A Malian soldier’s military uniform. Image produced on Canva by Global Voices.
This article by Arnauld Kassouin and Moucharaf Soumanouest was first published in French on Bénin Intelligent on August 26, 2024. Global Voices republished the article as part of a media partnership agreement.
Ukraine’s involvement in an attack by the separatist rebels of the Tuareg ethnic group on Africa Corps (formerly Wagner), a Russian paramilitary group allied with the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), which took place in Mali from July 25 to 27, 2024, was the defining moment that brought two separate wars together in the Sahel.
On August 1, the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA) reported that this attack on Tinzaouaten, a commune in the northwestern Kidal region bordering Algeria, had claimed the lives of 47 Malian and 84 Russian soldiers. The CSP-DPA is a coalition of Tuareg political and military movements in northern Mali, which has been waging war against the Malian government since 2013 over the independence of the Azawad territory.
Read: The Sahel faces resurgence of terrorist attacks
However, this attack is also an example of how the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 are being felt far beyond European borders. The CSP-DPA gained ground in July due to Ukraine’s intervention. On July 29, Andriy Yusov, the Ukrainian Intelligence Agency’s (GUR) spokesperson, confirmed his office was “in contact with the separatist rebels in northern Mali.”
The CSP-DPA spokesperson Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane was quick to clarify the matter on Radio France Internationale (RFI):
Bien sûr, nous avons des contacts avec les Ukrainiens, avec tout le monde, et particulièrement avec ceux qui subissent la terreur de Wagner.
Of course, we are in contact with the Ukrainians, with everyone, especially those living under Wagner’s terror.
According to French newspaper Libération, Yusov confirmed on Ukrainian television that:
Les combattants du CSP-DPA ont reçu des informations nécessaires qui leur ont permis de mener une opération militaire réussie contre les criminels de guerre russes.
The CSP-DPA fighters received the information they required to carry out a successful military operation against Russian war criminals.
In an article by online news outlet Maliweb, Russian expert Oleg Nesterenko said:
C’est une opération qui s’inscrit dans le cadre du projet secret de la Direction des renseignements de l’Ukraine.
This operation was part of a classified project by Ukraine’s Intelligence Directorate.
Yurii Pyvovarov, the Ukrainian ambassador to Senegal, commented on Yusov’s video:
Le travail se poursuivra. Il y aura certainement d’autres résultats. La punition des crimes de guerre et du terrorisme est inévitable. C’est un axiome.
The work continues, and there will undoubtedly be further developments. Punishment for war crimes and terrorism is inevitable. This is self-evident.
The Russo–Ukrainian war moves to the Sahel
Could Ukraine’s open support for the CSP-DPA rebels be considered the start of a proxy war linking the Donbas in eastern Ukraine with the Sahel?
In a telephone interview with the BBC, Bakary Sambe, the regional director of the Timbuktu Institute, an African research center for peace, stated:
D’après les derniers événements au Mali, ce n’est plus une guerre par procuration, mais plutôt une véritable guerre froide dont le nouveau terrain de jeu se déroule dans la région sahélienne.
Based on the recent events in Mali, this is no longer a proxy war but a full-blown cold war in the Sahel region.
Comments made by Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, appear to confirm Sambe’s claims. One week after the events on July 27, Zakharova accused Ukraine of opening a second front in Africa. Swiss public broadcasting organization, Radio Télévision Suisse (RTS), quoted her as saying:
Incapable de vaincre la Russie sur le champ de bataille, le régime criminel de Zelensky a décidé d’ouvrir un deuxième front en Afrique. Le gouvernement ukrainien soutient des groupes terroristes dans des États du continent favorables à Moscou.
Unable to defeat Russia on the battlefield, Zelenskyy’s criminal regime has decided to open a second front in Africa. The Ukrainian government supports terrorist groups in the African states that support Moscow.
In an article published on Wathi, a citizen think tank based in Dakar, capital of Senegal, Bah Traoré Legrand, a researcher in disinformation, explained:
Le Mali est devenu un théâtre d’affrontements indirects entre la Russie et l’Ukraine, et ce, à cause de la dynamique de la géopolitique internationale actuelle.
Due to the current dynamics of international geopolitics, Mali has become the backdrop for indirect clashes between Russia and Ukraine.
