Global Climate Justice Fellowship – Global Voices

China's impact on the Rogun Dam Project in Tajikistan

Shahida Yakub — Wed, 20 Nov 2024 12:00:27 +0000

The project has significant social and environmental implications

Originally published on Global Voices

The Rogun Dan being constructed. Image by Sosh19632 via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.

The Rogun Dam, located on the Vakhsh River in Tajikistan, is one of the most ambitious hydropower projects in the world, let alone in Central Asia. Designed to be the world's tallest dam, with a projected height of 335 meters (1,099 feet), it is poised to transform Tajikistan’s energy landscape by providing an estimated output of 13.1bn kWh, with a total capacity of 3,600 MW.

About 90 percent of energy in Tajikistan is created through hydropower, with the Nurek hydroelectric power station (opened in 1980) producing 11.4 bln kHw — almost half of all electric power produced in Tajikistan.

Tajikistan’s energy sector has been in a state of crisis for years now. This crisis is due mainly to aging power generation assets, many of which have not been modernized since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ,as well as added pressures due to climate change. Given that so much of Tajikistan's energy generation is driven by hydroelectric power, decreasing water levels due to shrinking glaciers and other climate pressures are causes for concern.

The Vakhsh River, which has been experiencing a decrease in water levels due to mismanagement and climate change. Screenshot of video “20201201 Rogun Dam – Video Drone” by Marco Piscoya. Fair use.

In 2020, Tajik officials released a statement notifying residents that there would be electricity use limits and outages throughout the country, largely because “the volume of water in the country’s largest river Vakhsh had fallen by 50 percent. As a result … the water level of the Nurek reservoir, had fallen by 17 metres compared to 2019.” This decrease in water meant the Nurek Dam was unable to meet the country's electricity needs.

These limitations on energy consumption have become an annual event in Tajikistan, especially during winter. Despite the decreased water levels, Emomali Rahmon, the Tajik president, maintains that “with the construction of Rogun Dam, we are not only resolving the problems with electric energy for the population, but we are also creating a solid basis for the development of various spheres of economy.”

Construction of the Rogun Dam started in 1976, but it was stopped due to political and funding challenges. As of November 2018, 75 of the total 335 meters had been built, and one turbine of six is in operation. Officials estimate that, with proper funding, the dam could be fully completed by 2028.

China's expanding role in Central Asia

China's growing influence in Central Asia is part of its larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strategy, wherein it is seeking to expand infrastructure and trade links between China and various regions of the world. Tajikistan, as a strategically important landlocked country bordering China, is a key partner in the BRI framework. This relationship is underpinned by Chinese investments in infrastructure, mining, and hydropower.

China’s involvement in the Rogun Dam project is driven by its geopolitical interests, desire to secure stable energy supplies, and strategic influence over Central Asian infrastructure.

Building the Rogun Dam requires vast financial resources. When the project first resumed in 2008, officials estimated the overall cost would be about USD 3 billion, but this amount has ballooned over the years to over USD 9.7 billion total. For a country like Tajikistan, whose economy is relatively small and reliant on remittances, this is a monumental expense. So far, Tajikistan has already spent USD 3.3 billion on the project but still lacks at least USD 6.4 billion to finish building the dam, according to estimates made in August 2024. During the last decade, the projected costs of completing the Rogun Dam have increased by 15 percent annually.

Chinese banks and investment institutions have become key financiers of infrastructure projects across Central Asia, including Tajikistan. Chinese funding has supplemented Tajikistan's efforts to finance the dam, either through direct investments or loans to Tajikistan’s government.

Chinese investment in the Rogun Dam Project

Tajikistan and the Rogun Dam. Image by C1MM via Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 3.0.

China’s influence on the Rogun Dam project is part of its broader strategy to increase its presence in Central Asia. While Tajikistan is the main driver of the project, Chinese financial resources, technical expertise, and geopolitical interests have had a significant impact on its development.

It's noteworthy that, even as China seeks to strengthen its ties in Central Asia, the scale of Chinese financing is very limited compared to other investors in the dam. According to an analyst who spoke to Global Voices on condition of anonymity, “Chinese actors tend to avoid investment in controversial projects.” While Chinese companies have previously explored hydroelectric projects in Tajikistan, most of these efforts were abandoned to appease downstream Uzbekistan, which could see its water supply suffer if the upstream rivers are dammed, thereby hindering its cotton industry. Criticism from environmental groups is also spooking further Chinese investment.

