbaijan's deputy energy minister and COP29’s chief executive, Elnur Soltanov promoting the country’s fossil-fuel interests and the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR). The leaked video was further proof of prior calls, reports and research documents pointing out that the Azerbaijani government was unlikely to offer any real climate change policies on energy efficiency and long-term sustainability. And that COP29 would serve the interests of the state, desperately wanting to be seen as a global player and equal partner and to secure funding for its own energy deals.

Soltanov's promotion of SOCAR and the country's energy prospects also fit into the narrative built ahead of COP29 and expressed by the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev. The president's remark that the country’s resources were a gift from God while attending the Petersberg Climate Dialogue in April 2024, an annual international climate negotiation hosted by the German Federal Foreign Office, was yet another signal that Azerbaijan had no intention of stopping investing and producing fossil fuels, and that it was set to continue boosting the natural gas exports to Europe.

The boost to climate finance — one of the outcomes that was expected at this year's COP — also failed to meet the expectations. As described by India’s delegate Chandni Raina, the final document was “little more than an optical illusion,” while Nigeria’s envoy, Nkiruka Maduekwe, called it “an insult.” The Climate Action Network Europe described the agreed amount as “breadcrumbs.” At the end of the day, the budget was raised from USD 100 billion (agreed to in 2009) to USD 300 billion a year by 2035 for developing countries. This amount is significantly lower than the more than USD 1 trillion a year that researchers estimate is needed.

The “loss and damage fund,” set up two years ago, also remained underfunded.

Both the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Least Developing Countries blocks walked out of the negotiations on climate finance in protest at the USD 250 billion offered initially. The walkout prompted negotiators to eventually agree on the final amount of USD 300 billion.

“The world’s wealthiest countries have spent this year’s climate conference bullying lower-income countries into accepting a miserly finance agreement which could saddle them with huge debts. High-income countries and the Azerbaijan presidency are loudly congratulating themselves, but no amount of spin can hide the fact that this agreement is a disaster for the human rights of people and communities on the front line of proliferating climate impacts,” said Ann Harrison, climate justice advisor at Amnesty International.

Some participants and those involved in the negotiations expressed their frustration with the chief negotiator, Azerbaijan's COP29 president Mukhtar Babayev. As per The New York Times, “Instead of rapidly dealing with a number of the smaller issues in play, negotiations moved at a plodding pace and many points of dispute remain unresolved,” reported the paper. During a press conference, Babayev said he, too, was frustrated with negotiations, and placed the responsibility on the parties involved in the process.

Authors Alice C. Hill and Priyanka Mahat wrote in their review for the Council on Foreign Relations: “The conference ended with only modest climate finance goals, failed to deliver on an expected announcement of a new commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions, and displayed unusually high tensions among nations. The result was deep concern among climate policy activists for the future of climate diplomacy.”

On rights and freedoms

The timing of COP29 marked exactly one year since the government launched a new crackdown against civil society representatives in Azerbaijan. Scores of journalists, political and civic activists, rights defenders and young scholars were handed pretrial detention sentences on bogus charges.

#Climate talks in Baku is about to end, but impunity for crimes against journalists in #Azerbaijan never ends. Sevinj Vagifgizi, Ulvi Hasanli and Mahammad Kekalov from @AbzasMedia were detained on trumped-up charges just 1 year ahead #COP29 for their brave investigative reporting pic.twitter.com/0Vj4qFoHmK

— FreeAbzasMedia (@FreeAbzasMedia) November 21, 2024

During the conference, local courts extended pretrial detentions and dismissed motions by those currently held behind bars to release them under house arrest.

As #Azerbaijan hosts #COP29 (now in its second week), a court in Baku extends the pretrial detention of former diplomat Emin Ibrahimov by another two months. https://t.co/qwfjYe4ckW

— Arzu Geybulla (@arzugeybulla) November 19, 2024

Documentation of torture and ill-treatment in detention and prison facilities was also reported.

URGENT: Journalists from “Abzas Media” – Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, and Elnara Gasimova – have reportedly faced violence in prison.

Family members of “Abzas Media” editor-in-chief Sevinj Vagifgizi, who is being held in Baku Detention Center No. 1, allege she has been… pic.twitter.com/8JuRkLSJhZ

— Ulviyya Ali (@UlviyyaAli) November 17, 2024

Azer Gasimli, political expert and founder of the Political Management Institute, was barred from leaving the country and placed under a travel ban as negotiations over climate finance went on. Gasimli told Meydan TV in an interview that the decision to ban him was political and his future arrest was possible. Scores of Azerbaijani civic activists are expecting further crackdowns now that the COP29 spotlight over the country is over.

During COP29, the Azerbaijani presidency dismissed questions by Amy Goodman, the host of Democracy Now newscast, on the status of arrested journalists and activists:

We asked a top Azerbaijani official at the #COP29 summit why activists, journalists and government critics were jailed ahead of the U.N. climate talks. https://t.co/xMjqRPw6wp pic.twitter.com/QRSzQfgJlC

— Democracy Now! (@democracynow) November 20, 2024

Arrested civic activist, Imran Aliyev announced he was going on a hunger strike given what he said was his unlawful arrest and the ongoing pretrial detention. Another activist, Nicad Ibrahim, injured himself with a mirror shard in protest of his arrest. An independent economist who was arrested as part of a criminal investigation launched against Abzas Media and Farid Mehralizade penned a letter to the presidential aide and the head of the Department of Foreign Policy Affairs of the Presidential Administration, Hikmat Hajiyev. He dismissed claims during COP29 that there were any political prisoners or that journalists were persecuted for their reporting.

Mehralizade questioned Hajiyev's claims solely based on his personal experience in a pretrial detention facility where he had been threatened over “speaking too much.” “If indeed I am standing accused of my involvement in some alleged large scale financial machinations, what does ‘teaching me a lesson,’ or other threats mean?” wrote Mehralizade in his letter that was published by Azadliq Radio on November 26.

The presence of a vibrant civil society free from any kind of persecution is one of the building blocks of a democracy. In Azerbaijan, where this presence has been gradually sidelined over the years, it has been replaced with government apologists, as well as fake social media accounts and trolls. Ahead of COP29 and during the conference, several reports shed light on inauthentic accounts promoting the Azerbaijan presidency as well as Hajiyev's comments and statements.

It remains to be seen whether the government of Azerbaijan understands that no amount of fake social media engagement and promotional content can cover up the country's climate and human rights record. However, the decades-long experience of shedding light on these violations by domestic and international rights watchdogs is sufficient to conclude that little will change in Azerbaijan now that the spotlight has shifted.

Failed assassination attempt sparks speculations of power struggle in Uzbekistan

Nurbek Bekmurzaev — Thu, 21 Nov 2024 08:12:04 +0000

It is getting harder to keep things behind the scenes

Originally published on Global Voices

Komil Allamjonov (on the left) and Saida Mirziyoyeva (on the right). Screenshot from the video “Allamjonov bilan Otabek Umarov hamda DXX o’rtasida urush ketyapti-manbalar” from the Ozodlik Radiosi YouTube channel. Fair use.

On October 26, an assassination attempt was carried out against the former top-level official Komil Allamjonov in Uzbekistan’s capital Tashkent. A pair of suspects fired eight bullets at Allamjonov’s car at night. Neither Allamjonov nor his driver sustained any injuries. Undoubtedly, this was the most significant assassination attempt in Uzbekistan’s recent history given Allamjonov’s stature and influence over the country’s political life.

The timing of the incident stirred discussions of a possible power struggle unfolding among different groups close to President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, to solidify their position as his future successor. Allamjonov abruptly left the president’s office, where he led the department of informational policy, only a month before the attack.

His sudden departure sparked speculations that it would weaken the position of the president’s oldest daughter Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of the presidential office, and seemingly a frontrunner in the successor race. Allamjonov and Mirziyoyeva have worked together in tandem at various state organizations for the last eight years.

Adding to the suspense has been the absence of any comments on the assassination attempt from the authorities and Allamjonov himself. Even the statement from the Prosecutor General’s Office on the incident did not contain any mention of Allamjonov, it simply informed journalists of the shooting. The office has publicly discouraged journalists and bloggers from speculations. Nevertheless, the attack has become the most talked about news, resembling a detective series with new information rolling out every day.

Here is a YouTube video with the first part of Radio Ozodlik's investigation.

On October 27, a video emerged with two men admitting carrying out the attack and sharing plans to give themselves up to the police. Additionally, there emerged an audio file in which undisclosed people claimed that Allamjonov orchestrated the assassination attempt but did not pay those who executed it.

This was followed by a wave of posts on Uzbek social media that Allamjonov did indeed plan the attack himself. According to Radio Ozodlik (the Uzbek branch of RFE/RL), bloggers and journalists who spread these rumors admitted receiving directives from their “media supervisors,” who in turn acted on the orders from the security services. Radio Ozodlik’s investigation on the case remains the most comprehensive and credible coverage of the incident thus far.