According to Irina Filatova, a Russian historian based in South Africa, there is a clear rationale behind the Ukrainians’ involvement. She explained to German media company Deutsche Welle:
Ils (Ukrainiens) doivent montrer aux pays africains que les Russes ne sont pas tout-puissants, qu’ils peuvent aussi perdre.
They (the Ukrainians) have to prove to African countries that the Russians are not all-powerful and can also lose.
In a BBC Afrique (BBC Africa) article, Paul Melly, an analyst and researcher at Chatham House, a London-based think tank, is quoted as saying:
Les allusions de Kiev à une implication directe confirment jusqu’où elle est prête à aller pour mener sa riposte contre le président russe.
Kyiv’s mention of direct involvement confirms just how far it is prepared to go in retaliation against the Russian president.
Indeed, Kyiv’s strategy in Africa is to loosen “Russia’s grip” on this continent. Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kouleba explained to Africanews:
Nous ne voulons pas être une autre Russie. Notre stratégie n'est pas de remplacer la Russie, mais de libérer l'Afrique de l'emprise russe.
We don’t want to be another Russia. Our strategy is not to replace Russia but to free Africa from Russia’s grip.
Geopolitical implications
Ukraine’s involvement with the CSP-DPA rebels is not without its consequences: Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger subsequently broke off their diplomatic relations with Ukraine. These three countries were determined to make their voices heard and took the matter to the United Nations Security Council.
In memorandum no.24-003-AES, all three countries “denounced and strongly condemned the Ukrainian government’s open support for international terrorism, especially in the Sahel.”
Paul Melly added:
Il s’agit là d’un nouveau cas où des puissances extérieures exploitent le continent comme un terrain de jeu sanglant pour leurs propres rivalités.
This is yet another example of external powers using this continent as a bloody playground for their rivalries.
Yassine Fall, Senegal’s Minister of African Integration and Foreign Affairs, didn’t hesitate to remind Yurii Pyvarovov of his duties the day after his comments. A statement that the news outlet Anadolu covered states:
Concernant l’ambassadeur d’Ukraine à Dakar qui a été convoqué, il lui a été rappelé les obligations de discrétion, de retenue et de non-ingérence qui doivent accompagner la gravité et la solennité de sa mission.
The Ukrainian ambassador in Dakar who was summoned was reminded of his obligations of discretion, restraint, and non-interference, which go hand in hand with the seriousness and solemnity of his role.
Likewise, on August 5, 2024, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) released a statement expressing “its firm disapproval and condemnation of all foreign interference in this region.”
A repeat of the Libyan situation in Mali?
In 2011, Libya experienced a similar situation. During the Libyan Revolution between March and October that year, a civil war pitting the forces loyal to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi against the opposing rebels led to an international military intervention of around 20 countries.
The current situation in Mali, especially in Kidal, is reminiscent of the Libyan crisis. Amidou Tidjani, a teacher-researcher at Paris 13 University, states:
Nous sommes désormais dans un conflit d’État à État à travers des acteurs indirects qui sont groupes armés terroristes.
We are now experiencing an inter-state conflict involving indirect parties, which are armed terrorist groups.
Fakoro Traoré, the author of the article titled Tinzaouaten or the proxy war, which Malian media outlet Bamada published, believes:
Ce qui s’est passé à Tizawaten est guerre de recolonisation. Il est la suite logique de la guerre contre Kadhafi.
What happened in Tinzaouaten is a war of recolonization, which is consistent with the war against Gaddafi.
Libyanization, typified by the collapse of state authority and the proliferation of armed groups, is, therefore, a real danger. Ukraine’s recent involvement in supporting Malian rebels could further exacerbate this instability by fuelling internal conflicts. These dynamics could prompt other regional or international actors to intervene in the Sahel region, thus increasing the risk of the fragmentation of all Sahel countries.
Wassim Nasr, a journalist and specialist in Jihadist movements, told French media outlet Le Grand Continent that:
La région du Sahel s’inscrit aussi bien que le Soudan dans la stratégie ukrainienne d’internationalisation de la lutte contre la Russie.
The Sahel region and Sudan both fall within Ukraine’s strategy to internationalize its fight against Russia.
In a publication titled “Ukraine: Training terrorist groups in the Sahel, mercenaries, and the incursion into Russia,” Oleg Nesterenko stated that “these Ukrainian strikes against Mali couldn’t take place without direct support from NATO countries.”