But money isn't the only way China is supporting the project. China’s contribution to the Rogun Dam project is also evident in its technical assistance and engineering expertise. Chinese companies have established a dominant presence in Central Asian infrastructure development, including hydropower projects. Chinese engineers, contractors, and firms bring expertise that is critical for the construction of such a massive and complex project as the Rogun Dam.

But China has its own motivations for supporting the effort, despite the controversy.

While Tajik officials hope the dam will be able to solve its electricity crisis, they also are looking to their energy-starved neighbors as potential customers for the surpluses energy that is produced. Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are especially attractive options that would benefit from a reliable, sustainable energy source. In securing water and electricity resources through Central Asia, China is indirectly supporting its broader regional water and energy interests, as well as ensuring the stability of energy supplies that feed into its Belt and Road Initiative.

Environmental and social implications

Even as the Rogun Dam promises considerable economic and energy benefits, its environmental and social impacts are significant, and China’s involvement further complicates the equation.

Environmental activists report that over 7,000 people have already been displaced from the reservoir zone, and it is estimated that some 38,000 more are going to be further resettled to other regions of Tajikistan. However, this displacement was not without controversy. There were complaints that governmental compensation was not enough to buy a new house in the area of relocation.

Moreover, activists also raise concerns about mismanagement and lack of financial transparency in the construction of the dam. It was reported that, five years ago, one of the dam's power generators stopped working. In an interview with the analytical site Cabar.asia, a Tajik energy expert says that poor-quality cement, reinforcements, and other low-quality building materials have been used during the construction. Moreover, environmental activists say there has been a lack of transparency surrounding the construction and point out the high levels of corruption in Tajikistan, and the lack of public discussions of the project amid longstanding suppression of human rights in the country.

Environmental activists have also expressed fears that the dam will disrupt the natural flow of the Vakhsh River, affecting biodiversity and agriculture in downstream areas.

China’s track record on environmental considerations in infrastructure projects has been mixed. While Chinese investment brings much-needed funding, it also raises concerns about environmental oversight and long-term sustainability. Some critics argue that Chinese-backed infrastructure projects often prioritize economic gains over environmental protections, exacerbating the negative consequences of large-scale dams.

As the Rogun Dam nears completion, the balance of these factors will shape the future of Tajikistan’s energy landscape and its relationship with China. The dam represents not only a milestone in Tajikistan’s development but also a microcosm of the broader dynamics shaping Central Asia’s integration into China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

To learn more about the intersection of Chinese development projects and climate justice in the Global Majority, see our Climate Justice Fellowship Project:

Fueling China's EV expansion: The green revolution and its environmental demands in Central Asia

Shahida Yakub — Mon, 16 Sep 2024 17:46:34 +0000

While overall emissions will go down, mining will increase

Originally published on Global Voices

The BYD Han and Xpeng P7 electric vehicles. Chinese car manufacturer Xpeng plans to increase its green vehicle investment in Central Asia. Image from Wikipedia, license CC BY-SA 4.0.

China's burgeoning electric vehicle (EV) industry is making significant inroads into Central Asia, a region historically reliant on traditional automotive technologies and fossil fuels. During a recent visit to Tajikistan in July, Chinese leader Xi Jinping emphasized the need for collaboration on green energy cars. Two of China’s biggest EV companies, Xpeng and Li Auto, recently announced plans to focus on emerging markets in Central Asia and the Middle East. Chinese state media hailed electric vehicle exports as a sign of friendship and collaboration between China and Central Asia.

However, experts caution that China’s EV expansion may come with some short-term environmental costs, particularly in Central Asia. This region is rich in minerals critical for EV production but heavily reliant on fossil fuels for its own energy consumption.

Central Asia's energy landscape: Reliance on fossil fuels

China is at the forefront of the global transition to electric vehicles (EVs) largely because it has spent decades investing in and building up its talent, production capacity, and infrastructure in the green technology field. Its comprehensive approach includes robust manufacturing capabilities, significant investments in battery technology, extensive training and education, and substantial government support.

This steady investment has created something of an overcapacity issue, as numerous international researchers and economists say China's green technology output level and capacity outpace global demand. Chinese officials and state-run media outlets staunchly deny these claims, calling them “slander.” Nonetheless, in seeking consumers for its green energy and technology products, China is increasingly turning to foreign markets. This approach has been quite successful as, despite high tariffs imposed by the US and Europe aimed at curbing its EV expansion, China now accounts for close to 60 percent of all new EVs sold worldwide.