After the journalists identified one of the attackers as Shohruh Ahmedov and established his ties to the president of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov, the story gained a foreign angle. While in Turkey, Ahmedov was detained by the Turkish police alongside a group of Chechen nationals for attempting to assassinate one of Kadyrov's critics in Istanbul. When these details came out with a hint of a Chechen trace, Kadyrov came out with a statement denying speculations of his involvement in the attack.

The most recent piece of the puzzle now directs towards Mirziyoyev’s son-in-law and deputy head of the presidential security service Otabek Umarov, who is married to the president’s younger daughter Shakhnoza Mirziyoyeva. On November 14, an Uzbek national named Javlon Yunusov was arrested in South Korea in relation to his involvement in the attack.

Here is YouTube video with the second part of Radio Ozodlik's investigation.

Interestingly, Akhmedov, one of the detained attackers, worked as Yunusov’s bodyguard and driver. Additionally, the car in which the attackers fled from the crime scene was found near the restaurant belonging to Natalya Fen, Yunusov’s wife.

Radio Ozodlik’s sources have previously described Yunusov as Umarov’s trusted right hand man in the Fergana Valley, a vast region in Uzbekistan’s east. This link has now brought president’s son-in-law under the limelight of speculations. The reports of an ongoing “war” between Allamjonov and Umarov are only fueling them.

It is too soon to draw any conclusions about who ordered the attack on Allamjonov. It is reported that the case is under the personal control of Mirziyoyev. However, even when the investigation is completed it is likely that its results will be kept from the public. After all, this seems like a family affair nobody would want to share.

China's impact on the Rogun Dam Project in Tajikistan

Shahida Yakub — Wed, 20 Nov 2024 12:00:27 +0000

The project has significant social and environmental implications

Originally published on Global Voices

The Rogun Dan being constructed. Image by Sosh19632 via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.

The Rogun Dam, located on the Vakhsh River in Tajikistan, is one of the most ambitious hydropower projects in the world, let alone in Central Asia. Designed to be the world's tallest dam, with a projected height of 335 meters (1,099 feet), it is poised to transform Tajikistan’s energy landscape by providing an estimated output of 13.1bn kWh, with a total capacity of 3,600 MW.

About 90 percent of energy in Tajikistan is created through hydropower, with the Nurek hydroelectric power station (opened in 1980) producing 11.4 bln kHw — almost half of all electric power produced in Tajikistan.

Tajikistan’s energy sector has been in a state of crisis for years now. This crisis is due mainly to aging power generation assets, many of which have not been modernized since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ,as well as added pressures due to climate change. Given that so much of Tajikistan's energy generation is driven by hydroelectric power, decreasing water levels due to shrinking glaciers and other climate pressures are causes for concern.

The Vakhsh River, which has been experiencing a decrease in water levels due to mismanagement and climate change. Screenshot of video “20201201 Rogun Dam – Video Drone” by Marco Piscoya. Fair use.

In 2020, Tajik officials released a statement notifying residents that there would be electricity use limits and outages throughout the country, largely because “the volume of water in the country’s largest river Vakhsh had fallen by 50 percent. As a result … the water level of the Nurek reservoir, had fallen by 17 metres compared to 2019.” This decrease in water meant the Nurek Dam was unable to meet the country's electricity needs.

These limitations on energy consumption have become an annual event in Tajikistan, especially during winter. Despite the decreased water levels, Emomali Rahmon, the Tajik president, maintains that “with the construction of Rogun Dam, we are not only resolving the problems with electric energy for the population, but we are also creating a solid basis for the development of various spheres of economy.”

Construction of the Rogun Dam started in 1976, but it was stopped due to political and funding challenges. As of November 2018, 75 of the total 335 meters had been built, and one turbine of six is in operation. Officials estimate that, with proper funding, the dam could be fully completed by 2028.

China's expanding role in Central Asia

China's growing influence in Central Asia is part of its larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strategy, wherein it is seeking to expand infrastructure and trade links between China and various regions of the world. Tajikistan, as a strategically important landlocked country bordering China, is a key partner in the BRI framework. This relationship is underpinned by Chinese investments in infrastructure, mining, and hydropower.

China’s involvement in the Rogun Dam project is driven by its geopolitical interests, desire to secure stable energy supplies, and strategic influence over Central Asian infrastructure.

Building the Rogun Dam requires vast financial resources. When the project first resumed in 2008, officials estimated the overall cost would be about USD 3 billion, but this amount has ballooned over the years to over USD 9.7 billion total. For a country like Tajikistan, whose economy is relatively small and reliant on remittances, this is a monumental expense. So far, Tajikistan has already spent USD 3.3 billion on the project but still lacks at least USD 6.4 billion to finish building the dam, according to estimates made in August 2024. During the last decade, the projected costs of completing the Rogun Dam have increased by 15 percent annually.

Chinese banks and investment institutions have become key financiers of infrastructure projects across Central Asia, including Tajikistan. Chinese funding has supplemented Tajikistan's efforts to finance the dam, either through direct investments or loans to Tajikistan’s government.

Chinese investment in the Rogun Dam Project

Tajikistan and the Rogun Dam. Image by C1MM via Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 3.0.

China’s influence on the Rogun Dam project is part of its broader strategy to increase its presence in Central Asia. While Tajikistan is the main driver of the project, Chinese financial resources, technical expertise, and geopolitical interests have had a significant impact on its development.

It's noteworthy that, even as China seeks to strengthen its ties in Central Asia, the scale of Chinese financing is very limited compared to other investors in the dam. According to an analyst who spoke to Global Voices on condition of anonymity, “Chinese actors tend to avoid investment in controversial projects.” While Chinese companies have previously explored hydroelectric projects in Tajikistan, most of these efforts were abandoned to appease downstream Uzbekistan, which could see its water supply suffer if the upstream rivers are dammed, thereby hindering its cotton industry. Criticism from environmental groups is also spooking further Chinese investment.

But money isn't the only way China is supporting the project. China’s contribution to the Rogun Dam project is also evident in its technical assistance and engineering expertise. Chinese companies have established a dominant presence in Central Asian infrastructure development, including hydropower projects. Chinese engineers, contractors, and firms bring expertise that is critical for the construction of such a massive and complex project as the Rogun Dam.

But China has its own motivations for supporting the effort, despite the controversy.

While Tajik officials hope the dam will be able to solve its electricity crisis, they also are looking to their energy-starved neighbors as potential customers for the surpluses energy that is produced. Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are especially attractive options that would benefit from a reliable, sustainable energy source. In securing water and electricity resources through Central Asia, China is indirectly supporting its broader regional water and energy interests, as well as ensuring the stability of energy supplies that feed into its Belt and Road Initiative.

Environmental and social implications

Even as the Rogun Dam promises considerable economic and energy benefits, its environmental and social impacts are significant, and China’s involvement further complicates the equation.

Environmental activists report that over 7,000 people have already been displaced from the reservoir zone, and it is estimated that some 38,000 more are going to be further resettled to other regions of Tajikistan. However, this displacement was not without controversy. There were complaints that governmental compensation was not enough to buy a new house in the area of relocation.

Moreover, activists also raise concerns about mismanagement and lack of financial transparency in the construction of the dam. It was reported that, five years ago, one of the dam's power generators stopped working. In an interview with the analytical site Cabar.asia, a Tajik energy expert says that poor-quality cement, reinforcements, and other low-quality building materials have been used during the construction. Moreover, environmental activists say there has been a lack of transparency surrounding the construction and point out the high levels of corruption in Tajikistan, and the lack of public discussions of the project amid longstanding suppression of human rights in the country.

Environmental activists have also expressed fears that the dam will disrupt the natural flow of the Vakhsh River, affecting biodiversity and agriculture in downstream areas.

China’s track record on environmental considerations in infrastructure projects has been mixed. While Chinese investment brings much-needed funding, it also raises concerns about environmental oversight and long-term sustainability. Some critics argue that Chinese-backed infrastructure projects often prioritize economic gains over environmental protections, exacerbating the negative consequences of large-scale dams.

As the Rogun Dam nears completion, the balance of these factors will shape the future of Tajikistan’s energy landscape and its relationship with China. The dam represents not only a milestone in Tajikistan’s development but also a microcosm of the broader dynamics shaping Central Asia’s integration into China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

To learn more about the intersection of Chinese development projects and climate justice in the Global Majority, see our Climate Justice Fellowship Project:

China's investment in agriculture in Tajikistan: A focus on growth and pesticide use

Shahida Yakub — Mon, 18 Nov 2024 22:42:09 +0000

Chinese farmers are remarkably productive — but at a steep cost

Originally published on Global Voices

A field of cotton in Tajikistan. Image from Flickr, World Bank Photos. License CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

Even though Tajikistan is considered an agricultural country, only six percent of its territory is arable land, the rest is mountainous. Despite this, agriculture provides 20 percent of the country's GDP and over 45 percent of the country's employment.

