Glade Taulu, the confluence of the Sofia and Psysh rivers. Arkhyz, Karachay-Cherkessia, Western Caucasus, Russia. Image by Vyacheslav Argenberg via Wikimedia commons. CC BY 4.0.

As of November 2024, in the ongoing Russian–Ukrainian war, approximately 200 people from Kabardino-Balkaria, 150 from Karachay-Cherkessia, and 200 from the Republic of Adygea, along with about 250 Chechens and 910 Dagestanis, have reportedly died, according to publicly available data. All of them hail from the North Caucasus region of Russia, the most “Muslim” part of the country. To what extent these figures may underestimate the actual numbers is unknown.

The proportion of people conscripted into the war from the North Caucasus appears disproportionate. The mortality rate — the number of deaths per 10,000 men aged 16 to 61 — is 8 in Kabardino-Balkaria, 11 in Karachay-Cherkessia, and 14 in Adygea. For comparison, this figure is 2 in Moscow and 4 in Saint Petersburg, even though Moscow's population is six times larger than the combined populations of these three Caucasian republics. The participation of Caucasian peoples in this war is especially contradictory, given their historical traumas — from the brutal expansion of the Russian Empire and forced deportations during the Soviet period to present-day repression by the Kremlin. While the region may appear loyal to central authority, achieving this appearance has taken the Kremlin two centuries of repression.

The North Caucasus was conquered in 1864 after a century-long Caucasian War — the longest in the history of the Russian Empire. The war ended in mass killings and the expulsion of approximately one million Circassians to the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the majority of the Circassian people live outside their historical homeland, with only a minority remaining on their indigenous land.

This event is referred to in Russian historiography as the “Circassian Muhajirism” (“Circassian Pilgrimage”). However, among Circassians outside Russia, especially in Turkey and the Middle East, it has long been called the “Circassian Genocide” (“The Tlapserykh” or “Tsitsekun”). As of 2024, only Georgia officially recognizes the mass deportation of Circassians as genocide. Similar recognition is now being considered by Ukraine: in June 2024, reports emerged that Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada would consider a resolution to recognize the genocide of Circassians during the Caucasian War of 1763–1864 by the Russian Empire. However, the project of “Ukrainian irredentism,” which aims to claim not only the annexed Crimea and the so-called DPR/LPR but also the Kuban region as historically Ukrainian, has a complicated relationship with the Circassian national project, as both lay claim to the same indigenous lands.

Global Voices spoke with renowned journalist and human rights activist Murat Temirov, an ethnic Circassian from Russia, about how Circassians maintain connections despite being scattered across the world, whether there is a unified Circassian national movement, and what its goals are. Journalist Alexandra Sharopina contributed to the interview's edits. 

Global Voices (GV): Can Circassians maintain national unity despite being scattered across the globe?

Murat Temirov (MT): Yes, a certain connection is maintained, though not necessarily unity.  This connection among Circassians is preserved not only through language, norms of behavior, and traditional clothing but also through a shared tragedy.

The mass deportation, essentially genocide, carried out by the Russian Empire against the Circassians in the 18th and 19th centuries — when Circassians were expelled from their native lands and replaced with loyal populations — serves as a point of consolidation for Circassian identity.

Any Circassian in the world, from Australia to Canada, will tell this story in more or less detail.

The shared identity of the Circassians persists, in part, due to this tragedy. However, I believe it is not entirely beneficial that this tragedy anchors their collective focus in the past. A healthy community should aim toward something more, toward achieving victory.

GV: Is there a unified Circassian movement in the diaspora? Are its goals focused on repatriation and reclaiming indigenous status?

MT: No, there is no unified movement. There are fragmented organizations, often based on regional or local associations. In Turkey, for instance, there are numerous influential organizations like Kafkas Vakfı and Çerkes Vakfı. They are influential but largely avoid engaging in current political matters.

There have been attempts to create a unified pan-Adyghe movement. Three years ago, I proposed holding a Unified Circassian Congress in Belgrade. We began preparations but did not complete them.

From my perspective, creating a unified Circassian movement under current circumstances is impossible. I once had the idea of establishing a Circassian Analytical Center to regularly provide these fragmented organizations with materials and recommendations on key issues involving actors like Ukraine, the United States, and the United Kingdom. This analytical center would have been the first step toward a Circassian movement because analysis must precede action. However, this idea has not yet garnered support or been realized.

The right of Circassians to return to their native lands will only be possible with recognized statehood. There are certainly ideas for restoring statehood, but their realization would only be feasible in the context of a global war, requiring military force — which does not currently exist.

GV: Is it true that the Circassian national project conflicts not only with Russia's neo-imperial ambitions but also with the radical Ukrainian nationalist project, which claims Kuban as solely Ukrainian land, excluding Circassians?

MT: Yes, that is true.  On Circassian lands, those we now call Ukrainians appeared relatively late, just over 200 years ago. These events are well-documented in Russian and non-Russian historical sources.

The so-called Kuban Ukrainians are natural competitors for us. They seized our lands and consider them theirs, with Zelenskyy almost declaring them exclusively Ukrainian. I personally see them as no less dangerous rivals than the Russians.

Yes, this is a global redivision, a world war; it is inevitable, and it is unclear who else will lay claim to our land. However, the fact that we were expelled gives us the right to this land because such a crime has no statute of limitations, and sooner or later, there will be accountability. If not the current perpetrators, then their descendants.

GV: What is your position regarding the Ukrainian Rada's proposal to recognize the Circassian genocide, considering the issues we have discussed?

MT: Yes, I’ve heard this news. It is not yet clear in what form this recognition will come — as a law? I’m not sure Ukraine is prepared to take such a large-scale step, so I believe it will likely be a declaration similar to the one adopted by the Georgian Parliament, without legal consequences.

I, of course, welcome this step by the Ukrainian authorities but do not expect it to bring significant improvements for Circassians in their efforts to reunite on their homeland.

On the contrary, I fear that this move might stigmatize Circassians within Russia, portraying them as collaborators with the enemy. Both Georgia and Russia tend to remember the Circassians when they are in a difficult position. For Georgia, this happened after their defeat in the 2008 war with Russia.
Such declarations often have internal political motivations and are only distantly related to the Circassians themselves.