Regional collaboration on EVs

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have become regional hubs for Chinese EVs. As China’s biggest trading partner in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has pledged to increase collaboration on EVs and critical minerals. For Uzbekistan, China’s leading EV company BYD began producing new energy vehicles in an Uzbek factory, marking the establishment of its first factory in Central Asia. BYD has ambitious plans to increase its production in Uzbekistan to 500,000 cars a year.

The BYD Song Plus EV. One of the region's most popular electric vehicles. Image from Wikipedia, license CC BY-SA 4.0.

Despite the increasing popularity of EVs, in Kazakhstan, the share of EVs as opposed to gas/diesel-based cars is only 0.11 percent. Thus far, Uzbekistan is the leader of EVs in the region, where EVs make up 5.7 percent of the total vehicular landscape.

While some are concerned that the widespread adoption of EVs will increase electricity demand, potentially leading to increased emissions — particularly as much of the region's electricity is currently generated from coal — numerous studies and reports have debunked this fear.

Studies by the University of Cambridge in the UK and Nijmegen in the Netherlands show that electric vehicles are still more environmentally friendly than gas cars in 95 percent of the world, even when their power comes primarily from coal. However, the benefits of an EV transition could be blunted in a coal-based power grid unless a nation's green energy capacity is simultaneously expanded.

To bolster this green transition, Uzbekistan has committed to producing 30 percent of its electricity from solar energy, with plans to build solar and wind electric stations with a capacity of eight gigawatts by 2030, aided by foreign investors. However, this green grid development is already facing some hurdles, as Western investors are hesitant to invest in Uzbekistan due to a lack of rule of law and protection of investments, according to people close to the Uzbek foreign investment environment who spoke to Global Voices on condition of anonymity.

Increased demand for minerals due to EV expansion

In addition to selling EVs to Central Asia, China is also tapping into the region’s rich mineral resources to fulfil its demand for nickel, cobalt and lithium, which are all critical minerals in the manufacturing of batteries for electric vehicles. Kazakhstan, for example, has seen significant Chinese investment in mining infrastructure to supply EV production and battery manufacturing needs.

During his recent visit to Kazakhstan in July, Chinese leader Xi Jinping pledged to cultivate growth and cooperation in areas including renewable energy and critical minerals. Last year, Kazakhstan agreed to collaborate with China's leading metal producer, Zijin Mining Group, to improve its mining technology.

Aside from lithium, Kazakhstan is also rich in copper, an essential mineral in EV batteries. Kazakhstan is among the top 15 countries globally for copper production and reserves. Last year, China and Kazakhstan signed a memorandum to collaborate on clean energy in Zhezkazgan, the most important copper mining town in Kazakhstan.

This mining further complicates Kazakhstan's green energy transition, as mining activities can take a significant environmental toll and also negatively affect the health and quality of life for workers and those in the surrounding regions.

For decades, Zhezkazgan has seen environmental degradation and poor health among residents due to reliance on copper mining. Zhezkazgan’s overall mortality rates from cancer and respiratory diseases are much higher than the national average of Kazakhstan. And new Chinese investments in Zhezkazgan’s copper industry are unlikely to address residents’ concerns over water and air safety, or poor working conditions, according to Yipeng Zhou, who studies the history of mining in Central Eurasia.

Reducing the region's carbon footprint and pivoting to clean energy requires scaling up of EV deployment, a market dominated by China. However, the expansion of Chinese EVs also puts a strain on mineral resources in Central Asia where mining practices have put the local environment and residents’ health at risk.

Boycotting Xinjiang cotton: What does it mean for environmental and labor justice in Central Asia?

Shahida Yakub — Wed, 03 Jul 2024 11:33:54 +0000

Are other cotton producers faring better on labor and environmental issues?

Originally published on Global Voices

Workers pick cotton in Uzbekistan. Image via Wikipedia. Creative Commons license CC0 1.0

In recent years, the international community has boycotted cotton sourced from Xinjiang, a vast region in northwestern China, due to concerns over human rights violations. Under the leadership of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Beijing has subjected Xinjiang’s Muslim minorities to arbitrary detention and forced labor. Some global cotton buyers, in response, have turned to other regions to fulfill cotton demands.

The boycotting of Xinjiang cotton has created something of a ripple effect in other parts of the world, where cotton harvesting is associated with environmental challenges and human rights abuses. One of the most glaring examples of this is Uzbekistan, where cotton production contributed to one of the biggest environmental catastrophes in the world, the drying out of the Aral Sea, as well as decades of forced labor practices.