Tajikistan is one of the world's top exporters of raw cotton. In 2022, Tajikistan exported USD 212 million worth of raw cotton, making it the 12th largest exporter in the world.

However, Tajikistan’s cotton sector suffers from outdated machinery, low-quality seeds, insufficient government support for local farmers, and a lack of foreign investors willing to develop Tajikistan’s cotton and textile industries. Moreover, Tajikistan’s legal framework, corruption, and top-down power structures make this country unattractive to Western investors.

China offered Tajikistan a helping hand and invested over USD 3.8 billion over the last ten years, mainly in mining and agribusiness. China’s investments in Tajikistan's cotton industry reflect a broader strategy to enhance agricultural production and secure raw materials for its textile industry.

China’s cotton diplomacy

While international donors and foreign investors were wary of investing in Tajikistan, Chinese companies have been willing to navigate Tajikistan's complicated political web.

An exiled Tajik opposition member who spoke to Global Voices on conditions of anonymity said that in order to do business in Tajikistan, anyone, be it a foreign or local company or businessman, needs to have some sort of “roof,” i.e. patronage from local or state officials in order to secure business. And this kind of protection is often remunerated by payments or bribes.

One of the lawyers of the international law firms working in Tajikistan who was interviewed for a study on Chinese Cotton Diplomacy in Tajikistan says: “Chinese.. their work rules are different from other [investors]. In the first stage they work closely with us but … after 15 days they contact …officials and they are open to bribes, yes they do not need our services except [for] officials.”

Land lease

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon. Screenshot from YouTube.

Tajikistan has approximately 724,000 hectares of arable land, all of which are heavily reliant on irrigation due to the country’s mountainous terrain. Beginning in 2012, Tajikistan leased around 18,000 hectares of its land to China for cotton, rice, grain, and corn cultivation for a 49-year contract. The agreement was part of a broader initiative to strengthen economic ties between the two countries.

The main problem with this agreement is that its terms and conditions have not been disclosed. It is not clear what — if any — systems have been implemented regarding inspecting and regulating the lands leased by Chinese farmers.

In an interview with Radio Ozodi, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Agriculture, Narzullo Dodoboyev, said the land leased to Chinese farmers are “abandoned lands affected by erosion.” He also said that Chinese companies are going to invest in order to restore this land and start cultivating crops.

A regional expert who spoke to Global Voices on the condition of anonymity said that “China has a lot of expertise in turning land affected by erosion into a working land, through the ‘terracing method,’ which slows down soil erosion.”

And indeed, the results yielded by Chinese farmers are quite remarkable. In 2015, Tajikistan's deputy minister of agriculture, Sidjovuddin Isroilov, praised the Chinese company Xinxian Inhai which leased 6,300 hectares of land in the Khatlon region of Tajikistan. In one of its districts, the group cultivated the highest grain and cotton yield in the country.

However, a regional expert who spoke to Global Voices on the condition of anonymity pointed out that “the nature of agriculture in Tajikistan is based on irrigation and water brings weeds which have to be dealt with by using pesticides. Pesticides enter the soil and ultimately end up in water basins, most likely in the Amudarya River,” which flows through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan.

The Belt and Road Initiative

China is keen to help Chinese companies develop their work abroad within the framework of “The Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), it's massive international development plan.

Over the past eight years, China has invested in more than 820 agricultural projects in partner countries, with an investment stock exceeding USD 17 billion. In 2020, the total agricultural trade volume with partner countries reached USD 95.79 billion.

In Tajikistan, these efforts have been a boon for Chinese companies, as they are released from paying VAT when they import equipment and seed materials from China. The Tajik government doesn’t disclose the terms and conditions of these lease agreements.

The Head of a Water Users’ Association (WUA) in southern Tajikistan meets cotton farmers to discuss irrigation requirements. Image from Flickr. License CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

On the other hand, independent Tajik farmers have been left at a big disadvantage compared to well-financed Chinese agricultural companies. They have little to no support from the Tajik state. It is also difficult for them to get bank loans to buy modern equipment since they are exclusively offered short-term loans at high interest rates, which makes it nearly impossible for farmers to pay it back.

Fertilizers and pesticides

While China may be benefitting from its agricultural investments, they could be leaving a dangerous legacy in the host countries, namely: long-lasting pollution.

In 2018, the Chinese state agency Xinhua published a story about Chinese farmer Duan Li, whose company, Hunfank, from China's Henan province, invested over USD 31 million in agriculture in Tajikistan. Over 6,000 hectares of land that had been developed by this company became polluted and unsuitable for agriculture. Henan province is the major agricultural and a major food province in China, and some studies show that the vast amounts of chemical fertilizers used there are causing soil and water pollution.

China, the largest agricultural country in the world, typically uses 1.5 to 4 times as much pesticides per hectare as the world average. Pesticides play an important role in increasing productivity, reducing crop loss by controlling destructive pests and reducing diseases. However, pesticides are frequently linked to risks to soil health, water contamination, human poisoning, and damaging ecosystems.

Farmers in China also heavily rely on agricultural mulch film, a synthetic polymer compound material that will stay in the soil if it is not cleaned or picked up during agricultural production.

This problem is not isolated to Tajikistan. A regional expert who is monitoring China's farming practices in Russia, who spoke to Global Voices on the condition of anonymity, says that “Chinese farmers were achieving remarkable crops in Russia, but they used pesticides and other chemicals, which ultimately made the land unusable.” A number of reports in Russian media about the harmful consequences of Chinese farming practices in Russia have corroborated this claim.

Concerned experts

Global Voices approached several agricultural experts in Tajikistan and spoke to journalists who write about agriculture. However, none of them were able to comment on what kind of fertilizers and pesticides are used by Chinese farmers or the scale of their application on the crops. There is no publicly available information on this, and because civil society is deeply repressed in Tajikistan, it is unlikely that any independent research is possible on this matter.

One regional expert who spoke to Global Voices on the condition of anonymity, says that the agreement between Tajikistan and China on land lease “should have included a document about the system of controls of farming methods. But it is very likely that such a document doesn’t exist and that Tajikistan just leased the farming land to China and [is turning] a blind eye on what is going on.”

Because Tajikistan’s agriculture is heavily based on irrigation, ultimately, chemicals and pesticides used to promote crops are washed into the Amudarya river. However, local agriculture specialists point out that “neither Chinese nor Tajik farmers are too concerned about following environmental regulations and it leads to soil alkalization.”

It's undeniable that China's lease of agricultural fields in Tajikistan has led to several positive outcomes. The lease brought investment into the struggling Tajik agricultural sector, providing much-needed capital for local farmers. Chinese companies bring modern agricultural technology that has helped enhance productivity in Tajikistan's cotton sector. Improved methods and resources have also led to higher yields, benefiting the local economy and contributing to Tajikistan's export potential. However, the lack of transparency regarding fertilizers and pesticides poses a major environmental and social threat — one that has yet to be fully explored or understood because of Tajikistan's repressive environment toward media and civil society.

Torture, abuse, and degredation are rampant in Azerbaijani prisons

Arzu Geybullayeva — Sun, 17 Nov 2024 01:30:45 +0000

The situation is particularly dire for LGBTQ+ people

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Arzu Geybullayeva

Content notice: This article contains graphic descriptions of torture, rape, and abuse.

Ill-treatment and torture in prisons in Azerbaijan are not uncommon. Instances of mistreatment have been repeatedly documented by local journalists as well as by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), which issued a statement in July 2024 expressing its concern over the treatment of persons held by law enforcement agencies. Despite this, the practice remains a regular occurrence.

Nude photographs

In November 2023, numerous journalists and editors from the independent investigative journalism platform Abzas Media were arrested on bogus charges after investigating corruption in the Azerbaijani government. One of them, journalist and director of Abzas, Ulvi Hasanli, wrote a piece from the pretrial detention facility where he is being held, sharing his experience as a prisoner.

He revealed that Elnur Ismayilov, the head of Baku Detention Center, takes nude pictures of all newly arrived inmates, including transgender inmates:

What kind of fantasy, law and morality allows this? This man is a government official. He is not just some low ranking employee. He is a colonel. He has been managing the country's largest prison for eight years. He also uses those nude pictures as a means of blackmail against the prisoners. Who knows in what other ways [Ismayilov] uses these pictures?

Hasanli's observation adds more evidence to accusations that the state has a pattern of mistreating transgender inmates.