The Xinjiang cotton industry under scrutiny

Situated in northwestern China and bordering Central Asia, Xinjiang is home to approximately 12 million Uyghurs, a Turkic-speaking ethnic group that is predominantly Muslim. The region began to see large-scale cotton production in the 1950s when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) placed its economy under the control of a paramilitary institution known as the Production and Construction Corps (or bingtuan 兵团).

Researchers and human rights organizations have found that the Bingtuan forced members of local communities and prisoners — potentially more than half a million people — to work in mining, construction, manufacturing, and cotton harvesting under harsh conditions. Today, Xinjiang is pivotal in China’s cotton production, accounting for over 85 percent of the country’s output and 20 percent of the global supply. The Bingtuan is still responsible for around one-third of Xinjiang’s cotton production.

The cotton industry in Xinjiang has historically relied on manual picking. Despite the Chinese government’s claims of significant progress in machine harvesting, 60 percent of cotton harvesting in southern Xinjiang, remains a manual effort, according to Chinese state media and government statistics. In recent years, human rights organizations and international news media have uncovered evidence of systematic forced labor programs that coerced Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities to work in cotton fields and factories.

According to Chinese state media, the cotton textile industry in Xinjiang employs close to a million workers, although Beijing denies allegations of forced labor. These labor programs are part of Beijing’s broader strategy to maintain political stability in Xinjiang, international organizations say. The US government first banned Xinjiang cotton imports before subsequently passing a law to ban nearly all imports from the region in 2021. Brands like Nike, H&M, and Burberry have also publicly severed ties with Xinjiang cotton suppliers — moves that drew condemnation and boycotts from Chinese consumers.

This widespread international backlash has not only affected Xinjiang but also led to scrutiny of the cotton supply chain worldwide, as nations and companies reevaluated their dependencies on China.

Shifting tides of cotton sourcing

In recent years, many industries including textile and clothing have shifted operations from China to countries like Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Turkey, in order to avoid increased labor costs in China and the West's heightened regulatory scrutiny for Chinese products. However, paradoxically, in some cases, this increased demand for a more just cotton supply chain is exacerbating local environmental issues and worsening labor rights conditions.

Cotton is one of the most resource and labor-intensive agricultural commodities in land, water, and labor. In developing countries and regions, the cotton industry has long grappled with labor abuses and environmental issues, such as the depletion of water, soil contamination, and overuse of pesticides.

In Uzbekistan, Central Asia’s top cotton producer, an estimated 60 percent of agricultural water is wasted yearly due to mismanagement and obsolete technologies. The country is also known for labor exploitation in cotton production. Since 2011 Uzbekistan’s cotton products faced global boycotts because of the use of child and forced labor. Over 330 international brands and retailers supported this boycott. International pressure forced the Uzbek government to commit to agricultural reforms and eradicating forced child labor during the cotton harvest, which resulted in the lifting of the boycott in 2022.

However, experts believe that the labor risks are still very high. In an interview with Global Voices, Umida Niyazova, director of Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, a non-governmental organization based in Germany said:

Uzbekistan is still not willing to change its anti-market rules of regulation of its cotton industry. The central government and local authorities are still operating on a quota basis, whereas every region of the country has to produce a certain amount of cotton and assigns land to farmers specifically to grow only cotton.

The persistence of this quota system and the associated administrative pressures became evident during a video conference wherein the Deputy Advisor to the President of Uzbekistan Shukhrat Ganiev directly threatened farmers: “I don’t care what you do but you must deliver 11 thousand tons of cotton. Don’t play with it, don’t play — otherwise, it will end very badly for you and for the regional governor.”

The lifting of the boycott on Uzbek cotton in 2022 coincided with sanctions being imposed on cotton from Xinjiang. Uzbek officials looked to take advantage of this situation, even as many textile brands were wary of partnering with Uzbekistan in light of its unresolved environmental and human rights violations. Brands’ hesitation to move their production chain from Xinjiang to Uzbekistan didn’t stop the Uzbek president from announcing his ambitious plans to turn his country into a textile hub and increase the production of yarn up to 100 percent by 2027. In order to stimulate this strategy, the Uzbek government intends to create textile production zones and release them from taxation until 2027.

Due to a combination of political, geographic, and social factors, Uzbekistan is especially vulnerable to the climate crisis, with environmental watchdogs ranking it 96th out of 181 countries in 2020 for climate risk. To mitigate this, Uzbekistan signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement in 2015, as well as the United Nation’s Europe Protocol on Water and Health, which aims to protect human health and well-being through better water management. However, despite the pledges made by the Uzbek government, the lack of progress in agricultural reforms and tight control over farmers makes experts skeptical about the progress

China was and still remains one of the key foreign investors in Uzbekistan. Since 2017, the scale of China’s investments in the country increased fivefold and amounts to USD 11.1 billion, according to Uzbek Minister for Trade and Investments, Laziz Kudratov. One of the key areas of China’s investment is textiles and agriculture. Though partnership with China is hailed by the Uzbek government, human rights defenders are concerned about transparency in observing labor rights and care for the environment. In an interview with Global Voices, Umida Niyazova, director of the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights said.

When we talk about Chinese-owned textile factories or cotton clusters, we need to forget about any sort of advocacy. When we carried out our campaign to boycott Uzbek cotton, Western companies were signing up for this, but Chinese companies didn’t care. They continued to buy Uzbek cotton and they didn’t care about human rights violations or environmental justice. It would be much better if Western companies came to Uzbekistan, because they follow very strict regulations when it comes to labor or environment. We don’t see this happening with Chinese companies.

China increases gas imports from Turkmenistan for green energy transition. It's impact is unclear

Global Climate Justice Fellowship — Thu, 06 Jun 2024 07:25:37 +0000

Will China replacing coal with natural gas help the climate?

Originally published on Global Voices

Oil wells in Balkan Provence, Turkmenistan. Image via Wikicommons license (CC BY-SA 4.0)

China is the biggest energy consumer and importer in the world. Oil, gas and coal imports to China account for around 85 percent, 40 percent and 7 percent of the country’s domestic consumption, respectively; and about 18 percent, 16 percent and 18 percent of the global trade of these commodities.

China’s economy and energy industries were and still are heavily reliant on coal, which is posing environmental and health risks both at home and abroad. In order to reduce the country’s dependency on coal, the State Council of China announced an action plan for air pollution prevention and control and proposed to move to “coal-to-gas/electricity projects” in 2013.

Although China is developing its domestic gas and oil production, it is still heavily dependent on foreign gas exports. In 2021 its dependency on foreign gas reached 44.37 percent.

China’s main natural gas suppliers are Australia Russia, Qatar and Turkmenistan, with Turkmenistan supplying more than half of its pipeline gas imports.

Turkmenistan increases gas supplies to China

Part of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline system. Image via the state-run New China TV Youtube channel.

In 2022, Turkmenistan exported 35 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to China and overtook Russia which is now China’s second-largest gas exporter at 10 bcm per year. This increase comes even as China pays 30 percent more for Turkmen gas than for Russian gas. Reuters news agency quoted industry insiders claiming that China has failed to negotiate less cost for Turkmen gas because the Turkmen government insist on staying “in line with global pricing practices”.

China imports pipeline gas as well as liquefied natural gas (LNG). The difference between the two is once a pipeline is built it stays in place, whereas LNG is transported via transport tankers. In 2022, pipeline gas import accounted for 42 percent of China's total gas import.

Workers in Xinjiang, China, inspect part of the Central Asian Gas Pipeline, which starts in Turkmenistan. Screenshot via the state-run China Global News Network's YouTube channel.

Turkmenistan supplies gas to China via the 1,833-kilometer-long Central Asia-China pipeline system. It consists of three pipelines running parallel to each other, A, B, and C and the fourth one, pipeline D is currently under construction, indicating that China is and will continue to prioritize gas exports from Central Asia over Russian gas. Reuters news agency quoted a Chinese state oil official saying, “Central Asian pipelines are considered a cornerstone investment in China's energy and geopolitical space. It's a supply channel with a strategic value that supersedes commercial concerns.”

Turkmenistan plays a key role in China’s Central Asian gas supplies and relations between the two countries are crucial for both.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Turkmenistan President Serdar Berdimuhamedov shake hands on May 18, 2023. During this meeting, they discussed the countries’ energy trade deals, among other issues. Image via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the PRC. Free to use.