In November 2024, Meydan TV, an independent news outlet covering Azerbaijan, published an interview with a former transgender inmate Anna Taghiyeva, who spoke about her experience in prison. Taghiyeva told Meydan TV they were referred to as, “those with women bodies.” Taghiyeva recalled how Elnur Ismayilov used transgender inmates, to blackmail other inmates.

They would bring inmates into a room and have them stripped naked. They would then be beaten and forced into a confession. When that did not work, we were ordered to strip naked too and were used to threaten inmates. Because according to prison's unwritten rules, if we touched an inmate it meant they were infected, and this is how they were threatened.

The prison management prided themselves in using transgender inmates as part of their “strategy,” said Taghiyeva in the interview.
“We were once paraded in front of a new group of hires, all dressed up in clothes picked out for us by prison management. I stood in the center of the room, and that is how we were presented to the new group of recently hired prison staff.”

In another recollection, Taghiyeva said, she was summoned to the building where Ismayilov was having a meeting with other prison directors. “I guess they were bored, so they brought us in and asked us to undress, giving us instructions to turn around, exposing our bodies and making degrading comments.” She added:

I have seen many things in my life. But what I went through in prison, is unlike anything I have seen before. I questioned their humanity. I once asked ‘aren't you afraid of God’ and the prison guards laughed, saying in return, ‘Does God exist?’

Taghiyeva also mentioned how often transgender inmates are sold after their arrests. The price ranges. “I was told I would be sold, to another wealthy inmate,” said Taghiyeva. And there are others involved in the process as well. Taghiyeva explained that when transgender inmates are sold to other inmates, there is a third person who is in a cell when the buyer “meets his needs,” to confirm there was no touching involved.

The price starts at AZN 600 (USD 350). Similar instances were reported by other former transgender inmates. In 2022, JamNews wrote about a trans woman, Aidan Pashayeva, who was serving a sentence in a correctional facility and sold for AZN 500.

“We were already tired of living. And we were tortured so much we just wanted to commit suicide. I was sold into various departments and raped. And when we did not agree, they locked us in a punishment cell,” Pashayeva recalled in her interview with JamNews.

There is no data documenting the number of transgender inmates in Azerbaijan's prisons. The existing legislation offers no legal remedies for them to seek recourse for the abuse they suffered. According to a report by the Danish Institute for Human Rights, Azerbaijan does not have national policies protecting LGBTQ+ rights. There are also no specific institutions fighting discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity.

According to ILGA Europe, an international non-governmental organization advocating for LGBTQ+ rights and freedoms, Azerbaijan occupies the second to last place among 49 countries on the organization's Rainbow Index, just behind Russia.

Treatment of LGBTQ+ people

In recent years, the Azerbaijan government has intensified crackdowns against LGBTQ+ people. In 2017, at least 83 people were detained by the police for being gay or transgender. The detainees reported being tortured and blackmailed. In the same year, at least four Azerbaijani citizens who identified as LGBTQ+ committed suicide.

In 2018, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported the Azerbaijan government was using Israel’s Verint Systems surveillance equipment and software to identify citizens’ sexual orientation through Facebook.

More than a dozen LGBTQ+ people were arrested in 2019, most of whom were transgender sex workers who were solicited and then arrested, according to reporting from Meydan TV and Minority Magazine.

In March 2021, Minority Magazine reported a new movement calling itself “Pure Blood,” which was mobilizing via Telegram to target LGBTQ+ people in Azerbaijan.

Then, in the summer of 2021, during Pride month, Minority Magazine documented more attacks against LGBTQ+ people.

For many LGBTQ+ individuals who face discrimination and violence, there is little recourse through the police or any official judicial channels.

The most brazen example of the state's unwillingness to help the queer community was when popular blogger Sevinc Huseynova made open calls for violence against the LGBTQ+ community on social media platforms. She was never reprimanded for her actions despite ample evidence of her encouraging people to commit violent crimes against queer people. In one of her videos, Huseynova asked local law enforcement to look the other way on cases concerning hate crimes. “A sign is enough for us, just tell us, and we, the people, will slowly shove them away,” said the blogger. In another video, she called on Azerbaijani men to kill transwomen. At the time, the Interior Ministry said it was aware of the videos and was investigating. But no measures were taken.

However, Huseynova is not an isolated example. The anti-LGBTQ+ narrative in Azerbaijan is pervasive among politicians, celebrities, public figures, and even opposition activists. The same applies to the country's civil society representatives, who prefer to remain silent when it comes to defending the rights of the LGBTQ+ community. In the past, Azerbaijani lawmakers also voiced support for adopting a homophobic law akin to the one adopted in Russia in December 2022 and the 2012 Russian anti-gay propaganda bill.

Back in prisons and detention facilities, torture goes on. “First I would only hear the sound of torture — slap, kick, punch, truncheon blow, insult, swearing. Then, I started witnessing firsthand ill-treatment and torture — beating, inmates handcuffed to the cell bars [handcuffed to the top of the cell bar, the other at the very bottom], one hand handcuffed to the top of the bed, the other hand handcuffed to the leg and held like this for twelve hours, beating with truncheon while inmate was handcuffed to the cell bars,” wrote Ulvi Hasanli, adding other examples of ill-treatment and torture that he has witnessed since his arrest in November 2023.

Meanwhile, thousands of international stakeholders are currently in the capital Baku, attending COP29. Miles away from the UN-protected “blue zone,” torture and ill-treatment continue in silence, despite the international spotlight.

Nuclear referendum disheartens Kazakhstan’s opposition

Vlast.kz — Fri, 15 Nov 2024 02:30:15 +0000

Experts and observers say that both the turnout and the “yes” vote result are unrealistic

Originally published on Global Voices

Photo by Olga Loginova. Used with permission.

This article was written by Dmitriy Mazorenko, Nazerke Kurmangazinova, Olga Loginova, Beiimbet Moldagali, Almas Kaisar, and Victoria Natachiyeva for Vlast.kz and published on October 10, 2024. An edited version is published on Global Voices under a media partnership agreement.

Based on the October 6th referendum in Kazakhstan, an overwhelming number of voters seem to be in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant; however, amid widespread violations at the polls and waning political participation, experts and observers are seriously questioning the authenticity of this result.

The lack of political participation isn't exactly surprising. A string of unfulfilled promises since Qandy Qantar (Kazakh for “Bloody January,” the violent crackdown on protestors in 2022) disappointed Kazakhstanis, who showed little interest in the referendum, which President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had already pushed for in 2023.

Ever since taking power in 2019, Tokayev has also announced a number of reforms, but the changes only further stifled opposition and political participation. The trend continued during the referendum, as police arrested and filed criminal cases against dozens of activists.

While the authorities said the referendum would be a prime example of direct democracy, political scientist Dosym Satpayev and sociologist Serik Beissembayev told Vlast that this was an instrument to rubber stamp a decision that had already been made. Both experts argued that the increasingly intense repression against the opposition was inevitable, given society's growing dissatisfaction with the ruling government.

Preparations for a ‘yes’ vote

For about a year, the central and regional governments have scrambled to put together public hearings and expert discussions, to which they only invited specialists loyal to the government. Government agencies repeatedly said they had nothing to do with the hearings, attributing them to the goodwill of civic activists. In fact, these events were organized by groups such as the pro-government Civil Alliance.

The main refrain at each of these events was the issue of energy security: The country’s increasing electricity consumption would put it at risk unless a nuclear power plant was built. Neither the authorities nor the government-friendly groups offered any alternative options to make up for the increased electricity demand. The “yes” side of the referendum also routinely ignored and marginalized the experts who came out against the nuclear project.

A public discussion ahead of the referendum in Almaty. Photo by Almas Kaisar. Used with permission.

A few days before the referendum, police detained about 40 activists across the country. They had voiced their criticism towards the planned nuclear power plant. Some of them now face criminal charges, while a handful were given a two-month detention sentence for allegedly “organizing mass unrest.”

The questionable results

More than 5.5 million people (71.12 percent of the total) voted in support of the construction of the nuclear power plant at the referendum, according to official data. Independent observers, however, said the numbers for both the turnout and the voting results are unreliable.

Vlast collected voting protocols from independent observers and open sources, showing that the “no” vote stood at 57 percent at 31 polling stations in Almaty, Uralsk, Astana, Pavlodar, Semey, Shymkent, and the Turkestan region.

In Almaty, while the official statistics give a 54:46 “yes” victory, the evidence suggests that 55 percent of voters were against the project.

A protocol of the vote tally, which shows significantly more “no” votes, from one of the voting centers in Almaty.

Observers also recorded a number of gross procedural violations. Berik Abenov, from the Uly Kosh Foundation, filmed a woman in the village of Temirlan in the Turkestan region throwing a stack of ballots into a ballot box and then running away.

Kural Seytkhanuly, also from Uly Kosh, noticed a person in Turkestan trying to stuff a handful of ballots into a ballot box. He reported this to the commission chairwoman, who refused to take action. The prosecutor's office also left this case unchecked.