In 2009, China signed a gas deal with Turkmenistan, where Turkmenistan committed to increasing its gas exports to China by 30 percent each year. According to the report published by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, “China has now replaced exports to Russia as the mainstay of Turkmenistan’s gas business, and of its export revenues.” Turkmenistan is considered a high-risk country for international investors due to the government’s total control of the economy, corruption and weak regulatory legislation. At the same time, the Turkmen government doesn’t seem willing to change the current state of affairs, with one Oxford Energy report noting, “Turkmenistan now relies on two foreign companies — Chinese National Petroleum Corporation and Petronas — for more than one-quarter of its gas output”.

Turkmenistan’s export revenues and overall economy depend significantly on its gas exports to China. In 2022, Turkmenistan exported USD 12.5 billion worth of goods, with USD 10.3 billion of that being gas exports to China — a staggering 82 percent of their total exports.

Methane leaks in Turkmenistan

For China, buying gas from Turkmenistan not only diversifies its energy sources but also supports its effort to reduce carbon emissions. Natural gas is less carbon-intensive than coal, and transitioning from coal to natural gas in power plants and factories can cut CO2 emissions by nearly half.

However, this doesn't come without risk. Turkmenistan is home to some of the world's most serious methane leakage incidents. In 2021, the Paris-based International Energy Agency found Turkmenistan responsible for a third of large emission events around the globe. According to energy experts, methane leaks from the country’s two main fossil fuel fields caused more global heating in 2022 than the entire carbon emissions of the United Kingdom. The climate advantage of natural gas may be negated as Turkmenistan struggles to contain the leaks.

Methane leaks in Turkmenistan are believed to come from ageing and poorly maintained oil and gas pipelines and from the venting to the atmosphere of unwanted methane gas that is produced alongside oil. However, Turkmenistan remains one of the most closed countries in the world, and it is impossible to independently verify if work to combat methane leakage has started yet.

The importance of methane as a greenhouse gas has become much better understood in recent years, and today it is estimated that methane emissions are responsible for as much as 25 percent of greenhouse gas emissions today. Methane leaks are therefore a major threat to the fight against climate change and the natural disasters that it will bring. There is a growing global focus on addressing methane leaks from fossil fuel production sites and pipelines, which is seen as perhaps the fastest, simplest and cheapest way to slash greenhouse gas emissions.

During the 2021 COP26 global climate meeting in Glasgow, Turkmenistan’s president Serdar Berdimukhammedov pledged that his country would introduce modern technologies to tackle methane leaks. He later adopted a roadmap to implement these actions.

Local environmentalists in Turkmenistan who spoke on a condition of anonymity are sceptical about the commitment of the Turkmenistan leadership to reducing methane leaks.

At the same time, Beijing’s reliance on Turkmenistan for natural gas is increasing, as the world’s second-largest economy seeks new energy sources to fuel its development ambitions. While Chinese newspapers and research institutions have acknowledged the severity of the gas leaks in Turkmenistan, the government has yet to publicly address the issue in negotiations. Last year in May, Chinese leader Xi Jinping unveiled a grand strategy to coordinate Central Asia's development. In addition to infrastructure and trade, Xi said that the construction of a fourth natural gas pipeline should be accelerated.

The push to secure stable and substantial natural gas supplies from Turkmenistan is a critical step in China's energy transition strategy, as China pivots away from coal to cleaner energy sources to meet its ambitious climate goals.

In 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping committed to reaching net zero in greenhouse gas emissions by 2060. Since then, China has expanded its solar and wind energy capacities, as well as nuclear and hydroelectric power. Aside from the push into renewable sources, China is phasing out the construction of coal-fired power plants and filling energy demands with natural gas, which serves as a more immediate, albeit transitional, lower-carbon alternative. China’s National Development and Reform Commission, the agency responsible for the country’s macroeconomic plans, has pledged to boost the use of natural gas to 7 percent of total primary energy consumption by 2030. In August, Chinese leader Xi Jinping called to enhance the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Turkmenistan, a sign of Turkmenistan’s crucial role in helping China achieve its own environmental objectives.

China’s energy transition has begun and is driving a major expansion of solar and wind energy, along with nuclear power and hydroelectricity plants. However coal use in China is still growing, and any serious progress toward net zero will require it to stop building coal-fired power plants and replace them in many cases with natural gas plants or green energy alternatives.

Replacing coal with natural gas is one of the ways China is striving to meet its climate commitments, but to the extent this gas comes from Turkmenistan, the climate benefit is highly questionable.

Global Climate Justice Fellowship – Global Voices

China's impact on the Rogun Dam Project in Tajikistan

China's expanding role in Central Asia

Chinese investment in the Rogun Dam Project

Environmental and social implications