Some observers, including Seytkhanuly, were removed from the polling stations.

Another case involved journalists Lukpan Akhmedyarov and Raul Uporov, who were listed as observers in Astana for the Erkindik Kanaty Foundation. Other observers, however, asked the commission to remove them. A spokesperson for Erkindik Kanaty told Vlast:

There were no grounds for Lukpan and Raul to be removed. These decisions were made arbitrarily and illegally. Observers do not even have the right to petition for the removal of their colleagues.

Inactive activists

This past referendum, if anything, was a sign of a weakening public participation across the country.

Vadim Ni, an environmental law specialist and a co-founder of the platform AES Kerek Emes (Kazakh for “No Need for NPP” [nuclear power plant]), said that only few people were involved in their public discussions during their campaign to vote “no” for the referendum.

A ballot showing a “no” vote in Astana. Photo by Tamara Vaal. Used with permission.

Roman Reimer, co-founder of Erkindik Kanaty, agreed: “Ahead of the referendum, there were only isolated attempts to register groups and create a coalition among those who oppose the construction of the nuclear power plant.”

According to Ni, there was simply too little time to organize a campaign. On September 2, during his speech to the nation, Tokayev set the date to October 6, just five weeks later. This was not enough for a detailed discussion on such a complex topic, Ni quipped.

Trust me, I’m listening

Political scientist Dosym Satpayev told Vlast that the recent referendum has nothing to do with direct democracy. He argued that referendums are a tool often used in authoritarian regimes to create the illusion of democracy. In Kazakhstan, this strategy already had various names since Tokayev came to power: from “New Kazakhstan” to a “Listening State.”

This referendum was the fourth in the history of Kazakhstan and the second after Qandy Qantar. All of them were a tool for manipulating public opinion in order to legitimize a decision that had already been made. Ahead of the vote, there was always strict control and pressure on opponents.

Sociologist Serik Beissembayev said that a 63.6 percent turnout was unrealistic. Turnout had shown a constant decline in previous electoral rounds.

It wasn’t a nail biter. Government officials at all levels echoed the president's mandate, calling for a ‘yes’ vote. The people understood that the country's leadership had already made a decision. Citizens who expressed the opposite point of view were stigmatized.

Tokayev’s unfulfilled promises after Qandy Qantar were the reason for society’s apathy and disappointment, which should have translated into a lower turnout.

Former President Nursultan Nazarbayev cast his vote at the referendum. Photo by Tamara Vaal. Used with permission.

Beissembayev and the Demoscope, a research organization, planned to conduct a telephone survey that could provide alternative data on turnout and the level of support for the construction of the nuclear power plant. However, the Central Election Commission refused to accredit them. Beissembayev told Vlast:

This amounts to censorship. This is the government ordering to hinder the work of an independent research organization. I think that the entire system is set up to control the media space and suppress independent sources of information.

Satpayev argued that the government fears society:

The elites are currently discussing whether Tokayev will extend his term of office by changing the Constitution or find a successor. The construction of the nuclear power plant will overlap with the next transition period, and those who will build it need a stable regime.

Against the backdrop of the transition, Satpayev expects more repression. Beissembayev also expects a strengthening of the current authoritarianism.

There is a growing distrust towards the entire political system of Kazakhstan. We have returned to the same system that was under Nazarbayev. And this could be the fuel of future protests. When people do not trust the political system, they are more prone to radicalization.

First the flag and now the anthem: How Kyrgyzstan's leadership is changing its national symbols

Nurbek Bekmurzaev — Thu, 07 Nov 2024 09:26:31 +0000

With head-scratching explanations and zero input from the public

Originally published on Global Voices

Nurlanbek Shakiyev, the Speaker of Kyrgyzstan's parliament, speaking about the plans to change the anthem. Screenshot from the video “Спикер ЖК: Гимн Кыргызстана будет изменен” from Kaktus Media‘s YouTube channel. Fair use.

On October 25, the Kyrgyz parliament’s speaker Nurlanbek Shakiyev revealed government plans to change the national anthem. He explained that the anthem was adopted 33 years ago when the country had just gained independence from the Soviet Union. Thus, it has to be changed, since Kyrgyzstan is a different country now that firmly stands on its feet. Shakiyev added that the anthem sounds like a march and is difficult to sing. He promised that everyone, even 6-year-olds and 90-year-olds, would be able to sing the new anthem.

Here is a YouTube video with Shakiyev's announcement of the plans to change the anthem.

Besides these explanations, Shakiyev recounted an anecdote he heard from Kyrgyzstan’s president Sadyr Japarov about the effect of the current anthem on birds. According to Shakiyev’s retelling of the story, during one of his foreign trips, Japarov noticed that birds got scared and flew away when they heard Kyrgyzstan’s anthem and came back and calmly sat on tree branches when another country’s anthem was played.

Shortly after Shakiyev’s announcement, Japarov supported the idea, repeating similar arguments. He noted that the authors of the current anthem “wrote joyful and exciting lines about Kyrgyzstan embarking on the path to independence,” but Kyrgyzstan has since become “a full-fledged state,” which “the whole world knows” about. “Why don't we now write an anthem for future generations about the fact that our people have a five-thousand-year history?” concluded Japarov.

This is not the first time the Japarov–Shakiyev duo has worked together to change a national symbol. Last fall, Shakiyev made an unexpected statement about the need to change the national flag and faced fierce public backlash. Although he presented it as his own initiative, it was later revealed by Japarov himself that Shakiyev was simply acting on his orders. In a couple of months, Kyrgyzstan’s flag was changed despite the public consensus that the flag was perfectly fine and should remain the same.

Here is a YouTube video with the ceremony of raising the new flag on the main square in the capital Bishkek.

What made everything worse was that the authorities failed to provide convincing arguments for the change and did not solicit input from the public, such as announcing a public call for the design of the new flag. In his attempt to justify the change, Shakiyev explained that the wavy sun rays in the old flag made the tunduk (the central element of the flag and roof part of the Kyrgyz traditional yurt) look like a sunflower. On his end, Japarov campaigned for the new flag with the promise that it will help Kyrgyzstan “be a developed and independent country.”

Thus, although the authorities have promised that musicians, poets, and other stakeholders will take part in developing a new anthem, ordinary people do not harbor much trust that their voices will be heard. Judging by the available surveys, most people believe it is not necessary to change the anthem, and it would be best if the authorities put their time and resources into solving other more pressing issues.

Here is a YouTube video with citizens’ opinion on changing the anthem.

Those who are in favor highlighted that changing the anthem would be a right step with regards to decolonization, since the lyrics and music of the anthem are similar to the old anthem of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic, a political entity that was part of the Soviet Union. Additionally, the anthem’s critics note that it is written in third person, which makes it sound like a wish, and advocate for a new anthem that would have such words as “I” and “we” in it to reflect agency and ownership.

Kyrgyzstan’s anthem was adopted in 1992. It originally consisted of three verses and a chorus. In 2012, the second chorus was removed because it contained controversial lines. If the way the flag was changed is any indication of the authorities’ approach to altering national symbols, ordinary citizens will be left out of the process of adopting a new anthem. However, the hope is that the country’s leadership has learned from its past mistakes and will ensure meaningful participation and feedback from the public.

Why child and forced marriages persist in Central Asia

Nurbek Bekmurzaev — Thu, 31 Oct 2024 02:48:15 +0000

Societal and gender norms, legal gaps, and lack of political will are contributing factors

Originally published on Global Voices

Photo by Daro Sulokauri. Used with permission.

Child, early, and forced marriage (CEFM) is a widespread issue that affects people of all backgrounds and in various parts of the world. It is estimated that 640 million girls and women alive today were married in childhood, and 12 million girls are married off before the age of 18 every year. Child marriage disproportionally affects girls and can have many long-term negative consequences, including domestic violence, health problems, and limited educational and employment opportunities.

Photo of Dariana Gryaznova by Equality Now. Used with permission.

Central Asia is one of many regions where CEFM is a prevalent issue. Bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan, commonly known as ala kachuu (grabbing and running), is the most notorious example of forced marriage practice in the region. In October 2024, Equality Now, a rights organization with a mission to create a just world for women and girls, published a report on CEFM in seven Eurasian countries, including Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Tajikistan.

Global Voices interviewed over email Dariana Gryaznova, the Eurasia Legal Advisor at Equality Now, to discuss the underlying causes of CEFM in Central Asia and the steps state authorities and civil society need to undertake to eradicate the issue. The interview has been edited for clarity and brevity.

Global Voices (GV): How prevalent is the issue of CEFM in Central Asia? How does it compare to other regions where you conducted research for the report?

Dariana Gryaznova (DG): Our research found that the rate of officially registered marriages involving minors varies significantly between and within these countries.

Georgia has the highest prevalence, with 14 percent of women aged 20 to 24 married before 18, rising to 25 percent in rural areas in regions like Kvemo Kartli. Kyrgyzstan also has a high rate, with approximately 13 percent of women in the same age bracket marrying below 18.

At 3.4 percent, Uzbekistan has the lowest child marriage rate and has achieved a significant decline over the past decade. However, prevalence in the country’s eastern regions, which are known as more conservative, remains at 11 percent. Tajikistan falls somewhere in the middle at 9 percent.

Armenia has a child marriage rate of 5 percent and is among the top ten countries worldwide for reducing the practice. Despite progress, child marriage remains prevalent within the Yezidi community, where girls as young as 13 or 14 are married off.

Underreporting and limited awareness hinder accurate assessment of the prevalence of child marriage in Eurasian countries. Official statistics often overlook unregistered marriages, contributing to a lack of comprehensive data.

GV: What are the underlying reasons for CEFM in Central Asia?

DG: Each country has its own unique challenges, shaped by unique cultural, economic, and legal contexts, but there are common drivers of CEFM across the region. Deeply ingrained gender norms, stereotypes about the roles of men and women, and notions of family honour are all issues. There is an emphasis on female virginity and obedience, and societal pressure and stigma surrounding unmarried women and girls.

In addition, families facing poverty or economic hardship may view early marriage as a means of securing financial stability or improving their socioeconomic status.

Research has revealed a correlation between violence within girls’ families of origin and their propensity to enter early marriages or unions. This implies that for some, child marriage might be perceived as an avenue to escape abusive home environments. However, many encounter the same violence they sought refuge from in their initial homes, highlighting how the cycle of gender-based violence persists into their early marriages or unions.

GV: What is the current legal framework to combat CEFM in the region? How effective is it? What changes are necessary to it?

DG: According to international legal standards, laws within each country’s legal system should set the minimum age of marriage at 18 without exceptions. However, Georgia and Azerbaijan are the only countries out of the seven Eurasian countries that have established 18 as the minimum age of marriage, with no exceptions. Azerbaijan introduced this amendment only recently on June 28, 2024.

The criminal laws of the seven countries examined by Equality Now do not treat CEFM equally, reflecting variations in their legal frameworks. While all the countries recognize CEFM as an issue, their criminal laws differ significantly in the strictness of penalties, scope of definitions, and enforcement.

For example, while the Criminal Code of Kyrgyzstan criminalises the kidnapping of a person for the purpose of entering into marriage, the Criminal Code of Russia criminalises only abduction and abduction of a minor. There is no specific mention of crimes committed in relation to forced marriage.

GV: What progress has Central Asia made towards addressing the issue of abduction for marriage? What challenges remain in the way of eliminating this practice?

DG: Abduction for forced marriage, also known as “bride kidnapping,” is a harmful practice that involves abducting a woman or girl to marry one of her captors without her consent, often accompanied by physical or psychological coercion, including rape.

Despite being illegal and widely condemned, this practice continues in various parts of the Eurasia region, including in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia.

There is a clear distinction between those countries with specific crimes of abduction for forced marriage and those that prosecute the conduct under the general crime of kidnapping. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have specific articles addressing kidnapping for forced marriage, reflecting a targeted approach to combating this particular crime.

In contrast, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Russian Federation, and Tajikistan prosecute abduction for forced marriage under general kidnapping laws, and Georgia prosecutes it under the crime of illegal deprivation of liberty.

GV: What steps should the government and civil society in Central Asia take towards ending the practice of CEFM?

DG: CEFM is a violation of human rights and should be recognized as such. In addition to strengthening legal frameworks and policies, states have a legal obligation to tackle CEFM through a comprehensive, rights-based approach, taking into account those in vulnerable or marginalised situations and addressing root causes of gender inequality, discrimination against women and girls, and gender-based violence in general.

This holistic response also includes addressing cultural, traditional, or honour-based justifications for violence and ensuring measures are in place to protect women and girls, including those affected by humanitarian emergencies and forced displacement.

States have to adopt holistic and gender-transformative programs and invest in education, health, economic empowerment, and social support for adolescent girls as a strategic choice that yields high returns for the entire community.

Another important issue is the need to improve data collection methods to accurately assess the prevalence of child, early, and forced marriage, and to monitor progress, including for those communities that are most affected. Comprehensive data and readily available data can guide the development of policies, targeted interventions, funding, and impact assessments.

The Azerbaijani government throws support behind Georgian Dream Party amid election inconsistencies

Arzu Geybullayeva — Mon, 28 Oct 2024 18:52:40 +0000

Azerbaijani officials and state media rallied behind the Georgian Dream Party

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Arzu Geybullayeva

Georgians voted in a parliamentary election on October 26th, described as a crucial and pivotal vote in the country's history. Initial reports show the ruling Georgian Dream Party winning with 54 percent, thus securing a parliamentary majority and reaffirming its hold on power. Rights groups have called the election “rigged” and warned that Georgia is on an increasingly authoritarian path. While the opposition and Georgia's President have refused to accept the election results due to electoral discrepancies and accusations of fraud, officials from Georgia's neighboring Azerbaijan rushed to congratulate the ruling government.

Azerbaijan's support is not surprising. While Georgia's government has been under heavy criticism since the last parliamentary vote in 2020, which was also contested, in the months leading up to the election, Azerbaijani media, officials, and even TV personalities have rallied behind the Georgian Dream party.

Meddling in the vote

Ahead of the vote, Azerbaijan pro-government news platforms were inundated with articles accusing the West of meddling in Georgia's elections as well as interviews with pro-ruling party candidates from ethnic Azerbaijani communities living in Georgia. There were no stories about opposition candidates from the same community or violations these candidates faced on election day.

It was not just traditional news outlets that were favoring the Georgian Dream Party. Even talk shows were encouraging ethnic Azerbaijanis, living in Georgia to vote for the Georgian Dream. “Support stability, peace, war free Georgia when you go to vote. Because war-free and peaceful Georgia is important for Azerbaijan. We have our compatriots living there. If the situation there gets complicated there, it will be bad for you, and for us. Bear in mind the example of Ukraine. What is Georgia like right now? Stable and peaceful, unlike Ukraine,” said the show's host, Hoshgadam Hidayatgizi, during the show.

Hidayatgizi's references to Ukraine are not surprising. Prior to the election day, Georgian Dream launched a political ad campaign featuring images of war-torn Ukraine juxtaposed with peaceful images of Georgia. According to OC Media, banners and campaign videos were released in September 2024 and showed “burnt remains of the Mariupol Drama Theatre, marked with the numbers 4, 5, 9, and 25 — the electoral numbers of the opposition Coalition for Change, Unity — National Movement, Strong Georgia, and For Georgia respectively. The contrasting image of a theatre in the western Georgian town of Senaki had Georgian Dream’s electoral number, 41, and was captioned with ‘Choose peace!’”

Following the election, Azerbaijani members of the parliament who were in Georgia to observe the election blatantly encouraged ethnic Azerbaijanis to vote for the Georgian Dream party.

Azerbaijani political commentators aren't ashamed to say that they have interfered with Georgian elections: pic.twitter.com/vV3NIS11BL

— Cavid #MakeRussiaSmallAgain (@cavidaga) October 27, 2024

Azerbaijani MP Arzu Naghiyev: pic.twitter.com/yHoF07Gzwx

— Cavid #MakeRussiaSmallAgain (@cavidaga) October 27, 2024

Similarly, one member of the Azerbaijan Parliament, Hikmet Bababoglu, speaking live on a pro-government television channel praised the election process based on his visit. “There were attempts to dramatize this election, but we did not witness any violations,” Babaoglu said in an interview. Babaoglu also criticized President Salome Zourabichvili and responses from the West, which has so far been critical of the election outcome based on reports of violations and fraud.

Georgia's ethnic Azerbaijani community

Ethnic Azerbaijanis make up the largest minority in the country. They reside in Georgia's southern province of Kvemo Kartli. Local activists say it is not the first time the Azerbaijani government has urged its diaspora to support the Georgian Dream Party.

In an interview with Meydan TV, Samira Ismayilova recalled how during the 2016 election, when then-26-year-old Ismayilova ran in the local election, vote rigging in favor of the ruling government ended with her losing the parliamentary election, despite evidence tilting the victory in her favor. Ismayilova told Meydan TV, how the government of Azerbaijan tried influencing votes by identifying influential people from the community with ties in Azerbaijan and using them as a means of reiterating a message of support in favor of the ruling government's candidate.

Samira Bayramova, another ethnic Azerbaijani living in Georgia, confirmed the influence of the Azerbaijani government in an interview with Meydan TV. Bayramova explained how, since 2016, the state oil company SOCAR has been involved in interfering in the Georgian election. The civic activist said the government sent a group of Azerbaijani officials to Georgia, specifically to the region of Kvemo Kartli, who openly supported the Georgian Dream Party's candidate and told the community members to follow suit.

Azerbaijan's encouragement often comes in various forms. Bayramova explained in the interview how SOCAR on one hand, invests in education of local communities and on the other, is involved in buying votes among members of the community.

In 2019, Azerbaijan's presence did not go unnoticed either, as the local residents were encouraged to vote for the Georgian Dream mayoral candidate in this year's election as well.

Ahead of October 26 election, scores of Azerbaijani officials, including SOCAR's vice president, vice speaker of Azerbaijani parliament, SOCAR's Georgia country director and others were visiting Georgia, for the opening of a kindergarden. SOCAR sponsored kindergardens are common in Georgia.

Ethnic Azerbaijanis interviewed by JamNews also said they were forced to vote for candidates representing the Georgian Dream. Some were told they would lose their jobs if they did not comply.

Explaining Azerbaijan's involvement

Azer Gasimli, an Azerbaijani politician and director of the Political Management Institute, finds Azerbaijan's involvement in the domestic politics of Georgia as mutually beneficial. Gasimli told Meydan TV that “it is in the interest of the government of Azerbaijan that Georgia does not integrate into European institutions and becomes more authoritarian. That there are no democratic processes taking shape.” Adding, the interests of both current ruling governments overlap and align in this regard. Azerbaijan is described in a number of international human rights reports as an authoritarian state
and for years, has had one of the lowest international track records on citizens’ rights and freedoms.

Azerbaijan held its own snap parliamentary election in September 2024. Ballot stuffing and other evidence of fraud and violations were widely documented. Attempts by independent observers to have the Central Election Commission annul results at polling stations where these violations were documented proved futile.

Perhaps relying on a similar lack of oversight, one ethnic Azerbaijani representing the Georgian Dream Party, attempted to do the same on October 26. Footage of Rovshan Isgandarov aggressively stuffing a ballot box with a stack of ballots was caught on camera and made it to the news. His actions prompted the closing of the polling station and promises of an investigation into the fraud.

Whether this and reports of election violations from other polling stations in Georgia, will have an impact on the final result of the elections remains to be seen. In an interview with BBC, on October 28, Georgia's Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze dismissed the reports as irregularities which happen everywhere while Georgian Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili denied allegations of fraud all together the same day during a press briefing.

A cinematic lens into Turkmenistan’s culture: An interview with Oguljamal Yazliyeva

Elmira Lyapina — Sun, 27 Oct 2024 05:15:19 +0000

A tale of two iconic films that help understand Turkmen culture and identity

Originally published on Global Voices

The main character from the movie “Shukur Bagshy” playing a dutar. Screenshot from the video “Şükür bagşy we Gulam bagşy birinji tapgyr” from TravelerEuropa‘s YouTube channel. Fair use.

The importance of cinema in understanding a nation’s culture and identity cannot be overstated. This is particularly true for countries like Turkmenistan, which is notorious for being one of the most isolated and closed places in the world, making it difficult for researchers and regular tourists to visit and learn about Turkmen culture.

In such a challenging context, cinema emerges as one of the few available means to delve into Turkmen culture and exploring the everyday life of Turkmen people. Fortunately, there are many Turkmen films on the internet, which can serve as a guide through Turkmenistan’s history, culture, and identity.

This article is an excerpt from an interview conducted with Mrs. Oguljamal Yazliyeva, an academic researcher of Central Asian Studies focusing on Turkmenistan and a representative of the Turkmen nation. In the interview, she discusses how Turkmen cinema reflects the nation’s deep historical roots and serves as a powerful medium for preserving its rich cultural heritage.

Kechpelek: A story of love and music

“Kechpelek” (Bitter Fate) is one of the most memorable and iconic Turkmen films. It was produced by Ovlyakuli Kuliyev in the 1970s. The film is a moving love story set against the backdrop of Turkmen musical traditions and everyday life. It tells the tale of a Turkmen bagshy (musician) named Berdymurat, played by a famous actor Baba Annanov. Kechpelek follows the love story between Berdymurat and a Turkmen girl named Maral.

The film portrays everyday life in Turkmen society, beginning with a wedding in the opening scenes and continuing with family and social relationships. The action unfolds against the backdrop of daily life — quarrels, conflicts, cooking and sharing meals, communication, games, and love. The music for the film was composed by the legendary Turkmen composer Nury Halmamedov. It holds a special role in the film, illustrating how art unites people. “It’s a very sad story, but it beautifully captures the role of music in the life of Turkmen people,” Yazliyeva reflects.

Here is the link to “Kechpelek” on YouTube.

The film’s soundtrack is an integral part of the narrative, weaving together the emotions of the characters and traditions of the Turkmen people. The songs that sounded on behalf of the main character were performed by the popular singer Annaberdy Atdanov. The music won great popularity and love of TV viewers. Over the years the main soundtrack became part of everyday life in Turkmenistan when people started using it at funerals, memorials, and other sad life-cycle events that require solemn and powerful music.

“The music in the film is incredibly famous and meaningful. It’s more than just background; it’s part of the story,” Yazliyeva notes.

Here is the link to “Mukam,” one of the songs in “Kechpelek,” performed by Annaberdy Atdanov, on YouTube.

Shukur Bagshy: Music as a weapon of peace

One of the most iconic films in Turkmen cinema is “Shukur Bagshy” (The Contest), a film by the Turkmen director of Tatar origin Bulat Mansurov. The film is based on a story by Nurmyrat Saryhanow. It portrays the power of music in the face of conflict by telling the story of a Turkmen bagshy named Shukur who takes his dutar, the Turkmen national musical instrument, to war instead of a weapon. When his brother is taken hostage by a Persian ruler, Shukur convinces his tribesmen not to launch war but let him try to free his brother via a music competition at the Persian ruler’s court.

“When asked why he brought his instrument, he [Shukur] said, ‘I will fight with my music,’” Yazliyeva recounts.

The central narrative revolves around a musical competition between a Persian musician named Ghulam and Shukur, with the freedom of Shukur’s’s brother at stake. In the end, the Turkmen musician’s peaceful resolution through music triumphs over violence, releasing his brother captured by Persians.

A philosophical film about the fate and role of human, it poses questions such as: Is it justified for a hundred people to die for one? Can a person live in peace? When is it necessary to take up arms, and when can a musical instrument serve as a weapon? To what extent can one trust authority and the enemy?

Through the lens of a musical competition, with music — specifically mugham — occupying 90 percent of the film, a powerful anti-war message emerges, as well as a statement on the necessity of power in people's lives. The dialogues are profound, and the film remains relevant today.

For example, the Persian khan responds to his vizier’s timid question about whether the Turkmen victory would threaten their rule: “If he loses, people will go to war inspired, and if he wins, they will go to war seeking revenge.”

“This film is very symbolic. It tells of the peaceful character of the Turkmen people — they don’t want war; they try to solve problems with love, music, and peace,” Yazliyeva explains.

While there is no historical or any other data that would prove Turkmen people to be more peaceful than other nations and that they resolved conflicts via music and other peaceful means, Turkmenistan has taken the path of peaceful coexistence in the modern times.

In 1995, four years after gaining independence from the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan officially adopted neutrality as the cornerstone of its foreign policy and pledged not to take sides in any armed conflicts. The country’s neutral status, which is recognized by the UN, also means that it will not join any military blocs or host military bases on its territory.

Here is the link to “Shukur Bagshy” on YouTube.

Turkmen Cinema as a cultural repository

For Yazliyeva, Turkmen cinema is much more than entertainment; it is a repository of the nation’s history, values, and identity.

If you watch Turkmen films, you can learn a lot about our culture and our history. Turkmen culture is open and hospitable, but it’s important for the world to understand us more deeply. Films are a way for people from different backgrounds to connect and learn from one another.

Turkmen cinema, with its rich storytelling and cultural depth, plays a vital role in bridging the gap between Turkmenistan and the rest of the world.

As Yazliyeva emphasizes, “Cinema helps expand knowledge about people, their history, and their development. It’s a way to connect with others and preserve our heritage for future generations.”

The themes of peace, love, and artistic expression run through the films. In a globalized world, where understanding across borders is more important than ever, Turkmen films stand as a testament to the enduring power of cultural diplomacy through art.

In Azerbaijan, the government takes treason seriously — or does it?

Arzu Geybullayeva — Fri, 25 Oct 2024 18:51:14 +0000

The charges have a chilling effect on the entire anti-war movement and ethnic minority activists but also broadly speaking on an entire civic space.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image created by Arzu Geybullayeva

Over this past summer, authorities in Azerbaijan arrested two young scholars, accusing them of treason. Igbal Abilov and Bahruz Samadov were both accused of treason and sentenced to months in detention. But what constitutes treason according to local legislation and is it being used fairly in Azerbaijan? The answer is in the details of the legislation and its implementation according to the lawyers.

The cases of Igbal Abilov and Bahruz Samadov

Before his arrest on August 21, 2024, Bahruz Samadov, was pursuing a PhD degree at Charles University in the Czech Republic. He was visiting his grandmother in Baku and was scheduled to leave for Prague the following week but police arrested Samadov outside his grand mother's home, and took him to the State Security Service. Two days later, a court in Baku handed Samadov a four-month pretrial detention on charges of treason. Samadov stands accused of conspiring against the state by communicating with Armenian nationals on WhatsApp. Samadov denies the charges.

In addition to his academic work at Charles University, Samadov has penned a series of opinion pieces on Azerbaijan for various international and regional media over the recent years. He was also among the community of peace activists who strongly opposed the Second Karabakh War in 2020, for which he and others were targeted.

In addition to Samadov, police also arrested and sentenced Igbal Abilov, who researches ethnic minorities and lives in Belarus, to four months in pre-trial detention in July 2024. Abilov was also charged with treason, as well as making calls against the state based on orders of foreign actors, and inciting national, racial, social, or religious hatred and enmity.

Shortly after Samadov's arrest, another peace activist Samad Shikhi was detained at the airport and prevented from leaving the country. He was then questioned as a witness in an investigation launched against Samadov. The most recent airport detention also includes Cavid Agha, an independent researcher who was leaving the country to pursue his studies.

A history of treason charges used to silence critics

In 2007, journalist Nvoruzali Mamedov was initially arrested on bogus drug charges, but later accused of committing treason. He was sentenced to ten years behind bars, where he died in 2009. In 2012, Hilal Mammadov was arrested on treason charges. Mammadov was a journalist and editor of a Talysh newspaper “Tolisi Sado” (The Voice of Talysh). He was sentenced to five years in prison in 2013. A year later, during Azerbaijani government's crackdown targeting civil society representatives, a couple, Leyla and Arif Yunus, were arrested on treason charges. Journalist Rauf Mirkadirov, faced similar charges after his arrest in 2014 as well. In November 2020, court in Baku sentenced journalist Polad Aslanov to 16 years imprisonment on treason charges. In February 2022, his sentence was reduced to 13 years. In 2017, at least three citizens were arrested on treason charges. In October 2024, Mirhafiz Jafarzade, an ethnic Talysh holding Russian citizenship, was sentenced to 16 years behind bars also on treason charges. Jafarzade was arrested in November 2022. Abilov and Samadov, are most recent names, targeted on treason grounds.

What does the legislation say?

According to Article 274 (high treason) of the Criminal Code:

High treason, that is to say a deliberate act committed by a citizen of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the detriment of the Republic of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, territorial inviolability, state security or defense capacity: [namely] joining the enemy; espionage; the transfer of state secret to a foreign state; [or] providing assistance to a foreign state, organization or their representatives by carrying out hostile activity against the Republic of Azerbaijan, is punishable by deprivation of liberty for a period of twelve to twenty years, or life imprisonment.

In the case of Bahruz Samadov, according to lawyer Samed Rahimli, the State Security Service (also known as the National Security Agency) accused the scholar of treason on the grounds that he committed espionage in an indirect way, meaning, he was acting on instructions of Armenian special services by providing miscellaneous information, that was damaging the national security; and that he aided and abetted the adversarial actions of Armenian special services by inciting ethnic and national hatred through his publications under their instructions.

The State Security Service used Samadov's private communication with at least two Armenian activists in which the scholar shared publicly available information on the reconstruction projects of formerly occupied territories among other things, as evidence for espionage. The State Security Service also alleged that Samadov’s anti-war publications, and his op-eds against Azerbaijan government's official narrative on various issues, including the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, were evidence for his aiding and abetting Armenian state security.

As such, the State Security Service perceived Armenian activists with whom Samadov communicated as official representatives of Armenian special services, and their exchanges as instructions, in the absence of any substantial evidence.

Rahimli, who is familiar with the case, said that private communication cited in the case, as evidence, does not prove that Samadov committed espionage in light of the information he shared being publicly available. As such, it cannot be categorized as a breach of national security by virtue of law and is therefore unreasonable. In addition, Rahimli pointed out that the meaning of indirect espionage — delivery of miscellaneous information, damaging to national security — is vague, and there is no existing case law clarifying its meaning. All of this to say, the treason charges leveled against Samadov, were unlawful and inadmissible.

Similarly, in the case of Igbal Abilov who, in addition to being accused of treason is also accused of making public calls to violence against the state and incitement to national, racial, social, or religious hatred and enmity, there is no evidence proving these crimes. The State Security Service claim Abilov was acting on instructions from officials at the Talysh Studies Center at the Yerevan State University (which the security service of Azerbaijan also considers as indirect representatives/officials of the Armenia Special Services) and the former or current leadership of the unrecognized Talysh government-in-exile. And as such, the security services are referring to Abilov's private communication with the officials and his publications on the internet, including his social media posts, as proof. According to Samed Rahimov this private communication does not prove that Abilov committed treason and related charges, because in his capacity as an academic, researching ethnic minority issues, Abilov's communication with the Talysh Studies Center and the exiled group does not prove he was acting on their instructions.

In both Abilov and Samadov's cases, the two men were forced to give out their passwords under duress to their devices.

According to Rahimli there are far greater implications of treason charges leveled against Samadov and Abilov.

In addition to severe and negative consequences for the two scholars (they are facing a minimum sentence of 12 years), the charges have a chilling effect on the entire anti-war movement and ethnic minority activists but also broadly speaking on an entire civic space.

The travel bans imposed on Shikhi and Agha, following Samadov's arrest, attest to this. And these are not isolated bans as local rights defenders estimate the number of travel bans as higher than the numbers publicly known.

In Azerbaijan, owning and operating drones is no easy feat

Meltem Talibzade — Fri, 18 Oct 2024 12:03:10 +0000

It's nearly impossible to obtain permission to own drones in Azerbaijan

Originally published on Global Voices

Photoart from pixabay created via Canva.

According to existing legal requirements, the license permit to use drones in Azerbaijan is the same as that for using certain weapons, explosive devices, and money-printing equipment. Drones are included in the list of items restricted to individual use by Article 18 of Law no. 564, “On the list of items now allowed for civilian use.” Similarly, the law has identified six government agencies responsible for authorizing each unique piece of equipment as well as its permit, which means that obtaining permission to own a drone is a cumbersome and painstakingly bureaucratic process.

The same rules apply when importing a drone. Would-be drone owners must submit an electronic application to the State Civil Aviation Administration and obtain approval from the six government agencies outlined in the law.

In practice, this means that a student wanting to fly a drone in the yard of their school or home, a school or university wanting to implement innovative educational solutions with the help of drones, a tourist wanting to photograph a city site, and a media organization wanting to use a drone to prepare a news article all must obtain permission from these government agencies.

A special permit can be obtained in cases of legal and natural persons (only those who are sole proprietors). The special permit is given by the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport, taking into account the opinions of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Security Service, the State Border Service, and the Security Service of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (this authority is exercised by the State Civil Aviation Agency operating under the Ministry).

Article 156 of the Criminal Code indicates that those who use drones to violate others’ privacy can face strict consequences.

Permissions to operate a drone have been particularly strict for journalists and activists. In 2018, civic activist Bakhtiyar Hajiyev had his drone confiscated after ordering it from the United States and not obtaining the necessary permission for its operation. In 2021, blogger Mehman Husynov was detained by the police, and his drone was also confiscated. Huseynov was taking pictures of properties illegally acquired by government officials.

When Huseynov tried bringing in a second drone, the State Customs Committee did not grant him the permission on the grounds that Huseynov did not have official approval from the aforementioned six government agencies. Huseynov, never formally applied to obtain a permit.

In the case of Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, the activist did appeal to the relevant agencies only to receive a rejection months later on various grounds including claims that Hajiyev’s indicated purpose of use was not suitable.

At the time of writing this story, no shipping company in Azerbaijan accepts drone shipments.

These strict policies indicate that one reason for this excessive red tape is that the government and its officials fear drone footage might be used to expose their corruption, for instance, taking videos of their private property.

Independent experts in Azerbaijan think that these rules are fairly harsh and unnecessary in an age when global resources and satellite services can track any object.

Any hopes for changing this system lie with the draft bill on aviation, which was first mentioned in 2022 by the Minister of Communications and High Technologies Rashad Nabiyev. The bill promised to create more streamlined policies and procedures on the use and registration of drones. Yet, two years since the Minister first spoke of the bill, nothing has changed.

The same legislation allows remote-controlled drones with a special permit granted to just a handful of civil society representatives.

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